



Policy Goals

1. Setting clear expectations for teachers

Expectations for students and teachers are clear; however, schooling hours for students are lower than those of high-performing systems, and the statutory definition of working time is limited to classroom teaching.

Status

Established



2. Attracting the best into teaching

Around 12 percent of the teaching force is unable to meet the profession's minimum requirements; the introduction of flexible entry routes may open up the teaching profession to a wider pool of candidates.

Established



3. Preparing teachers with useful training and experience

The balance between subject matter and pedagogy during training for secondary school teachers may be reviewed; required time allocations for classroom experience during training are below those of high-performing systems.

Established



4. Matching teachers' skills with students' needs

While monetary bonuses are offered to teachers who take up posts in hard-to-staff schools, there are no subject areas identified as facing a shortage of skilled teachers.

Latent



5. Leading teachers with strong principals

Performance-related pay for principals is absent; principals are able to make few decisions related to staffing in schools.

Established



6. Monitoring teaching and learning

Sufficient student achievement data to inform teaching are available; internally led teacher evaluations are carried out regularly.

Established



7. Supporting teachers to improve instruction

Weak teachers have the opportunity of being supported through a supervisor and mandatory professional development is broad ranging and includes a variety of different styles of active learning techniques.

Advanced



8. Motivating teachers to perform

Mechanisms exist to hold teachers accountable and performance-related incentives are offered; however, data on teacher dismissals are not available.


Emerging



Education System at a Glance


A total of 1,995,167 students (around 96.2% of total enrollment) attend public schools in Tunisia. The public school student population is concentrated almost evenly between the primary (50.6%) and secondary levels (49.4%), and 82.6% of the total number of students attend schools in urban areas. Around 3.9% of enrolled students attend private schools (all of which are private, government-independent schools). All private schools are located in urban areas, principally serving secondary school students.

Figure 1. Number and share of public school students by level and location



Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011.

Figure 2: Number and share of private school students, (all located in urban areas)



Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011.

Public investment in Basic Education

Tunisia is a lower middle income country, with a GDP per capita of \$3,720 (current US\$). Table 1 presents the

main indicators of public education expenditure in Tunisia.

Table 1. Key public education spending indicators

| Education expenditure | 2007 | 1999-2000 |
|--|------|-----------|
| Public education spending as a share of GDP (%) | 7.2 | 6.9 |
| Public spending on education as a share of government expenditure (%) | 22.4 | 17.4 |
| Primary education spending | | |
| Total public expenditure on educational institutions and administration (% of GDP for primary) | 2 | 2 |
| Spending per student – primary (% of GDP per capita) | 20.9 | 15.4 |
| Secondary education spending | | |
| Total public expenditure on educational institutions and administration (% of GDP for secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary) | 3 | 3 |
| Spending per student – secondary (% of GDP per capita) | 24.2 | 26.7 |

Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank Development Indicators, 2011.

Performance of Tunisia's education system

Table 2. Key indicators on system performance

| Indicator | 2008 | 2000 |
|--|------|------|
| Percentage of repeaters, female primary (% of female enrollment) | 6 | 14 |
| Percentage of repeaters, male primary (% of male enrollment) | 10 | 18 |
| Primary completion rate, female (% of relevant age group) | 93 | -- |
| Primary completion rate, male (% of relevant age group) | 93 | -- |

Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank Development Indicators, 2011.

Tunisia has participated in several international assessments of student learning: three rounds (2003, 2006 and 2009) of the OECD's Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), and three (1997, 2003 and 2007) of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).

Table 3. PISA results – average test scores and percentage of students performing at advanced and below basic levels

| | Reading | | | Mathematics | | | Science | | |
|-------------|---------------|---|--|---------------|---|--|---------------|---|--|
| | Average score | % students performing at advanced level | % students performing at below basic level | Average score | % students performing at advanced level | % students performing at below basic level | Average Score | % students performing at advanced level | % students performing at below basic level |
| 2003 | 375 | -- | 34 | 359 | -- | 51 | 385 | -- | -- |
| 2006 | 380 | -- | 31 | 365 | -- | 48 | 386 | -- | 28 |
| 2009 | 404 | -- | 6 | 371 | -- | 43 | 401 | -- | 21 |

