



Policy Goals for Independent Private Schools

1. Encouraging Innovation by Providers

Central government has legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers and determine class size. Central government also has the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered. The school has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels, and to appoint and dismiss teachers without review from central authorities.

Status

Emerging



2. Holding Schools Accountable

Government sets standards for what students need to learn, by when, and how well. Standardized exams are administered in select grades annually. Government requires schools to undergo a standard term inspection. Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school, specific priorities for improvement, and schools are required to submit a school improvement plan following the inspection. Sanctions include additional monitoring, and as a final measure school closures based on the results of school inspections.

Advanced



3. Empowering All Parents, Students, and Communities

Regular information is provided to parents on standardized exam results. Students and parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process. The government does not provide tax subsidies or cash transfers for families attending private schools.

Established



4. Promoting Diversity of Supply

The government allows all of the following types to operate a school: community, not-for-profit, faith-based, for-profit. Certification standards that are not linked to education outcomes restrict entry, including facilities (separate science labs etc.) and assets (ownership of land and buildings). Registration/certification guidelines are made public but from a single source. Schools are able to operate while paying two or three types of fees. Schools set fees, but are subject to review from government.

Established




Introduction

In recent years, the private sector in education, including a vibrant mix of for-profit, non-profit and faith-based organizations, has grown significantly around the world. **In the last two decades, the percentage of students in low-income countries attending private primary schools doubled from 11 percent to 22 percent** (Figure 1). This growth in private provision is closely connected to the boom in access that has taken place in low-income nations over the last two decades—primary net enrolment increased from 55 percent to 80 percent between 1990 and 2010.

As countries redouble their efforts to achieve learning for all at the primary and secondary levels, the private sector is a resource for adding capacity to the education system. By partnering with private entities, the state can provide access to more students, particularly poor students who remain largely unreached by existing education services (Pal and Kingdon 2010; Patrinos et al. 2009; Hossain 2007). Additionally, evidence shows that governments have been successful at improving education quality and student cognitive outcomes in many countries through effective engagement with private education providers (Barrera-Osorio and Raju 2011; French and Kingdon 2010; Barrera-Osorio 2006).

Figure 1. Private enrolment as a percentage of total primary enrolments, by country income level



Source: World Bank (2013)

This report presents an analysis of how effectively the current policies in Tanzania engage the private sector in basic (primary and secondary) education. The analysis draws on the Engaging the Private Sector (EPS) framework, a product of the World Bank's Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER). SABER collects and analyzes policy data on education systems around the world, using evidence-based frameworks to highlight the policies and institutions that matter most to promote learning for all children and youth.

SABER-EPS research in Tanzania has found that access to primary education is nearly universal; however enrolments at the secondary level are low. Challenges also remain at the primary and secondary levels regarding equity and quality. The private sector's role in provision of education exists mainly at the secondary level as a result of government policies restricting private sector involvement in primary education. All non-state schools in Tanzania are ineligible for government funding, and as such operate independently. Based on a review of existing policies and in order to meet the challenges of access, quality, and equity, SABER-EPS offers the following recommendations for Tanzania to enhance its engagement with the private sector in education:

1. Consider public-private partnerships at the secondary level that target low income and marginalized students in order to support equity;
2. Ensure that the regulatory environment promotes consistent quality in existing non-state schools.

The rest of the report provides an overview of SABER-EPS, followed by a description of the basic education system in Tanzania, with a focus on the private sector and government policies related to private provision of education. The report then benchmarks Tanzania's policy environment utilizing the SABER-EPS framework, and finally offers policy options to enhance learning for all children in primary and secondary school.

Overview of SABER-Engaging the Private Sector

In many countries, the extent and activity of the private sector in education is largely undocumented and unknown. SABER-EPS is working to help change that. SABER-EPS assesses how well a country's policies are oriented toward ensuring that the services of non-state providers promote learning for all children and youth.

The aim is not to advocate for private schooling. The intention is to outline the most effective evidence-based policies specific to each country's current approach of non-state provision. SABER-EPS assesses the extent to which policies facilitate quality, access, and equity of private education services. Data generated by SABER-EPS can support governments in engaging private providers in their efforts to improve education results.

Four policy goals to engage the private sector


SABER-EPS collects data on four key policy areas that international evidence has found effective for strengthening the accountability mechanisms between citizens, policymakers, and providers (see Box 1). These policy goals were identified through a review of rigorous research and an analysis of top-performing and rapidly-improving education systems.

