Policy Goals

1. **Setting clear expectations for teachers**
   Expectations for both teachers and students are clearly defined, but official time allocations may limit teachers’ effective fulfillment of lesson-planning and grading duties.

2. **Attracting the best into teaching**
   Pay and benefits are very competitive, but selection processes could be widened.

3. **Preparing teachers with useful training and experience**
   Pre-service reforms are underway to systematize and allocate specific requirements.

4. **Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs**
   There are significant untapped options to get teachers to work in hard-to-staff areas and to teach critical shortage areas.

5. **Leading teachers with strong principals**
   Principals’ entry requirements and decision-making power could be broadened along with the performance incentives on offer to them.

6. **Monitoring teaching and learning**
   Students and teachers’ assessments produce considerable data, but more consideration may be directed toward use of assessment data to inform teaching.

7. **Supporting teachers to improve instruction**
   Data are used to improve instruction and professional development is diverse and has enough hours devoted to it.

8. **Motivating teachers to perform**
   While behavior-related accountability mechanisms exist, performance incentives and sanctions are weak.
Education System at a Glance

Jordan is a lower-middle-income country with a growing secondary school-aged population and a young, principally female teaching force based in urban areas.

Jordan spent 4.5 percent of GDP on education and 9 percent of total public expenditure on primary and secondary education (2007-2008).\(^1\) In 2009, Jordan allocated 13.7 percent and 17.4 percent of public expenditure per student as a share of GDP per capita on primary and secondary education, respectively.\(^2\) In the same year, 80.9 percent of the education budget went to teacher salaries.

Jordan’s education system consists of a two-year cycle of pre-school, ten years of compulsory basic education (Grades 1-10), and two years of secondary education (Grades 11-12). Teachers and students are concentrated at the primary level (Figure 1), with 78.1 percent of public sector teachers working in primary schools.

The private sector accounts for 30 percent of Jordan’s total teaching force (Figure 1). Over 94 percent of private school teachers work in urban areas, and around 23 percent of primary students and 12 percent secondary students attend private schools.

The governorates of Amman and Irbid continue to experience fast population growth, and an influx of Iraqi refugees is placing increased demands on education services.\(^4\) Public school teacher-pupil ratios are higher in urban (at 20) than in rural areas (14). In the private sector, there is no urban-rural difference in the teacher: student ratio (18).\(^5\)

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\(^{1}\) World Bank, SABER – Teachers\(^{2}\)2010.

\(^{2}\) UNESCO, Global Education Digest\(^{2}\) 2009.

\(^{3}\) World Bank, SABER – Teachers\(^{2}\)2010.


\(^{5}\) World Bank, SABER – Teachers\(^{2}\)2010.
A majority of teachers are young women. Around 35 percent of teachers are aged under 30, and 38.6 percent are 30-39 years old (Figure 4). The “feminization” of the teaching profession has increased dramatically over the last twenty years or so; the difference in the male-female share is not so large in the older age-groups (also despite the fact that male teachers are more likely than female teachers to leave teaching by mid-career). Among principals, the average age is 40. Around 61 percent of public school teachers are women, (including principal posts). The female share of private school teachers is even higher, at 81 percent.

![Figure 4. Distribution of public school teachers by age and gender](source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010.)

While almost all public school teachers are employed with open-ended status, private school teachers have fixed-term contracts. Only 9 percent of public school teachers work on a part-time basis.

Teachers are among the largest group of government employees, and under a 1995 agreement to gradually double their salaries, they had been receiving annual salary increases of 5 percent. However, this was halted in 2007, and the Government has tried to since focus on reducing salaries. In 2010, a 3 percent limit on salary rises for public-sector employees was introduced. However, in 2010, the Government then negotiated a pay deal with teachers that included pay rises of 15 percent from June 1st, a further 5 percent increase from October 1st, and 10 percent increases at the beginning of both 2011 and 2012. Accordingly, in March 2011, all teachers received a 10 JD extra salary increase.

Jordanian teachers are not represented by teacher organizations. Teachers’ right to associate was prohibited in 1994 by the Supreme Council. Both strike action and collective bargaining are illegal. However, general strike action (not limited to teacher organizations) does take place, and some teacher organizations are focused on gaining official sanction from the Ministry for their activities and demanding mandatory affiliation of teachers. Generally, teacher representatives appointed by the Ministry of Education act as interlocutors on behalf of teachers and may express views on certain policy areas, including initial teacher education, professional development, recruitment, performance evaluations, curricula, and student assessment procedures.

