



Policy Goals

1. Setting clear expectations for teachers

Expectations for students' learning exist, but low working time requirements may limit teachers' ability to fulfill both teaching and non-teaching tasks effectively.

Status

Advanced



2. Attracting the best into teaching

Teacher pay is competitive, but the salary schedule could be broadened to attract teachers to work in hard-to-staff areas and teach critical shortage subjects.

Emerging



3. Preparing teachers with useful training and experience

There are no accreditation rules in place for pre-service training providers, and induction programs are not offered to beginning teachers.

Emerging



4. Matching teachers' skills with students' needs

There are untapped incentives to get teachers to work in hard-to-staff areas and to teach critical-shortage subjects.

Emerging



5. Leading teachers with strong principals

Selection criteria are vaguely defined and principals' leadership role is administrative.

Emerging



6. Monitoring teaching and learning

There are no national student learning assessments at the primary level, but data management systems do include information on teacher performance.

Established



7. Supporting teachers to improve instruction

Some data are directed toward improving instruction, but there are no requirements for the amount of time allocated to professional development.

Emerging



8. Motivating teachers to perform

Few behavior-related accountability mechanisms exist, and performance incentives and sanctions are weak.

Emerging




Education System at a Glance

Yemen is a low-income country with a young and growing secondary education population; female students exhibit lower enrollment rates, and the teaching force is largely male, especially in leadership positions.

In 2008, Yemen spent 5.2 percent of GDP on public education.¹ In the early years of the decade (2001), Yemen was devoting 9.6 percent of GDP for public education provision. In 2008, Yemen spent 16 percent of total government expenditure on education. In 2000, this figure was double, at 32.8 percent.

Yemen’s education system consists of Basic Education from grades 1 to 9 (ages 6-14/15) and Secondary Education from grades 10 to 12 (ages 14/15-18).

Figure 1. Number and share of public school teachers by level and location




Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010.

More than half of Yemen’s multi-donor Trust Fund (TF) allocations (US\$ 58 million) are directed to multi-donor

¹ World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 2010.

TFs in education (basic education and the Education For All Fast-Track Initiative).² Enrollment in primary education increased from 3 million in 1996 to 4.3 million in 2007. The challenge in the sector is to continue to absorb a rapidly growing school-age population while improving the quality and relevance of education. Moreover, it is important to continue to increase enrolment rates in basic education (currently at about 74 percent), especially among girls and young women, and to reform curricula, further develop teacher training, and strengthen quality management.


Figure 2. Number and share of public school students by level and location



Source: World Bank, SABER –Teachers 2010.

Around 5.9 percent of teachers are employed in the private sector and around 3.6 percent of students attend private schools.

Figure 3. Number and share of private school teachers by level and location



Source: World Bank, SABER –Teachers.

² World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy FY10-13.

Yemen should pay close attention to equity, particularly gender disparities. Despite progress over the last years, in 2008, gender parity in education remains low (0.66 for basic, 0.45 for secondary) and youth female literacy (ages 15-24) stands at only 70 percent (as compared to 95 percent for males). Gender parity in basic education has slightly improved, with the share of girls in basic education rising from 40.5 percent in the 2004-2005 school year to 41.8 percent in August 2008.³ Deep-rooted traditions also constrain the ability of women to engage in the broad labor force, which potentially undermines the utility of female education. Overall, a World Economic Forum report on gender issues (“Global Gender Gap 2010”) ranked Yemen the lowest of 134 countries.⁴

Reforms have increased access, equity and quality of education. Over the past 5 years, noteworthy reforms in basic education have included the abolition of school fees, improvements in annual work planning, contracting of female teachers in remote parts of the country, tying of teacher posts to the school rather than to the individual, reductions in teacher absenteeism, and capacity-building at all levels of education service delivery. Conditional cash transfers and capitation grants have also been introduced. The Cabinet approved a Secondary Education Strategy in 2007.


The majority of teachers is in the 30- to 39-year-old age bracket and is male, and leadership positions are primarily filled by men. Around 71 percent of public school teachers are male. In the private sector, however, only around 22 percent of teachers are male. Further, 92.1 percent of principals are male.