The four policy goals allow the government to increase innovation and strengthen accountability between the critical actors in the education system (Figure 2). Empowering parents, students, and communities enhances the ability of parents to express their voice and hold their policymakers accountable for results. Additionally, when parents are empowered, their client power is increased, and they have greater direct influence over provider behaviors. Increasing school accountability strengthens the quality and equity assurance mechanisms between the state and providers. Encouraging innovation and promoting diversity of supply on the other hand, allow providers to respond to local needs. Increasing school-level autonomy over critical decision making will improve the services provided to students. Allowing a diverse set of providers to enter the market will increase client power and enable citizens to choose from a wider range of provider models. By developing these policy goals, a government can improve the accountability of all providers in the system, and subsequently have a positive impact on educational outcomes.

Box 1. Key private sector engagement policy goals

- i. **Encouraging innovation by providers:** Local decision making and fiscal decentralization can have positive effects on school and student outcomes. Most high-achieving countries allow their schools substantial autonomy over managing resources, personnel, and educational content. Local school autonomy can improve the power of the poor in determining how local schools operate.
- ii. **Holding schools accountable:** If schools are given autonomy over decision making, they must be held accountable for the outputs they produce. Increases in autonomy should be accompanied by standards and interventions to increase access and improve quality. The state must hold all providers in the system accountable to the same high standards.
- iii. **Empowering all parents, students, and communities:** When parents and students have access to information on relative school quality, they have the power to hold schools accountable and the voice to lobby governments for better quality services. For empowerment to work equitably, options for parents and students should not depend on wealth or student ability.
- iv. **Promoting diversity of supply:** By facilitating market entry for a more diverse set of providers, governments can increase the responsibility for results, as providers subsequently become directly accountable to citizens as well as to the state.

Figure 2. Relationships of accountability for successful service delivery



Source: Adapted from World Bank (2003)

SABER-EPS recognizes that all four policy goals will assist governments in raising accountability for the education services provided in their countries. The tool allows governments to systematically evaluate their policies and implement practices that have been shown to work across multiple country contexts.

Four types of private provision of education

Across the world, governments can undertake numerous strategies to support non-state education provision for improving educational outcomes. SABER-EPS benchmarks the key policy goals across the four most common models of private service delivery:

1. Independent private schools: schools that are owned and operated by non-government providers and are financed privately, typically through fees
2. Government-funded private schools: schools that are owned and operated by non-government providers, but receive government funding
3. Privately managed schools: schools that are owned and financed by the government, but operated by non-government providers
4. Voucher schools: government provides funding to the school the student chooses to attend; these can be government or non-government providers or both, depending on the system

SABER-EPS analyzes laws and regulations to (i) identify the types of private engagement that are legally established in each country and (ii) assess each education system’s progress in achieving the four policy goals. **The aim is to provide policy guidance to help governments establish strong incentives and relationships of accountability between citizens, governments, and private education providers, with the subsequent goal of increasing education results.**

Benchmarking Education Policies: the SABER-EPS Methodology

The World Bank has developed a set of standardized questionnaires and rubrics for collecting and evaluating data on the four policy goals for each type of private school engagement established within countries.

The policy goals are benchmarked separately for each type of private engagement in the country’s education system. A point of emphasis here is that **these tools only assess official and established policies governing private education provision. Additional tools are required to determine on-the-ground implementation of these policies.** This information is compiled in a comparative database where interested stakeholders can access detailed reports, background papers, methodology, and other resources describing how different education systems engage with the private sector: <http://saber.worldbank.org/>.

For each indicator within the four policy goals, the country receives a score between 1 and 4, representing four levels of private sector engagement: 1 (Latent), 2 (Emerging), 3 (Established), or 4 (Advanced) (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. SABER rubric benchmarking levels



Source: World Bank (2013b)

The overall score for each policy goal is computed by aggregating the scores for each of its constituent indicators. For example, a hypothetical country receives the following indicator scores for one of its policy goals: Indicator A = 2 points; Indicator B = 3 points; Indicator C = 4 points; Indicator D = 4 points. The hypothetical country's overall score for this policy goal would be: $(2+3+4+4)/4 = 3.25$. The overall score is converted into a final development level for the policy goal, based on the following scale:

- Latent: 1.00 – 1.50
- Emerging: 1.51 – 2.50
- Established: 2.51 – 3.50
- Advanced: 3.51 – 4.00

The ratings generated by the rubrics are not meant to be additive across policy goals. That is, they are not meant to be added to create an overall rating for engaging the private sector.