The Ministry of Education has been working very seriously on defining a new Teacher Policy Framework. This entails establishing pre-service programs in partnership with universities to implementing new measures for selection, recruitment and deployment, all in the context of a well-defined teaching career which would involve systematic performance evaluations of teachers. The Framework has been ready for Government approval for 6 months now, but changes first in the Ministry of Education, and then in the Government as a result of the recent political turmoil, have prevented its final approval.

Goal 1: Setting clear expectations for teachers

Established ●●●●

Expectations for both teachers and students are clearly defined, but official time allocations may limit teachers’ effective fulfillment of lesson-planning and grading duties.

Expectations for students’ learning attainments are outlined in detail. Teachers are provided with a clear sense of what their students should learn at each grade. The Ministry of Education is responsible for designing a national curriculum, informing teachers of required subject content that should be taught to students at different grades. The task of setting standards for what
students must know and be able to do also falls under the mandate of the Ministry, which specifies student learning objectives for each grade level.

**Teachers are guided by clear expectations and performance goals.** As with clear expectations for students’ learning, teachers’ tasks are guided by defined objectives. Strengthened in July 2006, the National Teacher Professional Standards provide parameters for lesson planning, self-evaluation, and professional conduct. The Ministry of Education has outlined teachers’ duties as: teaching, grading assignments, supervising students, integrating difficult students, mentoring fellow staff members, standing in for absent teachers, carrying out administrative functions, collaborating on the school plan, and taking part in the internal school evaluation. In addition, the Ministry has established teacher performance goals and processes to inform teachers on individual progress toward these goals.

**Teachers’ ability to effectively fulfill non-teaching tasks may be limited by official time allocations.** The Ministry of Education determines teachers’ working time, ensuring that these time stipulations are appropriately allocated and provides protection to teachers from arbitrary decisions at the school level. Since the Jordanian school year consists of 195 days with 6 hours per day (nearly all high performing systems have more than 180 days of school), teachers have adequate time to meet expectations for student learning. A statutory definition of working time exists, acting as a common understanding of how teachers’ tasks are determined and remunerated, and refers to the number of hours that teachers spend on the school premises. While such a definition is more favorable than limiting working time only to hours spent directly in the classroom, it does not go far enough in recognizing that lesson planning and grading may take place outside of official school hours.

**Mindful of underestimating teachers’ working time, Jordan might consider widening this definition, accounting for the additional hours that teachers may need to put in outside school time to achieve high levels of student learning.** Working time content includes teaching, lesson planning, and administrative tasks. The amount of 1,170 hours per year to spend on these tasks falls below some of the top performing countries (1,265 hours in the UK and 1,554 hours in South Korea). However, this figure is greater than teachers’ working hours in Lebanon (864 and 640 hours at primary and secondary levels, respectively). Jordan allocates 780 hours to teaching (comprising 67 percent of total working time) in primary and secondary schools, above the world’s top performers in international student assessments, where teaching time is generally less than 60 percent of total working time. Jordan might consider how classroom time is used in understanding why other countries (Figure 5), which devote significantly less hours to classroom teaching, are able to consistently rank among the top performers.

**Figure 5. Share of working time devoted to teaching (primary), selected countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working time devoted to teaching (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance 2010 for South Korea, Denmark and the Netherlands; World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010 for Jordan and Lebanon.

**Goal 2: Attracting the best into teaching**

**Established ●●●●●**

**Pay and benefits are very competitive; selection processes could be widened.**

Screening processes do not appear to be sufficiently demanding. Applicants can enter tertiary education (to become a teacher) based on test scores in the secondary school leaving examination. However, a high proportion of applicants to teaching are admitted, suggesting that the profession, which is part of the civil service, is not highly selective. In 2009, 87 percent of applicants (687 out of 789) were admitted to the profession, and their average scores in the secondary school leaving examinations averaged 65 (out of 100). In Jordan, any graduate can join the civil service roster (waiting-list) and wait long enough until a position opens up in the teaching profession. Teacher selection thus depends entirely on the roster process, which means that selection requirements are not part of the Ministry’s mandate.
While official requirements for teachers are adequate, a significant proportion of Jordanian teachers is unable to meet them. In Jordan, primary school teachers must have completed a higher education diploma (usually a two-year program), and secondary school teachers should have graduated from a four-year program awarding a degree above ISCED 5A level (equivalent to a master’s level degree). Generally speaking, a higher education diploma is sufficient to enable a teacher to teach at both primary and secondary levels. However, around 12 percent of teachers fail to meet these requirements and yet remain in the profession. There are no specific teacher training programs within university faculties.