Source: OECD (2010). PISA 2009 Results: Learning Trends - Volume V. Table V.3.2 and Table S.V.h. Paris, France: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Table 4 and 5. TIMSS Results: Test Scores and Student Performance

| | Mathematics (4 th grade) | | | Science (4 th grade) | | |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------|---|--|
| | Average score | % students performing at advanced level | % students performing at below basic level | Average Score | % students performing at advanced level | % students performing at below basic level |
| 1997 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2003 | 339 | -- | -- | 314 | -- | -- |
| 2007 | 327 | -- | 28 | 318 | -- | 32 |


| | Mathematics (8 th grade) | | | Science (8 th grade) | | |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------|---|--|
| | Average score | % students performing at advanced level | % students performing at below basic level | Average Score | % students performing at advanced level | % students performing at below basic level |
| 1997 | 448 | -- | 78 | 430 | -- | 68 |
| 2003 | 410 | -- | 55 | 404 | -- | 52 |
| 2007 | 420 | -- | 61 | 445 | -- | 77 |

Source: Mullis, I. V. S., Martin, M. O., González, E. J., Chrostowski, S. J. (2004). TIMSS 2003 International Mathematics Report. Exhibit 2.4. Boston, MA: TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center. Mullis, I. V. S., Martin, M. O., Foy, M. (2008). TIMSS 2007 International Mathematics Report. Exhibit 2.3. Boston, MA: TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center.

Size and composition of the teaching force


There are 133,671 public school teachers and 10,675 private school teachers.

Figure 3. The total number and share of teachers by sector




Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2011.

Figure 4. Number and share of private school teachers, (all located in urban areas)



Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2011

Figure 5. Number and share of public school teachers by level and location




Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011.

The private teaching sector is directed fully toward the urban student population (Figure 5). The majority (84.8%) of private school teachers are employed at the secondary level, with the remainder (around 15.2%) working at the primary level.

No data are available on the number of teachers holding types of working statuses (open-ended/fixed) and whether they are employed as full-time or part-time workers.

Figure 6. Distribution of public school teachers (secondary) by age



Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011.

Complete data are not available on the age ranges of teachers broken down by gender in the profession. At the secondary level, the data show that 57.6% are below 40 years. There are 2 national level teacher organizations with a membership of 89,000. Between 2006 and 2010, there have been around 11 strikes (4 in 2009) and 4 school days were lost over the same period (1 day in 2009).

Goal 1: Setting clear expectations for teachers

Established ●●●○

Expectations for students and teachers are clear; however, schooling hours for students are lower than in high-performing systems, and the statutory definition of working time is limited to classroom teaching.

Expectations for what students should know and be able to do are clear. Tunisia has a national curriculum


that sets out the content in detail. Standards, set by the Ministry of Education (MoE) at the national level, prescribe what students should know and be able to do at each grade level.

Expectations for what teachers are supposed to do are clear. Teachers' tasks are explicitly laid out in legal regulations set out by the MoE. Primary and secondary school teachers' tasks include teaching, lesson-planning, grading assessments, and providing extra-curricular activities. Tunisian teachers are guided by performance goals set by the General Inspectorate of Education (within the MoE), providing teachers with a focus of what they should accomplish.

Teachers may not have enough time to fulfill their duties, as annual schooling hours are shorter than in high-performing systems, and the statutory definition of "working time" is limited. The MoE is responsible for deciding on teachers' working time, thereby providing protection to teachers from arbitrary time management decisions at the school level. The school year consists of 198 days at the primary level and 180 days at the secondary level (nearly all top-performing systems have more than 180 days of school). Actual schooling hours at the primary level of 5 hours (990 hours annually) and 6 hours (1080 hours annually) at the secondary level fall below those in high-performing systems (1200 hours). Teacher working time is defined as the number of teaching hours in the classroom: 20-25 hours per week at the primary level, and 15-18 hours per week at the secondary level. Primary school teachers are organized according to 7 grade levels and the working week (defined as teaching time) varies from 25 hours for primary school teachers within the first 2 lowest grade brackets to 20 hours for those within the remaining upper 5 grade brackets and for those who have been in the profession for over 20 years. Secondary school teachers are organized under the same 7 grade levels, with weekly hours declining from 18 to 15 hours as a teacher moves up the grade levels. The statutory definition of working time (only defined as teaching time) is limited: some teacher tasks such as lesson-planning and grading take place outside of classroom teaching time, and the working time definition may not necessarily recognize clearly enough that teachers need to put in these additional hours outside of their lessons. Since Tunisian teachers hold civil-servant status, they are required to work 40 hours per week, in keeping with the civil service regulations. Annual total teachers'