Use of the SABER-EPS tool

The SABER tool is to be used not as prescriptive policy but rather as an informed assessment of the country policies in reference to the current knowledge of effective approaches. The results of this benchmarking serve as a good starting point for discussions of potential policy options to be considered in light of the nuances of the local context and national education system. Education systems are likely to be at different levels of development across indicators and policy goals. While intuition suggests it is probably better to be as developed in as many areas as possible, **the evidence is unclear as to whether it is necessary to be functioning at *Advanced* levels for all policy goals.** National education priorities lay at the center of recommended policy options, and countries may prioritize higher levels of development in areas that contribute most to their immediate goals.

Finally, the SABER-EPS policy intent analysis focuses strictly on policies that are in place in each country; its purpose is not to review the implementation of these policies. Acknowledging that practice often differs from intent, further research is necessary to understand the challenges and realities of implementation. The policy options offered in this report serve as a starting point for consideration.

Education in Mainland Tanzania


Tanzania is a low income country in East Africa. With a GDP per capita of US\$ 609 in 2012, it is one of the poorest countries in the world. By 2007 national standards, 34 out of 100 people were estimated to be poor (United Republic of Tanzania 2010). The population is estimated at 44.5 million, of which about one million reside in the semi-autonomous Zanzibar. The Government of Tanzania is responsible for defense, external affairs, fiscal policy and monetary issues in the entire country, while Zanzibar has autonomy over development policy, including education.

Education in Mainland Tanzania follows a 2-7-4-2 system, comprising 2 years of preprimary education, 7 years of primary education, 4 years of lower secondary, and 2 years of upper secondary education. Primary school is compulsory and fee-free, with the legal school entry age being 7 years. At the end of primary school, students take the Primary School Leaving Examination, upon which students are selected into secondary school. Lower secondary school is called Ordinary Level (O-Level), and upper secondary Advanced Level (A-Level). At the end of O-Level, students take the Certificate of Secondary Education Examination (CSEE), the results of which determine selection for A-Level government schools (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

Tanzania made primary education fee-free in 2002, and has since nearly achieved universal primary education

In 1995, Tanzania had a net primary enrolment rate of less than 50 percent. Enrolment had increased by 10 percent by 2001, but dramatically expanded following the implementation of the fee-free primary education policy in 2002. During 2001-2006, enrolment increased from 61 percent to 96 percent, surpassing even the international average for primary enrolment (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Primary enrolment rate (net), Tanzania, Sub-Saharan Africa, and international average, 1995-2008



Source: EdStats, World Bank 2014

Focus now needs to shift to secondary education, equity, quality, and ensuring that an expanding school-age population can be accommodated in the system.

Despite Tanzania's notable progress in expanding access to primary education, there is now a need to focus on improving access to secondary education, increasing quality across the board, and supporting equity in education. The Tanzanian education sector faces the following challenges, as outlined by the Tanzania Education Sector Analysis (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012):

- Increasing the public resources allocated to secondary education
- Improving access to and retention in secondary cycles
- Achieving greater efficiency gains in the use of public education resources
- Ensuring children enter primary school at the right age
- Supporting pro-poor schooling
- Taking affirmative action to enhance girls' participation in school to ensure gender parity
- Reducing disparities between regions, districts and schools


Additionally, cross-cutting challenges include the high proportion of youth in the population as well as population growth. Under 15-year-olds currently make up around 44 percent of the total population. The population is estimated to grow by 32 percent between 2010 and 2020. Although the share of youth is projected

to remain the same, in absolute terms primary schools will need to accommodate nearly 2 million children more in 2020 as compared to 2009. (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012)

Access to secondary education has increased, but gross enrolment is still only 39 percent in lower secondary and 4 percent in upper secondary.