Different models of pre-service training exist, but there could be more flexible entry routes. Primary school teachers can enter both consecutive and concurrent training programs (in the latter, subject matter knowledge and pedagogical skills can be acquired simultaneously). However, for secondary school teachers, only consecutive programs exist, meaning that the candidate must first acquire subject matter knowledge and then, at a later stage, pedagogical skills. To increase entry pathways into the profession, alternative models may be considered.

Pay and benefits are generous; but a salary scale based on years of service alone might deter high performing applicants. Starting salaries are extremely competitive by world standards and are equivalent to 162 percent of the country’s GDP per capita – more than most high-performing systems pay their teachers (Figure 6). Compensation packages incorporate several benefits, including health care, pension housing support, and transportation benefits. Salaries rise over a career and a teacher at the top can expect to earn more than quadruple the starting salary. However, the absence of performance-related pay could deter results-driven individuals, if high achievers are not differentiated strongly enough. It is concerning that pay is unrelated to staffing needs in critical shortage subjects, indicating that Jordan is not exploiting the pay factor to recruit where demand is acute. In 2008, though, a promising reform introduced incentives for teachers to work in hard-to-staff schools. Jordan might be encouraged to rigorously assess the reform’s impact over the next few years.

Goal 3: Preparing teachers with useful training and experience

Established ●●●●

Pre-service reforms are underway to systematize and allocate specific requirements.

Jordan currently lacks a pre-service training system but reforms are underway in this area. The Ministry of
Education is responsible for regulating pre-service training institutions. This mandate should give the Ministry of Education the ability to ensure that institutions reach the accredited status to be able to operate. Existence of an accreditation process is a positive characteristic, since it certifies that courses taught at institutions reach the system-wide standard and have the potential to train students into successful teachers. Overall, Jordan lacks a true pre-service teacher training system. There are no mandatory training programs at universities that a candidate must undertake. Instead, an applicant joins the civil service roster and waits for a teaching post to open up. The selection of teachers depends entirely on that waiting list, which means that required pre-service training programs do not form part of the training process and are out of the hands of the Ministry of Education.

Box 1. Reform agenda

The Ministry of Education has been working very seriously on defining a new Teacher Policy Framework that entails a radical reform agenda. This agenda will include establishing pre-service programs in partnership with universities to implementing new measures for selection, recruitment and deployment, all in the context of a well-defined teaching career, involving systematic performance evaluations. The Framework has been ready for Government approval for 6 months now, but changes first in the Ministry of Education and then in Government administration as a result of the recent political turmoil have prevented its final approval.

In spite of the absence of a structured pre-service training program, some courses for which data are available balance pedagogical theory and methods with subject matter knowledge. Although a systematic pre-service training program awaits to be adopted, in some institutions for which there are data available prospective primary school teachers spend 18 percent of their total training on pedagogy theory and methods, 27 percent of their time on mathematics, science, and language (9 percent each), and the remaining 55 percent of their time divided among seven other subjects (social studies, English, computer science, art, physical education, Islamic learning). Would-be secondary school teachers devote 14.5 percent of their time to pedagogy theory and methods, 40 percent to their chosen subject disciplines (mathematics, science or language), and the remaining time divided between other subjects (social studies, English, computer science, art, physical education, Islamic learning) (Figure 7). Over the last year (2010), the Ministry of Education has prepared a systematic policy framework for a detailed curriculum plan for all pre-service training institutions. The plan awaits formal approval.

Classroom experience can be required of teachers before teachers can preside over their own classroom. However specific training requirements have not been established. Both primary and secondary school teachers are required to complete 3 to 6 months of classroom experience. In high-performing systems, classroom experience requirements range between one and three years because the initial years in the teaching profession can impact long-term effectiveness.

Although there are no explicit pre-service teacher training requirements, new teachers in Jordan may have the opportunity of participating in an induction program. Although a systematic induction process has not been implemented, in order to smooth their transition from training to work or from different classroom environments, teachers may have the opportunity of participating in an induction program. In most high-performing systems, such programs typically last between one and two years.

Figure 7. Length of induction programs (primary school teachers), selected systems

Sources: OECD, 2009 Creating Effective Teaching and Learning Environments: First Results from TALIS for for Japan and the United Kingdom; World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010 for Chile, Yemen, Jordan, Nepal, Lebanon and Egypt.