working time for both primary and secondary school teachers comes to around 1680 hours (40 hours per week, 210 days per year). These working hours fall in line with high-performing systems, where average annual working hours exceed 1,500 hours. In terms of distribution of tasks per week, primary school teachers are required to devote 20 hours per week to teaching and are supposed (although not formally required) to spend 20 hours planning lessons and grading their students' work. On top of the 20 hours of mandatory teaching time, 5 out of the 7 grade levels of primary school teachers are required to devote 2.5 hours to leading weekly cultural activities or in assisting the school principal with administrative tasks. Secondary school teachers are required to devote 18 hours to teaching and are supposed to spend 22 hours divided on lesson-planning and grading (although this is not formally required). Therefore primary school teachers devote around 50% and secondary school teachers around 45%, respectively, of their total working time to teaching. This time allocation for tasks falls in line with the requirements in high-performing systems, which generally require teachers to devote around 60% of total working time to teaching.

Figure 7. Share of teaching time as a percentage of total working time (primary), selected systems



Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance 2010 for Hungary, Netherlands and South Korea; World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011 for Singapore, Tunisia, Japan, New Zealand, Jordan, Lebanon, Chile and Indonesia. For Chile, this percentage applies to both primary and secondary school teaching time allocations but for other systems, these figures are applicable to only primary school teachers. The classification of systems as (i) high-performers and top-improvers; (ii) high-performers; (iii) top-improvers is found within , World Bank (Draft Report), Identifying Successful Education Systems: Using International Student Achievement Tests: An Exercise for SABER Sub-System Work.

Goal 2: Attracting the best into teaching

Established ●●●○

Around 12% of the teaching force is unable to meet the profession's minimum requirements; flexible entry routes may open up the teaching profession to a wider pool of candidates.

Entry requirements are set up to attract talented applicants. Applicants are selected into initial teacher education programs based on the following: (i) performance in a compulsory tertiary education entrance examination to gain admission into teacher education programs; (ii) performance in a compulsory tertiary education program; and, (iii) motivation and interpersonal skills, demonstrated in an interview. Around 0.73% (2010) of applicants gains admission into teacher training programs. Overall entry into teacher education programs is highly competitive: for entry into primary school teacher education programs, approximately 100,000 applicants compete for 1,000 places; and for entry into secondary school teacher education programs, approximately 100,000 candidates compete for 2,500 places. Official requirements to become a primary school teacher include: (i) completing required coursework; (ii) achieving an ISCED 5A educational qualification – equivalent to a bachelor's degree; (iii) graduating from a tertiary education program; (iv) passing a written test; and (v) passing an interview-stage assessment. For secondary school teachers, the requirements are similar, with the additional requirement of ensuring that a teacher is a graduate from a tertiary education program specifically designed to prepare teachers. In 2010, 13.2% of primary school teachers and 10.8% secondary school teachers, respectively, were unable to meet these requirements and yet still remained in the profession. Both primary and secondary school teachers undertake consecutive education training programs (where subject matter knowledge must be acquired first and then pedagogical skills are learned). Concurrent training programs (where subject matter knowledge and pedagogical skills can be acquired simultaneously) are not available.

Pay and benefits are appealing to talented candidates.


Starting salaries for a beginning teacher with the minimum required qualifications (*maitre baccalaureate*) are very high by world standards (around 423% of GDP per capita).¹ High-performing systems pay their teachers 82%-119% of GDP per capita. Teacher compensation packages in Tunisia include: paid sick leave and healthcare benefits, and may include pension benefits. Salaries (paid on time) rise only slightly over a career: after 15 years of service, a teacher with the minimum education qualifications (*maitre baccalaureate*) can expect to earn around 1.19 times the starting salary. Most high-performing and rapidly improving systems pay their teachers between 1.31 and 1.70 times the starting salary after 15 years in the profession. It currently takes 25 years of teaching experience to reach the maximum level on the salary schedule, comprising 6 salary grades. The salary schedule is differentiated according to the geographical location of schools; while monetary bonuses are offered to teachers who take up positions in hard-to-staff schools, they are not offered for either teaching a specific subject, grade level or for teaching difficult student populations. Performance-related pay through the salary schedule and through monetary bonuses is offered to effective teachers.