Enrolment at both levels of secondary education has increased since 2000, with progress being made particularly in lower secondary education. At O-Level, total enrolment increased from less than 250,000 in 2000 to over 1.7 million in 2013. Most of this expansion has been made possible due to the increased supply of government schools. At A-Level, enrolment has increased more slowly, from around 24,000 students in 2000 to 75,000 in 2013. The rate of enrolment in lower and upper secondary in 2009 was 39 percent and 4 percent respectively. Upper secondary enrolment in particular is far below the average of Sub-Saharan Africa and low income countries (Figure 5). (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012; MoEVT 2014a)

Figure 5: Secondary enrolment (gross), Tanzania (2009), low income countries and Sub-Saharan Africa (2011)



Source: Tanzania: UNESCO and MoEVT 2012; LIC and SSA: EdStats, World Bank 2014

The second National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, published in 2010, sets the operational targets for increasing access to secondary education at 45 percent net enrolment for lower secondary and 5 percent net enrolment for upper secondary (United Republic of Tanzania 2010). The target for upper


secondary represents a mere 1 percent change from the current situation.

Rural and poor children, and girls, do not have equal opportunities to access education, partly because of indirect schooling costs to households.

Disadvantages tend to be cumulative, as noted by the Tanzania Education Sector Analysis. Girls from poor households, living in rural areas are in the most unequal position to access education: for every 100 rich urban boys that complete primary school, only 53 poor rural girls do (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

Although household wealth is linked to attendance in primary education, it has a dramatic impact on a student’s ability to access secondary education (Figure 6). Children from the wealthiest households are over six times more likely to be enrolled in secondary schools compared with students from the poorest households (Figure 6). Children from rural areas are also at a disadvantage, partly due to the inadequate supply of rural schools and the unavailability of nearby schools for some rural children (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

Figure 6: Net attendance rate in primary and secondary school by income quintile, 2010




Source: EdStats, World Bank 2014

One reason why access to education is unequal is that households continue to bear indirect costs to education, such as spending on uniforms and books. Even for primary education, households cover a quarter of schooling costs, despite the fee-free primary education policy (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

In terms of achievement, poor and rural students are significantly behind their wealthier urban peers; in regional assessments Tanzania performs well.

Tanzania performs well in regional assessments, and has even improved from 2000 to 2007. The Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) projects administered to 6th graders showed that Tanzania (mainland) was above the average in both 2000 and 2007. The country also improved in both Reading and Mathematics during this period. In 2007, Tanzanian students performed the best in Reading (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Student performance in Reading in SACMEQ II and III, selected participating countries




Source: SACMEQ 2014b

Despite Tanzania’s notable performance overall, there are distinct differences in learning outcomes depending on household wealth, geographic location (urban/rural), and gender. In the latest SACMEQ (2007), students from rural households scored 44 points less than their urban peers in Reading, while the difference between the poorest and wealthiest students was 56 points (see Figure 8). It is important to note that a difference of approximately 50 points represents a difference of one year of schooling (Chitiga and Chinoona 2011). Accordingly, students from the poorest households are over a year behind their wealthiest peers in schooling. A difference is also visible according to gender, with girls

falling slightly below the Tanzanian Reading average of 578, and boys slightly above it (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Student performance in Reading, by types of disadvantage, Tanzania (mainland), 2007



Source: SACMEQ 2014

These differences in student achievement towards the end of primary school should be of great concern, as students are selected into secondary schools based on their performance in the Primary School Leaving Examination (Education and Training Policy 1995). Accordingly, it can be expected that poor and rural students, and girls, are restricted in their access to secondary education even at the stage of initial admission.

Class sizes in Tanzania are high due to resource constraints and a shortage of teachers.

In 2009, the pupil-teacher ratio in public primary schools was 55 to 1, surpassing the national target of 45 to 1. In public secondary schools, the pupil-teacher ratio was 49 to 1 in 2009, compared to 23 to 1 in non-state schools. Classrooms in Tanzania are crowded because of a shortage of teachers at both levels of education. High teacher salaries can also be a constraint to recruiting further teachers. (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012)

In its National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, Tanzania is striving to lower the pupil-teacher ratios to 45 to 1 in primary education and 25 to 1 in secondary education (United Republic of Tanzania 2010).

Although government has prioritized education in its spending, allocations are unequal.