Note 1. For Jordan, these time allocations are not systematically applied to all programs.
Goal 4: Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs

Emerging ●●●●

There are a wide number of untapped options to get teachers to work in hard-to-staff areas and to teach critical shortage subjects.

Teachers are provided with some incentives to take up posts in hard-to-staff schools. For working in hard-to-staff schools, teachers can expect to receive both monetary bonuses and subsidized housing (Table 1). Even if starting salaries are good when looked in relation to GDP per capita, these bonuses (which can be put towards food, gas, and housing) may be helpful in attracting teachers to work in these areas. Other kinds of incentives are offered in top-performing systems to attract teachers to work in areas where they are needed most, such as better chances of promotion, scholarships, and food and travel stipends. In Jordan, the number of years of teaching experience determines whether a teacher is able to transfer from one school to another. Using this criterion may increase inequity, exacerbating hard-to-staff schools’ recruitment problems. In some education systems, using years of teaching experience to grant transfer requests has had undesired effects: when teachers gain greater experience and potentially reach a point where they can understand more deeply the diverse needs of students, they are allowed to transfer to better-performing schools (which usually offer better working conditions and serve more socio-economically advantaged students). This could deny disadvantaged areas access to experienced teachers, leaving the least knowledgeable and potentially the least effective teachers in hard-to-staff schools and possibly increasing turnover rates.

There are identified critical shortage subjects, but there are no incentives for teachers to teach them. Ensuring that there are skilled teachers in every subject area is a challenge faced by most education systems. Jordan has taken steps to identify a set of critical shortage subjects (mathematics, science and technology), which facilitates planning for increased recruitment in these disciplines. Jordan seems to be further ahead in this regard than nearby countries, Lebanon and Egypt, which have not identified any critical shortage subjects. Jordan’s increased foresight is commendable; even in top performing systems, principals report difficulties in recruiting for certain disciplines. Unfortunately, however, there are no incentives for teachers to actually take up teaching posts in these subjects. Jordan might wish to look into whether shortages in subjects that offer more flexible and competitive job market opportunities (e.g. mathematics, science and technology) can be addressed through monetary and non-monetary incentives to entice qualified individuals considering other professions (e.g. engineering, computing) to choose to enter teaching. To attract mid-career professionals from other fields, Jordan might look into more flexible routes into teaching.

Table 1. Incentives for teachers to take up posts in hard-to-staff areas, selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion opportunities</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher basic Salary</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary Bonus</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarship/loan aid</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing support</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food benefits</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel benefits</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Goal 5: Leading teachers with strong principals

Emerging ●●●●

Principals’ entry requirements and decision-making power could be broadened along with the performance incentives on offer to them.

Requirements to become a principal may be expanded to better screen applicants’ skills. Setting requirements for principal positions is important because they influence the type of candidate that will apply for this role. In Jordan, principals must hold a tertiary education degree and have five years of teaching experience. In high-performing systems, additional selection criteria govern principal selection; examples include completion of a supervised training for would-be principals, mentoring programs, and successful performance on a written test to more rigorously assess the skills of applicants.

While principals have an explicit role in guiding teachers, performance-based pay is absent. It is positive that Jordanian principals are explicitly required to provide guidance to teachers and are subject to performance evaluations. However, because the same salary schedule is applied to both principals and teachers, Jordan might wish to consider whether the types of candidates it attracts to principal positions differ considerably from regular teachers and civil servants. Notwithstanding this, the average school principal could expect to earn 50 percent more than the average teacher, and a teacher or principal at the top of the salary scale could expect to earn 526 percent of GDP per capita, which places Jordan well in the range of top-performing systems (who all pay their school principals more than 100 percent of their GDP per capita). Further, principals’ overall compensation packages are generous relative to teachers’ (152.7 percent of teachers’ compensation packages). While local educational authorities evaluate the performance of principals under their jurisdiction, increases in compensation based on performance evaluation results are largely absent. The Queen Rania Award for Excellent Principals, introduced in 2005, offers financial awards to a small number of successful principals, but its reach is limited (Box 2). Research has documented that performance-related pay can act as an incentive to motivate principals, which is important considering that they are central to pedagogical and instructional leadership.