Working conditions are appealing. The MoE is tasked with monitoring school infrastructure standards, but data on how many schools meet these standards are unavailable. Average student-teacher ratios are 17 in primary and 13 in secondary. These averages are lower than in many high-performing countries, but they may mask important variation across schools serving different populations.

There are attractive career opportunities. Upon the promotional decision of the MoE, teachers can take up (horizontal) leadership positions, such as head of department posts or subject area posts, and specific incentives are offered to teachers who do assume these positions. Promotions are determined by the results of performance evaluations.

¹Maitre principal (baccalaureate) earns 493% of GDP per capita; Professeur (maitrise) earns 610% of GDP per capita.

Figure 8. Teachers' salary increases after 15 years



Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance 2010 for South Korea, New Zealand, Finland, Italy and Hungary. World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011 for Singapore, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia and Chile. Note 1: for South Korea, New Zealand, Finland, Italy and Hungary, the figures are for primary school teachers. Note 2: the classification of systems as (i) high-performers and top-improvers; (ii) high-performers; (iii) top-improvers is found within , World Bank, Identifying Successful Education Systems: Using International Student Achievement Tests: An Exercise for SABER Sub-System Work. Why Is There a Need for a Way to Identify Successful Education Systems?

Goal 3: Preparing teachers with useful training and experience

Established ●●●○

The balance between subject matter and pedagogy during training for secondary school teachers needs to be reviewed; required time allocations for classroom experience during training are below those of high-performing systems.


There are minimum standards for pre-service training. The MoE is responsible for establishing and implementing the rules that govern pre-service education programs. The existence of an accreditation process is a positive characteristic because it allows institutions seeking to enter the teacher training market to be evaluated, certifying that their courses reach the system-wide standard and have the potential to train students into successful teachers. During pre-service training for primary and secondary school teachers, there are requirements and corresponding specified time allocations for pedagogic theory, teaching methods and subject matter knowledge. For primary school teachers,

time allocations for subject matter knowledge (60%) and pedagogic theory and teaching methods (40%) are well balanced. For secondary school teachers, the balance between time allocation for subject knowledge and

New teachers are required to have classroom experience, but the time allocations are below those of high-performing systems. While classroom experience is a prerequisite before teachers can preside over their own classrooms, the amount of required time is below the requirements of high-performing systems. Primary school teachers are expected to undertake 6-12 months of classroom experience, while secondary school teachers are expected to complete between 3-6 months. In most top-performing systems mandatory classroom experience consists of at least one year. Given that the initial years of teaching in the profession can impact long-term effectiveness, Tunisia may look into the extent to which the timing requirements for practical experience are aligned with preparing teachers well.

New teachers are offered a smooth transition into their first teaching job. Beginning teachers are offered an opportunity to participate in an induction program to smooth their transition from training to work or from different classroom environments. Tunisia's time allocations for induction programs of 24 months fall into line with those of high-performing systems, which typically offer induction programs of at least one year in length.

Figure 8. Length of induction programs (primary education teacher training requirements), selected systems



Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011 for Singapore, Japan, Chile, Indonesia, Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.

Goal 4: Matching teachers' skills with students' needs

Latent ●○○○

While monetary bonuses are offered to teachers who take up posts in hard-to-staff schools, there are no subject areas identified as facing a shortage of skilled teachers.

There are some incentives to draw teachers into working in hard-to-staff areas. Teachers are offered monetary bonuses to take up positions in hard-to-staff areas. Other incentives such as better chances of promotion, a higher basic salary, scholarships, and food and travel stipends, are not currently offered. Transfer requests are determined and approved based on the teacher's years of experience and, to a lesser extent, the teacher's performance (as assessed by both external evaluators and by the school authority and/or colleagues). In some education systems, using years of teaching experience to grant transfer requests has had the undesired effects of denying disadvantaged areas access to experienced teachers – leaving the least knowledgeable and potentially the least effective teachers in hard-to-staff schools and thereby possibly increasing turnover rates.