Over the past decade, public expenditure on education in Tanzania has increased: in terms of GDP, spending increased from 4.7 percent in 2004 to 6.2 percent in 2010. This surpasses the average of both low income countries (4.2 percent in 2010) and Sub-Saharan African countries (4.3 percent in 2010). (World Bank 2014)

While the above-average spending is a positive development, secondary education is underrepresented in allocations. Nearly half of all education spending was allocated to the preprimary and primary sectors in 2009 (46 percent), while 34 percent was spent on tertiary education. Meanwhile, secondary education was allocated only 17 percent of total spending in 2010, which decreased to 11 percent in 2011. The Tanzania Education Sector Analysis concluded that this spending was excessively low and far below countries that were equally close to achieving universal primary education (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

Tanzania's education spending has been noted to exhibit other inequalities in resource allocation. For example, teachers have been inequitably distributed between regions and districts, with teachers being concentrated in urban areas (United Republic of Tanzania 2010). Additionally, spending on basic education has thus far focused too little on the quality of services (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012). For example, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty noted that less than 25 percent of planned school inspections were actually being carried out. Hard-to-reach schools and schools that needed regular inspection were the least supervised (United Republic of Tanzania 2010).

Private Education in Mainland Tanzania

The Education Act only allows private schools to provide technical education.

Private schools in Tanzania are legally only allowed to provide education in technical fields. The Education Act of 1978 is the primary policy document regulating the private sector, and stipulates the following:

23. With effect from the commencement of this Act, no person may establish a private school unless it is intended to provide national education wholly or mainly in technical fields of learning.

Further,

28. The Commissioner may refuse to register a private school if it appears to him:

(a) that registration of that school would not be in the public interest;

(b) that the school is not intended to provide national education wholly or mainly in technical fields of learning;

(c) that the school is not likely to be able in the near future to provide national education wholly or mainly in technical fields of learning;

Consequently, the private sector mainly plays a role in secondary education, where its share is 17 percent of total student enrolments.

At the primary level, the share of enrolments in non-state schools is negligible, around 1-2 percent (Table 1, Figure 9). In secondary education, students in non-state schools currently make up 17 percent of secondary school students (MoEVT 2014a). In this respect, Tanzania is very much the average Sub-Saharan African country – the average share of secondary private enrolments in the region is 18 percent (World Bank 2014).


Two details are notable about the engagement of the non-state sector in secondary education. First, the share of the sector has substantially decreased over the past decade: whereas private schools enrolled nearly 4 out of 10 lower secondary students in 2004, they currently enroll just 16 percent of them (Table 1; MoEVT 2014a). At the upper secondary level, the share of non-state enrolment has similarly halved, from 49 percent in 2004 to 24 percent in 2013 (Table 1; MoEVT 2014a). Non-state schools have not necessarily decreased in numbers, but rather the public sector has accommodated the expansion in access to secondary school over the past decade. Second, although the private sector has been playing a decreasing role in secondary education over the past decade, the share of enrolments at this level is still notably higher than at the primary level (Figure 9).

Table 1: Share of students enrolled in non-state schools in Tanzania, 2004-2009

	2004	2006	2008	2009
Primary	0.6%	1%	1.3%	1.5%
O-Level	38%	27%	14%	11%
A-Level	49%	39%	36%	32%

Source: UNESCO and MoEVT 2012

Figure 9: Share of students enrolled in non-state schools in Tanzania, 2013



Source: Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2014a

Further, the issue of access at the rural level highlighted above can also be identified when looking at the non-state schools in Tanzania. According to official government statistics, there is a divide in terms of the number of private schools in rural areas compared to the number of private school in urban areas (based on school census conducted by the Tanzanian Ministry of Education).

Non-state schools in Tanzania are independent private schools; they receive no government funding.

Non-state schools in Tanzania are all independent private schools, as they are owned and operated by non-government providers and are financed privately, receiving no government support. Independent private schools fall into three categories:

Islamic seminary schools: These are schools owned and managed by Islamic organizations. Their curriculum typically includes Islamic studies. These schools are not allowed to discriminate on the basis of religion in student admissions, although students may be required to follow basic Islamic principles during their studies. In February 2014, there were 44 Islamic (secondary) seminary schools in Tanzania.

Christian seminary schools: These are schools owned and managed by Christian organizations. Their curriculum typically includes Christian studies. Legally, as for Islamic organizations, these schools are not allowed to discriminate on the basis of religion in student admissions. By February 2014, there were 32 Christian (secondary) seminary schools in Tanzania.