Principals play a role in evaluating teacher performance. Principals are often the closest observers and sole evaluators of individual teachers’ work in Jordan, as there are no externally led teacher evaluations. Principals thus have a strong pedagogical leadership role in guiding the teachers in their schools (including as a follow-up to the evaluations). This means that principals can influence in-service training and can make decisions on the use of teaching and learning materials and on teachers’ time allocation. Principals do not have a strong say in hiring and firing decisions. Providing principals with greater autonomy in making hiring and firing decisions does not necessarily correlate with improved principal and teacher performance, and a decision to implement this would largely depend on the organizational structure of the education system; nevertheless, a growing body of evidence does show that principals apply sound judgment when they do make these decisions. This might be because principals are well placed to understand the specific needs of their students and teachers. Overall, given that Jordanian principals are chiefly responsible for annually evaluating their teachers’ performance, further empowering them to use the results from these assessments to determine consequences, including professional development and compensation, could lead to improvements in school quality.

Box 2. Queen Rania Award for Excellence

Since 2005, Queen Rania annually presents awards to school principals, nominated by their colleagues, students, parents, community members or by themselves personally. In 2009, 7 principals (out of 348 applicants), selected based on 9 qualifying criteria, received this award. First-place principals received JD. 4,500 in prize money (equivalent to twice a principal’s average annual salary), while second-place winners received a total of JD. 2,000 (roughly equivalent to a principal’s average annual salary).

Goal 6: Monitoring teaching and learning

Established ●●●●

Assessments of students and teachers produce considerable amounts of data, but more attention may be directed toward using these assessment data to inform teaching.

Jordan has a robust national assessment system and participates in international student assessments. The National Education Quality Control assessment measures student achievement in mathematics and Arabic, at ages 14 and 16. The General Certificate for Secondary Education assesses student achievement upon high school completion, usually at age 18. All of these exams are annual and census-based (i.e., they evaluate all students, not only a sample), making it possible to trace students’ performance over time and to link students’ scores to individual teachers. These characteristics make these exams very well suited for informing, improving, and rewarding effective teaching.

Over the last two decades, Jordan has regularly participated in international student assessments, such as the International Assessment of Education Progress in 1991; the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) in 1999, 2003 and 2007; and the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in 2006 and 2009. Jordan is also scheduled to participate in the next rounds of the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) and TIMSS in 2011. Continuous participation in these assessments gives Jordan the opportunity to see how its students’ achievement levels measure up with those of other education systems across the world and in the Arab Region. As Jordan continues in this strong participation record, utilizing the data to inform teaching in a systematic approach could further inform teaching processes. Currently, assessment results are not necessarily disseminated or communicated to regional and local education authorities, nor to schools, teachers and principals, to enable them to use the data to make better-informed decisions.

Teacher evaluations are conducted frequently, but Jordan should look into holding the lowest-performing teachers accountable. In Jordan, local educational authorities are responsible for evaluating all teachers, and teacher evaluations are carried out by principals (local inspectors have a small input). All teachers participate in evaluations at least once a year, and each teacher’s appraisal is informed by the principal’s individual assessment, classroom observation, and optional contributions of colleagues. While sufficient sources are used to collect information on teacher performance (Table 2), Jordan might consider including a self-appraisal carried out by the individual teacher. This process could allow a teacher to see the degree to which his or her self-analysis tallies with reviewers’ findings. Jordan may also want to look into whether principals are adequately prepared to assess teachers with consistent and systematic tools. Appropriately, evaluations consider wide-ranging criteria, from teachers’ knowledge of the subject they teach, compliance with the curriculum, and use of homework assignments in the classroom. Moreover, teachers are evaluated on their attendance, instructional processes, and, importantly, the extent to which their students are reaching acceptable achievement levels. In 2009, not a single teacher failed an evaluation, which suggests that teachers’ performance may not be clearly differentiated.

Table 2. Sources used in teacher performance evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010 for Jordan and Lebanon; OECD, TALIS 2009 for South Korea.</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students’ achievement</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention &amp; pass rates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other learning outcomes</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student feedback</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental feedback</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration among colleagues</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classroom teaching</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Goal 7: Supporting teachers to improve instruction

Established ●●●●

Data are used to improve instruction, and professional development is diverse with enough hours devoted to it.

Teacher performance data from evaluations are directed toward improving teaching. All professionals can constantly improve, and teachers are no exception. In Jordan, internal teacher evaluations (conducted by the principal with input from school inspectors) are used to inform teachers on how they can develop their instructional practices and to allocate professional development opportunities. Based on the evaluation results, as part of the follow-up supervision system, struggling teachers can be paired with assigned supervisors.