Figure 4. Levels of decision-making authority

	Hiring or Firing	Distributing	Evaluating
Ministry of Education	✓	✓	✓
Sub-national Education Authority	✓	✓	✓
Local Education Authority	✓	✓	
School	✓	✓	

Source: World Bank, SABER-Teachers 2010.

Figure 5. Distribution of public school teachers by age and gender



Source: World Bank, SABER-Teachers 2010.

The Ministry of Education (MoE) sets policies, and implementation is carried out by the sub-national (Governorate) and local (District) levels together with as Local Councils (Municipalities). All teachers can join the 2 national teacher organizations. Collective bargaining and strike action are legal, but permission must first be sought to render a strike legal.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ <http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-gender-gap>.

Goal 1: Setting clear expectations for teachers

Advanced ●●●●

Expectations for students’ learning exist, though low working time requirements may limit teachers’ effective fulfillment of both teaching and non-teaching tasks.

National curriculum and student standards exist. The MoE is responsible for designing a national curriculum, which sets the contents in detail, informing teachers of required subject content that should be taught to students at different grades. The Ministry is also tasked with setting standards for what students must know and be able to do at each grade level.


Teachers are guided by performance goals; while teachers’ tasks are defined, no time management requirements have been established for effective completion of these tasks. Teachers’ tasks are guided by performance goals. In determining the content of teachers’ tasks, the Ministry has outlined that teachers are responsible for: teaching, grading assignments, supervising students, integrating difficult students, mentoring fellow staff members, standing in for absent teachers, carrying out administrative functions and collaborating on the school plan. However, the Ministry has not set specific time requirements for the amount of hours that teachers are expected to devote to non-teaching tasks such as lesson-planning and grading.

The required number of school hours is well below that of top-performing systems. The MoE determines teachers’ working time thereby providing protection to teachers from arbitrary time management decisions at the school level. The school year consists of 729.6 hours (192 days) in school at the primary level and 864 hours in school at the secondary level respectively. This number of school hours at both primary and secondary levels required of students falls short of that in high-performing systems (1200 hours). It is therefore unclear whether teachers have adequate time to meet expectations for student learning.

The definition of teachers’ working time should be broadened to ensure that work completed outside of school is accounted for. A statutory definition of working time exists, acting as a common understanding of how teachers’ tasks are determined and remunerated. This definition refers to the number of hours spent at school. While this definition includes more than the number of teaching hours, it is limited by not recognizing that lesson planning and grading may take place both outside of classroom teaching and potentially in a teacher’s home after the end of the school day. Mindful of underestimating teachers’ working time, Yemen might consider expanding this definition to ensure that working time accounts fully for the number of overall working hours. This would recognize the additional hours that teachers may need to put in outside school time to achieve high levels of student learning.

Total annual working time is well below that of high-performing systems. The total amount of working time to devote to teaching is 672 hours for basic education teachers (21 hours per week) and 576 hours for secondary school teachers (18 hours per week). Data are not available to determine the number of hours dedicated to lesson-planning and grading. Generally, in high-performing systems, teachers are expected to work 1520 hours annually, with a range from 1265 hours in the United Kingdom to 1960 hours in Japan (Figure 6), and devote to 60 percent or less to teaching time to ensure that teachers can give sufficient working time to lesson-planning and grading.

Figure 6. Total Working Time of Teachers



Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance 2009 for Japan, New Zealand, Denmark, Netherlands, South Korea and United Kingdom; World Bank, SABER-Teachers 2010 for Egypt, Chile, Jordan, Djibouti, Lebanon, Yemen and West Bank & Gaza.

Goal 2: Attracting the best into teaching

Emerging ●●○○

Teacher pay is competitive, but the salary schedule could be broadened to attract teachers to work in hard-to-staff areas and teach critical shortage subjects.

The MoE sets requirements to enter teaching, but a non-trivial proportion of teachers do not meet them. A Bachelor's degree in Education is required for both primary and secondary school teachers. Around 13 percent of teachers hold neither a university degree nor a diploma from the Teachers Institutes, and are considered unqualified by the MoE. Only about 40 percent of teachers hold a bachelor's degree.