Schools owned by non-government organizations: These are schools owned and managed by individual organizations. Most are registered as not-for-profit organizations, although a few may operate for profit. These form the majority of private secondary schools in Tanzania, numbering 968 in February 2014 (about 97 percent of all private schools).

The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty envisions a role for the non-state sector in service delivery to the poor.

The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty emphasizes scaling up the role and participation of the private sector “in priority areas of growth and poverty reduction” (United Republic of Tanzania 2010). The National Strategy also sees a role for the private sector in improving public service delivery to the poor and vulnerable. To achieve this, required government interventions include “providing special incentives to the private sector in order to motivate it to invest in underserved locations and in businesses that support the poor and vulnerable” (United Republic of Tanzania 2010).

Benchmarking Mainland Tanzania's Private School Policies

This report presents the results of *SABER-Engaging the Private Sector* for independent private schools, as Tanzania (mainland) has decided to involve these providers in offering basic education services. The report discusses the benchmarking results against the established recommended practices. For more information on the global evidence underlying these policy goals, see the SABER framework paper, *What Matters Most for Engaging the Private Sector in Education* (Baum, Lewis, Lusk-Stover, and Patrinos 2014). A rubric explaining the criteria for the score categories for each indicator is included in the Annex of this report.

The main policies, laws and official documentation used to benchmark Tanzania (mainland) include:

- Education Act of 1978
- Education and Training Policy of 1995
- Education Sector Development Programme 2008-2017
- Teachers' Service Agreement, Regulation 120
- Guidelines for Schools Supervision
- Whole School Inspection Checklist

Goal 1: Encouraging Innovation by Providers

The highly particular and contextualized nature of education delivery necessitates decision making at the school level. In order to be aware of and adapt to changing student needs, school leaders require autonomy over the most critical managerial decisions.

The methodologically rigorous studies assessing the impacts of local school autonomy on student learning outcomes generally find a positive relationship (Hanushek and Woessmann 2010; Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011). A few studies find evidence that local autonomy for school leaders is associated with increased student achievement, as well as reduced student repetition and failure rates (King and Özler 2005; Jimenez and Sawada 2003; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012).

Box 3. International best practice: Encouraging innovation by providers

- Teacher qualification standards are set at the school level.
- Appointment and deployment of teachers are decided at the school level.
- Teacher salary levels are set at the school level.
- Dismissals of teachers are decided at the school level.
- How the curriculum is delivered is decided at the school level.
- Class-size decisions are made at the school level.
- Management of operating budgets is conducted at the school level.

Encouraging Provider Innovation in Tanzania

Levels of Development

Independent private schools:



In Tanzania, education policies for independent private schools are **Emerging**, demonstrating some instances of good practice.

Teacher standards are set by central government for both government and non-government schools. Curriculum delivery is similarly determined centrally for all schools by the Tanzania Institute of Education:

“The Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE) shall be responsible for pre-primary, primary, secondary school and teacher education curriculum design, development, dissemination, monitoring, and evaluation.” (Education and Training Policy, 6.2.1.)

Maximum class sizes are also centrally determined for both government and non-government schools. For both primary and secondary school, the maximum class size is 40 (MoEVT 2012).

Independent private schools are currently autonomous in setting teacher salaries, and deploying and dismissing teachers. This is part of the decentralization of management that is outlined in the Education and Training Policy:

- 4.3.1. “Ministries responsible for education and training shall devolve their responsibilities of management and administration of education and training to lower organs and communities.”

Private schools deploy teachers directly from the labor market and teachers are normally employees of specific schools. Schools can dismiss teachers within their own regulations, but, like all employers, they must abide by the Labour Relations Act, 2004. Similarly, private schools have autonomy over setting teacher salaries, as long as they follow guidelines established in the labor laws. The policies that grant such autonomy for private schools are presently informal.

- Strengthen the regulatory environment around the non-state sector, so that policies which are currently informal (such as certain provisions of school autonomy) are stipulated in policy documents.
- Allow schools to determine their own standards for hiring teachers.
- Increase the flexibility of schools to adjust class sizes and the curriculum to fit available school resources and needs of the local community.