There are few incentives offered to teachers to teach subjects in which there is a low supply of highly skilled teachers. Ensuring that there are skilled teachers in every subject area represents a challenge faced by most education systems. Tunisia has not taken steps to identify a set of critical shortage subjects or a set of subjects which could be facing a low supply of highly skilled teachers. Even in top-performing systems, principals report difficulties in recruiting for certain disciplines. Given the absence of a policy that identifies subject areas in which there is a shortage of qualified teachers, there are no incentives offered to qualified professionals with expertise in these subject areas to enter teaching. Tunisia might wish to look into the extent to which there may be a shortage of qualified teachers in subject areas that offer more flexible competitive job market opportunities (e.g., physics, chemistry, mathematics), and the extent to which other professionals (e.g., in engineering and medicine) can be attracted into teaching through monetary and non-monetary incentives.

Figure 9. Incentives for teachers to take up posts in hard-to-staff schools, selected systems



Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance 2010 for Finland, Netherlands and Slovenia; World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011 for South Korea, New Zealand, Chile, Indonesia, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan.

Goal 5: Leading teachers with strong principals

Established ●●●○

Requirements to become a principal are set up to attract talented candidates.

Requirements are administered by the Ministry of Education. All principals must hold 7 years of teaching experience and be at least 30 years of age; those applying to be secondary school principals are required to hold 2 years of administrative experience. Other selection criteria include: holding the equivalent of an ISCED 5A qualification (a Master's level degree); completing specific courses/training requirements designed for aspiring principals; and performing to a satisfactory standard in a supervised internship.

Principals are not provided with strong incentives to perform well. Principals are explicitly required to provide guidance to teachers on curriculum and teaching-related tasks, which should help the teachers in their schools to improve instructional practices. It is positive that principals must be evaluated on their performance in regular evaluations, conducted by the Administrative and Financial Inspectorate, within the MoE, and sub-national authorities. Principal pay, which


is governed by a distinct salary schedule, is very high – around 633% of Tunisia’s GDP per capita. High-performing systems also pay their schools principals more than 100% of GDP per capita. Tunisian principals cannot receive monetary awards based on performance (which could act as a motivating force in this integral role of providing instructional leadership). Examples from Chile and Jordan may be useful to Tunisia. Chile offers performance-based pay to teachers and principals through individual bonuses and school-based bonuses based on a school’s performance in the externally-led performance evaluations. In Jordan, the Queen Rania Award for Excellent Principals, introduced in 2005, offers financial awards to a small number of successful principals who are selected as winners in the prestigious competition.

Principals can make few decisions to improve teaching.

They do not have any say in determining the selection of the teachers in their schools, as it is fully determined by the MoE. Further, principals do not play a significant role in removing ineffective teachers, although they can have some say in the decision. Research has shown that when given this authority, principals tend to make staffing decisions that lead to improvements in student learning outcomes. Similarly, principals do not have any decision-making authority in determining the salaries of their teachers and rewarding strong performance or in determining overtime distribution and payment.

In contrast, Tunisian principals do have full autonomy in managing the distribution of time during schooling hours and, as a corollary, teachers’ duties and responsibilities. This is positive, since there are good reasons to believe that letting principals make this decision would lead to more efficient time use. Because principals know better than external authorities the needs of their schools, it is likely that they will allocate teachers’ time better than education officials at national, sub-national or local offices. In addition, they have some input on promotional decisions affecting their teachers: principals are responsible for conducting the school-led performance evaluations and information from these are used in determining promotional opportunities (although all promotions are ultimately governed by the MoE).

Figure 11. Sources used in teacher performance evaluations, selected systems



Sources: OECD, 2008 – PISA 2006 and OECD, 2009 Creating Effective Teaching and Learning Environments: First Results from TALIS for Netherlands, New Zealand and Slovenia;; World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011 for Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Chile, Indonesia, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. Why Is There a Need for a Way to Identify Successful Education Systems?

Goal 6: Monitoring teaching and learning

Established ●●●○


Sufficient student achievement data are available to provide information on learning outcomes, and teacher evaluations are conducted regularly to access teaching performance.