Jordan takes professional development seriously and makes it mandatory for teachers to participate. In Jordan, the Ministry of Education, local educational authorities, schools, and some universities provide professional development to teachers. A positive development is that Jordan has made it mandatory for teachers to participate. If teachers were not required to take part in professional development, they might prioritize their immediate work agenda and not realize the potential benefits from professional development.

The amount of time set aside for professional development is in line with the practice in high-performing systems, but teachers have to cover some of the expenses from their own pocket. The time allotted to professional development in Jordan – about 20 hours per year (Figure 8) – is in line with the expectations of high-performing systems (50-75 percent of teachers in Australia, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland reported that they take part in 1-5 days of professional development each year). How time is utilized in professional development activities is just as important as the amount of time allocated. While the Government allocates some funding resources to teachers’ professional development, teachers are obliged to contribute their own finances to cover some of the costs. While in this regard Jordan’s practices do not differ from practices in high-performing systems, it might be useful to survey whether requiring teachers to contribute to finance the costs of their professional development discourages participation.

Professional development is varied and covers aspects related to teaching. Jordan offers different types of professional development, including traditional activities, such as courses, workshops, conferences and seminars. Importantly, Jordan has also introduced other forms of professional development that are proving effective in other education systems, such as qualification programs, observation visits to other schools, participation in teacher networks, and mentoring programs. The content of these activities is broad, covering not only support in carrying out administrative tasks but also aspects related to teaching, such as subject matter knowledge, teaching the curriculum, relating the curriculum to standards, classroom management, instructional practices and providing guidance on teaching students with special needs. Overall, the quantity, quality, breadth, and length of in-service and professional development opportunities available to teachers in Jordan are strong.

Figure 8. Number of hours allotted to professional development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Hours_Allotted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: OECD, TALIS 2010 for Netherlands, Sweden and the United States; World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010 for Egypt and Lebanon.
Goal 8: Motivating teachers to perform

Emerging ●●●●

While there are behavior-related accountability mechanisms for teachers, performance incentives and sanctions are weak.

There are some mechanisms in place to hold teachers accountable. Jordan has established certain mechanisms to hold teachers accountable on a continuing basis by requiring teachers to take part in annual performance evaluations and professional development activities. Further, several procedures are in place to safeguard the protection of vulnerable students and ensure that teachers who engage in child abuse can be dismissed. Additionally, dismissal can occur for other stipulated reasons, namely misconduct and incompetence. It also appears positive that Jordan does not tolerate teacher absenteeism and deducts the corresponding day’s pay for each unauthorized absence. In 2009, there were no teacher dismissals, but data over time are not available to analyze trends in dismissals.

There are some performance incentives but most are not monetary. Jordan offers several types of rewards for its best-performing teachers, including greater chances of promotion, greater access to professional development, and in some cases public recognition. An example is the Queen Rania Award for Excellent Teachers (similar to the award she presents to principals). Introduced in 2005, the Queen Rania Award recognizes 25 successful teachers with monetary bonuses each year. The Jordanian Government may be interested in evaluating this kind of program and investigating whether a scale-up in these activities would enhance teacher performance.

Some precautionary measures exist to prevent an ineffective beginning teacher from receiving tenure; but once tenure is granted, ineffective teachers are rarely dismissed. In addition to enacting mechanisms to ensure a minimum level of behavioral accountability and rewarding high performance, Jordan ensures that all teachers take part in a probationary period prior to awarding open-ended status (Table 3). The first years of teaching are among the best available predictors of a teacher’s performance later on in his or her career. In Jordan, where all public school teachers are employed as tenured civil servants, employment termination can become very challenging later on, so performance on the job during the probation period is used to inform the granting of open-ended appointments. Once a teacher has an open-ended appointment, the results of the performance evaluation process may not be used for dismissal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Possible to dismiss teachers for under performance</th>
<th>Mandatory probationary period before tenure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
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Sources: OECD, TALIS 2010 for Australia, Belgium, Japan and South Korea; World Bank, SABER – Teachers 2010 for Jordan and Lebanon.

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The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative produces comparative data and knowledge on education policies and institutions, with the aim of helping countries systematically strengthen their education systems. SABER evaluates the quality of education policies against evidence-based global standards, using new diagnostic tools and detailed policy data. The SABER country reports give all parties with a stake in educational results—from administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, objective snapshot showing how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn.

This report focuses specifically on policies in the area of teacher policy.