A process screens applicants to initial teacher education programs. Applicants to teacher education programs must meet the university providers' selection criteria, which include: (i) having obtained the high school certificate with a pass rate of 70 percent and above; and (ii) achieving the entering class's required pass rate. The pass rate of 80 percent for the incoming class of 2008-09 to education programs was also required of candidates to English language, engineering and computer science programs. Only the pass rate to enter medicine was higher – at 85 percent – while the faculties of Shariah and law, business, information communication & technologies, and applied sciences required a lower passing grade (75 percent), as did the faculties of arts and physical education (70 percent). In 2009, 91 percent of applicants were admitted into teacher education programs. Both primary and secondary school teachers can enter concurrent training programs (where subject matter knowledge and pedagogical skills can be acquired simultaneously). Yemen might consider increasing alternative models of pre-service training to ensure that a large, diverse pool of potential teachers may be attracted into the profession.

Pay and benefits are generous; but a salary scale based on years of service alone might deter high-performing applicants. 97 percent of teachers are employed as civil servants. Starting salaries are extremely competitive by world standards and are equivalent to 156.4 percent of the country's GDP per capita – substantially more than most high-performing systems, where average teacher pay is around 82-119 percent of their GDP per capita (OCED, TALIS 2009). Compensation packages incorporate several benefits including sick leave, retirement pay, pensions and work allowances. Work allowances are provided for all civil servants in health and education ministries, but provision health benefits are not included. Salaries rise moderately over a career, and after 15 years a teacher with the minimum qualification (secondary school education) can expect to earn around 1.5 times his/her starting salary. **Figure 7** shows that high-performing and rapidly improving systems pay their teachers with 15 years of service between 1.15 and 1.77 times the starting salary. In Yemen, it currently takes a beginning teacher 35 years to reach the top of the salary schedule. The absence of performance-related pay is concerning because this could deter results-driven individuals from entering into the profession. While the salary schedule or monetary bonuses are not directed to attract teachers to work in hard-to-staff schools or to teach critical shortage subjects, there are some monetary awards given to teachers who take up positions in rural areas.

MoE is tasked with monitoring infrastructure, hygiene, and sanitation standards of public schools; however, 8.2 percent of schools fail to comply with such standards. Average student-teacher ratios in public schools are 28.

Teachers can apply to become principals and horizontal promotions exist. Sub-national authorities have the ultimate say on promotions of teachers to leadership posts, such as lead/master teachers. However, these promotions do not necessarily come with additional salary benefits.

Figure 7. Teachers' salary increases after 15 years, selected systems



Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance 2010 for South Korea, New Zealand, Finland, Italy and Hungary. World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, West Bank and Gaza, Tunisia and Chile. Note 1: for South Korea, New Zealand, Finland, Italy and Hungary, the figures are for primary school teachers.

Goal 3: Preparing teachers with useful training and experience

Emerging ●●○○

There are no accreditation rules in place for pre-service training providers, and induction programs are not offered to beginning teachers.

The Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MoHESR) is responsible for regulating pre-service training institutions. The Ministry's mandate should give it the ability to ensure that pre-service teacher training institutions operate well and ensure that once students have finished training, they are suitably prepared to preside over their own classroom. However, the Ministry has not established an accreditation process to ensure that institutions abide by an acceptable standard of teacher training quality. An accreditation process can be useful to provide information to potential teachers and employers about the quality of teacher training institutions.

To further examine the possibility setting up an accreditation system, in May 2010, a Higher Council for Accreditation and Quality Assurance was set up under the MoHESR.

Box 1. A review of teacher training programs

A summary of teacher training programs

- Teacher training programs for primary education teachers
 - ✓ The urban 3 year teacher training institutes, post basic diploma (grades 10-12);
 - ✓ The rural 5 year teacher training institutes, post primary diploma (grades 7-11);
 - ✓ The 2 Year Post-Secondary Diploma (PSD). Primary education teachers with post-primary and/or basic diplomas are able to study for qualification programs and receive a PSD.
- In 2000, aspects of these pre-service training programs were molded into in-service training programs and came under the responsibility of the Deputy Minister of the Training Sector within the Ministry of Education.
- The 4 year university program began in 1971-72 to prepare secondary school teachers. This was expanded after 1986 and in subsequent years and now there are 30 Faculties of Education.

Teachers receive focused training in a subject discipline. In Yemen, all teacher trainees must attend a School of Education.