There are enough student achievement data to provide information on learning outcomes. Tunisia conducts regular national assessments of student learning for three groups: (i) all 10-year-old students annually (Fourth Grade Assessment); (ii) a sample of 15-year-old students annually (Ninth Grade Assessment - *Examen pour l’obtention du diplôme de fin d’études de l’enseignement de base [DFEEB]*); (iii) all 19-year-old students (*le Baccalauréate*) annually. While 2 out of 3 of

these assessments are census-based, unfortunately students’ scores cannot be linked to individual teachers in any of these assessments and students cannot be tracked over time. Tunisia regularly participates in international student assessments (TIMSS in 1999, 2003 and 2007; and PISA in 2003, 2006 and 2009) providing policy-makers with an opportunity to compare how Tunisian students are performing against their peers from other countries. Over the past decade, Tunisia’s performance has improved. In TIMSS 2003, Tunisian students (along with students from Iran, Morocco and the Philippines) performed at the bottom of the distribution of the 25 participating countries in both subjects (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2005; IEA, 2005). However in the second half of the decade (2006 onwards) Tunisian students’ performance has improved significantly.

There is adequate teacher performance data to inform teaching. Mandatory internal teacher evaluations are carried out biennially at the school level by the principal; while external evaluations are carried out by the General Education Inspectorate (within the MoE) at the national and sub-national levels. External evaluations are generally only carried out during the early years of a teacher’s career. In the internally-led evaluation it is positive that teachers might themselves be able to inform the process through their own self-assessment which allows them to see the extent to which their own judgment of their performance tallies with the overall conclusions of the review. However, this evaluation is driven by the principal, whose evaluation largely informs the process, along with classroom observation. Feedback from colleagues, students, and parents could provide a more comprehensive guide to how an individual teacher is performing, especially as teachers tend to perform better under the scrutiny of an evaluation process. The internal evaluation assesses a teacher on wide-ranging criteria: (i) compliance with the curriculum, (ii) teaching methods, (iii) assessment methods, (iv) teacher-student interactions, (v) students’ level of participation, (vi) students’ academic achievement, and (vii) teacher attendance. Unfortunately, data are not available to give an indication of the number of teachers that failed to perform to the requisite standard in the last round of evaluations.

Figure 12. Sources used in teacher performance evaluations, selected systems



Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011 for South Korea, Japan, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia.

Goal 7: Supporting teachers to improve instruction


Advanced ●●●●

Weak teachers have the opportunity of being supported through a supervisor, and mandatory professional development is wide-ranging and includes a variety of different styles of active learning techniques.

Teacher performance data are used to improve instruction. All professionals can constantly improve, and teachers are no exception. In Tunisia, internal evaluations are used to inform teachers on how they can develop their instructional practices and may be used to allocate professional development opportunities. Underperforming teachers, as assessed by the performance evaluation process, are offered the support of an assigned supervisor. However, given that national-level data are not available detailing how many teachers failed to perform to a satisfactory standard in the last round of these evaluations, it might be worth looking into whether these follow-up steps are offered to such teachers on a regular basis.

Professional development is used in a focused approach to improve instruction. The MoE (particularly the Director of Training) and sub-national educational authorities are responsible for providing professional development opportunities. Tunisian teachers are not responsible for funding their own professional development (the MoE provides financing), a positive feature because requiring teachers to pay for their professional development is likely to decrease participation and exclude some teachers from benefiting from these activities. All teachers are required to participate in professional development activities, for an upper limit of around 10 days (6 days appears to be the average). In high-performing systems, the required number of days of professional development ranges from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 28 days per year. Enforcing explicit requirements for professional development is important so that teachers do not run the risk of prioritizing their immediate work agenda and not realizing the potential benefits from professional development, as well as ensuring that principals are required to let their teachers' participate in such activities. Professional development in Tunisia includes broad-ranging activities and extends beyond traditional activities, such as courses, workshops, conferences and seminars to include qualification programs, participation in school and teacher networks, mentoring programs, and collaborative research. The recommended content of these types of professional development activities is similarly broad, covering not only support in carrying out administrative tasks (which are required as part of primary school teachers' workloads) but aspects related to teaching, such as subject matter knowledge, teaching the curriculum, classroom management, instructional practices, and providing guidance on teaching students with special needs. Given that Tunisia's policies in this area are very promising, the government may decide to look into level of implementation of policies and whether teachers are in fact taking part in professional development.

Figure 10. Number of required days of professional development, selected systems



Sources: OECD, Creating Effective Teaching and Learning Environments: First Results from TALIS 2009 for Slovenia, Australia, Hungary, Netherlands and South Korea; World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011 for Chile, Lebanon, Indonesia, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Japan and Singapore. Note 1. In some cases (Chile, Jordan and Egypt), the number of required days was calculated by dividing the total number of annual hours by number of daily working hours. Note 2. These figures refer only to secondary school teachers. Note 3. For Tunisia, 10 days represents the upper limit requirement. The classification of systems as: (i) high-performers and top-improvers; (ii) high-performers; (iii) top-improvers is found within , World Bank (Draft), Identifying Successful Education Systems: Using International Student Achievement Tests: An Exercise for SABER Sub-System Work. Why Is There a Need for a Way to Identify Successful Education Systems?

Goal 8: Motivating teachers to perform

Emerging ●●○○

Formal mechanisms exist in law to hold teachers accountable and performance-related incentives are offered; however, data on teacher dismissals are not available

There are minimum mechanisms in place to hold teachers accountable. Tunisia does have in place the following continuing requirements that teachers must fulfill to remain qualified as teachers: (i) to participate in the school-led performance evaluation; and (ii) to participate in professional development activities (between 6-10 days per year). Procedures are in place to safeguard the protection of vulnerable students and ensure that teachers who commit child abuse are

dismissed. Further, teacher misconduct is a stipulated criterion resulting in dismissal. There are sanctioning mechanisms (dismissal and salary reductions) applied to censure unauthorized teacher absenteeism (and this is taken into account in the performance evaluation process). In the performance assessment, a half point (marked out of 20 points) is deducted from the total score for each recorded day of unauthorized absence. Teachers are also subject to the Civil Service regulations, which prohibit unauthorized absenteeism.

Teachers are offered a number of performance-related incentives. Positively, teacher performance is rewarded in the salary schedule. Teachers may also be offered individual monetary bonuses. Wage increases depend primarily on advancements in grades which are determined on a teacher's pedagogic abilities determined through the teacher performance assessment (16 or more points out of 20 are required for a wage increase based on performance).

Ineffective teachers can be removed early on in their careers during a probationary period; however data on the incidence of poor-performing teachers are absent. Tunisia does have in place a mandatory probationary period prior to awarding open-ended status to new teachers. This may help in facilitating the dismissal of weak and unmotivated teachers earlier on, before they become permanent staff and part of the civil service. The first years of teaching are among the best available predictors of a teacher's performance later on. Therefore, it is positive to have in place screening processes to dismiss low-performing teacher entrants. In Tunisia, this screening process to gain open-ended status involves being assessed on performance. Once a teacher holds an open-ended appointment, the results of the performance evaluation process may be used in dismissing a teacher based on his/her performance. However, given the fact that data on the extent of teacher under-performance and rates of dismissal are unavailable, it is not possible to ascertain the extent to which ineffective teachers are removed in practice.

Figure 11. Regulations for teacher dismissal and probationary periods, selected systems

| | Dismissal for under performance | Probationary period |
|--|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| High-performers and top-improvers | | |
| Singapore | ● | ● |
| South Korea | ○ | ○ |
| High-performers | | |
| Japan | ● | ● |
| New Zealand | ● | ● |
| Top-improvers | | |
| Chile | ● | ○ |
| Other systems | | |
| Egypt | ● | ● |
| Indonesia | ● | ● |
| Jordan | ○ | ● |
| Lebanon | ○ | ○ |
| Tunisia | ● | ● |

● Takes place
○ Does not take place

Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010-2011 for Singapore, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Chile, Indonesia, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.

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The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative produces comparative data and knowledge on education policies and institutions, with the aim of helping countries systematically strengthen their education systems. SABER evaluates the quality of education policies against evidence-based global standards, using new diagnostic tools and detailed policy data. The SABER country reports give all parties with a stake in educational results—from administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, objective snapshot showing how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn.

This report focuses specifically on policies in the area of teacher policy.

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