Primary and secondary school teacher trainees specialize in one subject discipline. Around 70 percent of credit hours are devoted to subject discipline and the remainder to pedagogy theory and methods. This is positive, as teacher's knowledge of the subject they teach has been found to correlate with teacher effectiveness.

Classroom experience is a prerequisite before new teachers can preside over their own classes, but more time could be devoted to practical experience. Entering teachers are required to complete 3-6 months of practical experience as part of their training. This falls significantly below that of top-performing systems, where classroom experience requirements include at least 1 year. Given that the initial years in the teaching

profession can impact long-term effectiveness, Yemen might look into whether practical experience time requirements are aligned with preparing teachers well.

Induction programs are not offered. New teachers in Yemen do not participate in any induction program that could help them to smooth their transition from training to work. Yemen may consider introducing an induction program, as most high-performing systems have.

Figure 8. Length of induction programs, selected systems



Sources: OECD, 2009 Creating Effective Teaching and Learning Environments: First Results from TALIS for Japan and the United Kingdom; SABER – Teachers 2010 for Chile, Djibouti, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank & Gaza and Egypt.

Goal 4: Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs

Emerging ●●○○

There are untapped incentives to get teachers to work in hard-to-staff areas and to teach critical shortage subjects.

Teachers are not provided with monetary bonus incentives to take up posts in hard-to-staff schools. While teachers can be offered to work in rural areas on the periphery of cities, there are not hard-to-staff incentives in place to attract them to these areas. In many countries, insufficient incentives for teachers to work in hard-to-staff schools results in the least qualified teachers teaching in schools that serve the most disadvantaged students; this contributes to further inequality in teaching quality and learning outcomes.

Using the criterion of teachers’ years of experience in the profession as a basis for approving transfer requests may be increasing inequities, exacerbating hard-to-staff schools’ recruitment problems. In Yemen, the number of years of teaching experience determines whether a teacher is able to transfer from one school to another. In some education systems, using years of teaching experience to grant transfer requests has had undesired effects: when teachers gain greater experience and potentially reach a point where they can understand more deeply the diverse needs of students, they are allowed to transfer to better-performing schools (which usually offer better working conditions and serve more socio-economically advantaged students). This could deny disadvantaged areas access to experienced teachers, leaving the least knowledgeable and potentially the least effective teachers in hard-to-staff schools and possibly increasing turnover rates.

There are identified critical shortage subjects, but there are no incentives for teachers to teach them. Ensuring that there are skilled teachers in every subject area is a challenge faced by most education systems. Yemen has taken steps to identify a set of critical shortage subjects (mathematics, English language and physics), which could potentially facilitate planning for increased recruitment in these disciplines. Yemen’s policies are more closely aligned with those of Jordan – by identifying critical shortage subjects – than those of Lebanon or Egypt, where such subjects are not identified. This increased foresight is commendable; even in top-performing systems, principals report difficulties in recruiting for certain disciplines. Unfortunately, however, there are no incentives for teachers to actually take up teaching posts in these subjects. Yemen might wish to look into whether shortages in subjects that potentially offer more competitive job market opportunities can be addressed through monetary and non-monetary incentives to entice qualified individuals considering other professions to choose to enter teaching. To attract mid-career professionals from other fields, Yemen might consider establishing more flexible routes into teaching such as abridged courses for experienced professionals.

Figure 9. Incentives for teachers to take up posts in certain geographic locations and hard-to-staff areas

Monetary incentives offered	No monetary incentives offered
OECD countries	OECD countries
Australia	Belgium
Chile	Denmark
Finland	Netherlands
Ireland	Switzerland
Japan	Non-OECD countries
New Zealand	Lebanon
South Korea	Yemen
Sweden	
Non-OECD countries	
Egypt	

Source: OECD, Teachers Matter 2005; World Bank, SABER-Teachers 2010.

Goal 5: Leading teachers with strong principals

Emerging ●●○○

Principals’ selection criteria are vaguely defined and their leadership role is administrative.

While requirements to become a principal exist, they are loosely defined. Setting requirements for principal positions is important because they influence the type of candidate that will apply for this role. In Yemen, according to regulations set by the MoE, principals must hold a tertiary education degree and have both teaching and administrative experience. However, the School Regulations do not provide any time specifications for experience. Yemen might look into introducing other selection criteria to rigorously assess the skills of principal applicants, such as: performance in previous positions; completion of a training course specifically designed to prepare would-be principals; and on hiring, completion of an induction/mentoring program.


Principals could play a stronger leadership role in guiding teachers to improve instruction. The job profile of a principal includes having some say over the distribution of time during the school day, managing the

school budget, responding to information requests from local education authorities, and representing the school. However, principal’s official duties do not explicitly encompass providing instructional guidance to teachers.

Principals must participate in performance evaluations, and their pay is competitive relative to high-performing systems. Local education authorities conduct regular evaluations of principals’ performance. Principal pay is very competitive—principals can expect to earn 234 percent of the GDP per capita similar to top performing systems (which pay school principals more than 100 percent of their GDP per capita). However, the same salary schedule is applied to both principals and teachers. Yemen might wish to consider whether the types of candidates it attracts to principal positions differ considerably from regular teachers. Further, principals do not receive monetary rewards based on performance. Yemen would be advised to look into how performance-related pay could act as an incentive to motivate principals, especially as their role is integral in instructional leadership.

Principals can make few decisions to improve teaching even though they have a role in evaluating teacher performance. Because principals are often the closest observers and sole evaluators of individual teachers’ work, it is desirable to have them exert some decision-making authority over staffing decisions (e.g., selecting teachers; determining teacher pay and influencing teacher promotions). In Yemen, principals have a limited role in selecting substitute teachers. Principals administer the annual internal teacher evaluations, and may have a small say in determining follow-up actions to teacher evaluations. Overall, the role that principals play appears to be primarily administrative. Yemen may consider expanding the decision-making authority of principals; in most high-performing countries, principals have some say in key areas related to teacher hiring, promotion, and dismissal. A growing body of evidence shows that principals, when allowed to carry out these functions, apply sound judgment.

Figure 10. Principals’ decision-making role in hiring and firing, selected systems



Source: OECD, 2008 – PISA 2006 for Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovenia, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States; World Bank, SABEO-Teachers 2010 for Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan Lebanon, West Bank & Gaza and Yemen

Goal 6: Monitoring teaching and learning

Established ●●●○

There are no national student learning assessments at the primary level, and data management systems do not include information on teacher performance.

There are insufficient standardized national student performance data available to guide policy, largely because there are few student learning assessments. National student achievement data is obtained through two secondary school tests: the General Secondary Schools Examinations administered at the national level annually to all school-leavers at grade 12 and the annual sub-national Basic Education Examinations assessment administered to all students at grade 9. In these assessments, it is not possible to match student scores with individual teachers

Individual teachers and schools carry out their own student evaluations. Based on their performance in teacher- or school-developed tests, students receive certificates, enabling them to proceed to the next grade. While teacher-designed and directed assessments can complement national assessments, standardized assessments are necessary to allow system to assess levels of student achievement among different students and schools.

Yemen participated in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) in 2003 and 2007, but only 4th grade students were assessed. Continuous participation in TIMSS and potentially other international assessments, as well as extending TIMSS participation to cover 8th-grade students, can give Yemen the opportunity to see how its students’ achievement levels measure up with those of high performing systems across the world. Yemen is due to take part in TIMSS in 2011.

Optional teacher evaluations are conducted regularly, but they do not consider progress in student learning.

The MoE, sub-national, and local authorities are responsible for evaluating teacher performance. However, the school (through the principal and the local educational authority) is responsible for conducting the annual evaluations. It is a concern that these evaluations do not require participation by all teachers. For both internal performance evaluations, each teacher’s appraisal is informed by the principal’s individual assessment and classroom observation, with student views being optionally consulted and feedback from parents and colleagues not considered. The evaluations are based on several criteria, including: teacher attendance, student academic performance, compliance with the curriculum, teaching processes, methods used to assess students, and student participation in the classroom. The teacher’s knowledge of the subject matter he/she teaches is only an optional consideration. Assessing the teacher on his/her use of homework assignments in the classroom is also optional. Student learning outcomes are not considered.

Currently, data are not available to provide an indication on how many teachers fail their evaluations.

The limited data management systems may limit the effectiveness of these evaluations, as comparisons cannot be drawn between the performance of teachers at different schools and across time. Identification mechanisms that facilitate tracking teachers over time should facilitate teacher management, enabling policy decisions to be made through reasoned justification, based on data collected.

Box 2. Reforms underway

The Ministry of Education is trying to strengthen data collection, reporting, and verification. An Accounting and Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) was deployed in 4 central ministries – including education. A lack of credible population data and the use of several inconsistent data collection methods resulted in inflated educational data from 1999-2004, which led to inflated targets for the education system.

Figure 11. Sources used in teacher performance evaluations, selected systems

	Students' achievement	Teaching processes	Parents' feedback	Students' feedback	Colleagues' feedback
OECD systems					
Australia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Belgium	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Chile	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Denmark	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ireland	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mexico	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗
South Korea	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Non-OECD systems					
Djibouti	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗
Egypt	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗
Jordan	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗
Lebanon	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗
West Bank & Gaza	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗
Yemen	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗

Source: OECD, TALIS 2010 for Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and South Korea; World Bank, SABER –Teachers 2010 for Chile, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan Lebanon, Mexico, West Bank & Gaza and Yemen.

Goal 7: Supporting teachers to improve instructions

Emerging ●●○○


Some data are directed toward improving instruction, but there are no requirements for the amount of time allocated to professional development.

Teacher performance data from evaluations are used to develop instructional practices, but opportunities exist to use the data to support teachers in further ways. All professionals can constantly improve, and teachers are no exception. In Yemen, the results of internal evaluations are used to inform teachers on how they can develop their instructional practices. Results could be utilized to support teachers in other ways -- for instance, through the allocation of professional development opportunities and supervisor support. Professional development might enable teachers to develop their skills throughout their careers. Similarly, offering low-performing teachers the support of experienced teacher-mentors has been shown to contribute to teacher effectiveness in other countries. This is an option that Yemen may consider to strengthen teaching quality.

While teachers are not required to finance their own professional development, their participation in such activities is not mandatory. The MoE is responsible for overseeing and funding the provision of professional development, and international donors play a financing role. However, it is not mandatory for teachers to participate, and there are no official time specifications that teachers should devote to professional development. In high-performing systems, required days of professional development range from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 28 days per year. As teachers in Yemen are not required to take part in professional development, they might be prioritizing their immediate work agenda and not realizing the potential benefits from professional development. Similarly, as principals do not have to ensure that their teachers comply with time requirements, they may not be allocating adequate hours for professional development.

Professional development is reasonably varied and covers aspects related to teaching as well as qualification programs – aligning with recent teacher entry reforms. For teachers who do take part in professional development, different types of professional development activities are offered, including traditional activities such as workshops, conferences and seminars. Observation visits to other schools, participation in teacher networks, and mentoring programs are not offered. Importantly, on offer are two other forms of professional development that are proving effective in other education systems – participation in a school network and qualification programs. Qualification programs have proved useful for teachers seeking to upgrade their 2-year Post-Secondary Diplomas. Primary education teachers with post-primary and/or basic diplomas are able to study for qualification programs while working. This is because over the last 10 years the MoE has expressed the goal of hiring only teachers who have graduated from Faculties of Education. Although the current regulation is that teachers need to hold a university degree, the MoE is still allocating a considerable proportion of the posts to diploma holders and to general secondary graduates, to ensure that there are sufficient female teachers, to meet staffing needs to teach at grades 1-6, and to recruit enough teachers to rural and hard-to-staff areas. For example, in 2005 about 35 percent of the posts were allocated to diploma and graduates of secondary education. Overall, the content of professional development activities is broad, covering not only support in carrying out administrative tasks but also aspects related to teaching, such as subject matter knowledge, teaching the curriculum, classroom management, instructional practices, and teacher competencies.

Figure 12. Number of required days of professional development, selected systems



Sources: OECD, Creating Effective Teaching and Learning Environments: First Results from TALIS 2009 for Netherlands, Mexico, Sweden, South Korea, Brazil, Slovenia, United States and Australia; World Bank, TPAW 2010 for Egypt, Djibouti and West Bank & Gaza. Notes: (1) The number of required days was calculated by dividing the total number of annual hours by number of daily working hours; (2) These figures refer only to secondary school teachers.

Goal 8: Motivating teachers to perform

Emerging ●●○○

Few behavior-related accountability mechanisms exist, and performance incentives and sanctions are weak.

Teachers do not have to fulfill continuing requirements to remain in the profession. Yemen does not have in place requirements (such as participating regularly and successfully in professional development and performance evaluations) for teachers that must be fulfilled on a continuing basis. In high-performing systems, requirements are used to signal to all teachers that continuous learning and skills upgrading is important for teacher effectiveness and to provide education leaders with opportunities to dismiss the least effective teachers.

There are legal procedures to safeguard vulnerable students and ensure that teachers who engage in child abuse can be dismissed. Teachers can face dismissal on the grounds of misconduct and unauthorized absenteeism. The procedure for censuring absenteeism requires the school to report a teacher’s absence and the Governorate Office of Education (which is part of the MoE) administer the sanction. This usually results in pay being reduced for each day of unauthorized absence. According to regulations, teachers can be dismissed for absenteeism, but in practice dismissals are rare. In 2009, 0.04 percent of the teaching force was dismissed.

Teachers are offered few financial incentives or other opportunities for public recognition to reward strong performance. Performance-related pay and monetary bonuses for strong performance by individual teachers or by schools are not available. Yemen may look to Jordan for policy guidance – the Queen Rania Award for Excellent Teachers introduced in 2005 provides 25 high-performing teachers with monetary bonuses. Performance evaluations do not result in promotion opportunities. The only way effective teachers are differentiated is through public acknowledgement of their achievement. Given the restricted set of incentives offered, it is important for Yemen to explore alternatives to motivate strong teacher performance.

Yemen has put in place a probationary period prior to awarding open-ended status to new teachers. This is positive, especially as the first years of teaching are among the best available predictors of a teacher’s performance later on in the career. However, while qualifications are considered, performance evaluations to determine the granting of open-ended status are not mandatory. Further, the vast majority of public school teachers are employed as tenured civil servants (only 0.08 percent of the teaching force is employed under contract), presumably making employment termination later on very challenging. In 2009, 5000 new teachers were hired, all under open-ended appointments. Once a teacher has an open-ended appointment, weak results in the performance evaluation process may not be used to dismiss ineffective teachers. Yemen should look into designing policies that enable the sub-national educational authorities, who have ultimate responsibility for this task, to remove chronically low-

performing teachers. (The private sector, where all 12,055 teachers are contractual employees, may provide lessons.) The benefits of doing so are twofold: first, such mechanisms protect students from the detrimental and lasting effects of having poor teachers; and second, they can give underperforming teachers a clear incentive to work hard in order to avoid removal. Research has shown that removing a minority of low-performing teachers can considerably improve student achievement.

Figure 13. Regulations for teacher dismissal and probationary periods

	Dismiss teachers for under performance	Mandatory probationary period before tenure
OECD systems		
Australia	✓	✓
Belgium	✓	✓
Chile	✓	✗
Japan	✗	✓
South Korea	✗	✗
Non-OECD systems		
Djibouti	✗	✓
Egypt	✓	✓
Jordan	✗	✓
Lebanon	✗	✗
West Bank & Gaza	✓	✓
Yemen	✗	✓

Sources: OECD, TALIS 2010 for Australia, Belgium, Japan and South Korea; World Bank, SABER-Teachers 2010 for Chile, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan Lebanon, West Bank & Gaza and Yemen.

Acknowledgements

This report was prepared in 2011 by the SABER-Teachers Team, which included Lisa Kaufman, Nicole Goldstein, and Alejandro Ganimian and was led by Emiliana Vegas (Lead Economist, HDNED). The report also benefited from the collaboration of Kamel Braham and Tomomi Miyajima. Information and analysis is based on the data and SABER-Teachers conceptual model used in 2010-2011.

The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative produces comparative data and knowledge on education policies and institutions, with the aim of helping countries systematically strengthen their education systems. SABER evaluates the quality of education policies against evidence-based global standards, using new diagnostic tools and detailed policy data. The SABER country reports give all parties with a stake in educational results—from administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, objective snapshot showing how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn.

This report focuses specifically on policies in the area of teacher policy.

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