Goal 2: Holding Schools Accountable

On average, students perform better in schools with higher levels of accountability to the state (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Woessmann et al. 2007; Hanushek and Raymond 2005). For non-state providers, when government funding is tied to accountability standards, schools are incentivized to perform more efficiently (Barrera-Osorio and Raju 2010; Patrinos 2002). A strong accountability system requires that government, parents, and educational professionals work together to raise outcomes. The government must play a role in ensuring that superior education quality is delivered in schools. SABER-EPS assesses multiple policy indicators to determine a country’s level of development in regards to non-state provider accountability. A list of the key indicators is provided in Box 4.

Box 4. International best practice: Holding schools accountable

- Government sets standards regarding what students need to learn, including deadlines for meeting these standards.
- Students are required to take standardized examinations; results are disaggregated by school, socioeconomic status, gender, etc.
- Schools are required to report on the use of public funds as a condition for continued funding.
- Government or an external agency performs inspection of schools as determined by school need.
- Schools produce school improvement plans.
- School performance is tied to sanctions and/or rewards.

Goal 1: Encouraging Innovation by Providers		
Independent Private Schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Who has legal authority to set teacher standards?	Latent ●○○○	Central government has legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers.
Who has legal authority to determine teacher salary levels?	Advanced ●●●●	The school has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels without government review.
Who has legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers?	Advanced ●●●●	The school has the legal authority to appoint teachers without review from central authorities.
Who has legal authority to dismiss teachers?	Advanced ●●●●	The school has the legal authority to dismiss teachers without government review.
Who has legal authority to determine how the curriculum is delivered?	Latent ●○○○	Central government has the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered.
Who has legal authority to determine maximum class size?	Latent ●○○○	Central government has the legal authority to determine class size.

Based on the benchmarking results for *Encouraging Innovation by Providers*, the **potential policy options** for Tanzania include the following:

Holding Schools Accountable in Tanzania

Levels of Development

Independent private schools:



Tanzania's policies for holding independent private schools accountable are **Advanced**, demonstrating best practice in engaging the private sector.

The government sets standards for what students need to learn, and determines by when and how well. Students must pass a series of examinations to proceed to the next level in their education (Education and Training Policy 1995). These standardized examinations are administered at four points during the basic education cycle:

- Grade IV: Standard Four National Examination
- Grade VII: Primary School Leaving Examination
- Form IV: Certificate of Secondary Education Examination
- Form VI: Advanced Certificate of Secondary Education Examination

All exams are prepared and administered by the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA).

The results of these standardized exams are disaggregated by school, gender, region, and school ownership (government or non-government).

Policy outlines that all schools in Tanzania are to be inspected at least once a year. The only government department that is mandated to conduct school inspection countrywide is the School Inspectorate Division which is divided into several sections, including a Primary Education Inspectorate Section and a Secondary Education Inspectorate Section. The Primary Education Inspectorate Section performs the following activities (MoEVT 2014b):

1. Set targets, guidelines and coordinate inspection of pre-primary, primary, special education schools, adult and non-formal education centers;
2. Inspect and recommend strategies for improving the quality of pre-primary, primary, special education schools, adult and non-formal education centers and monitor their implementation;
3. Evaluate relevance and effective use of instructional materials used in pre-primary,

- primary, special education schools, adult and non-formal education centers; and
4. Inspect and recommend for registration of primary schools.

In practice, the Division has been facing resource constraints, and nearly half the schools were not inspected at all in 2013 (MoEVT 2014a).

According to the School Inspection Checklist, school inspections focus on the following aspects:

1. Infrastructure
2. Human resources
3. Management and administration
4. School revenue and expenditure
5. Staff development
6. School-community relations
7. Sports and extra-curricular activities
8. Guidance and counselling
9. Curriculum implementation
10. School culture

Inspection reports outline strengths and weaknesses of the schools, and recommend priorities (Guidelines for School Supervision and School Inspection Checklist). In practice, schools are also required to submit an improvement plan.

Sanctions can be imposed on schools and include higher levels of supervision, and, in extreme cases, cancellation of the school registration and takeover of the school by government. The Education Act (art. 29) stipulates that a school's operating license can be cancelled a) on any of the grounds on which registration could have been refused in the first place, b) if the manager or owner of the school has committed an offence against the Education Act, c) if the school has ceased to exist, or d) if the school has failed or is not likely to succeed in the near future to provide national education wholly or mainly in technical fields of learning.

If a school is taken over by the government, the latter is required to pay reasonable compensation to the owner of the private school. In accordance with The Education Act (art. 30), the government can take over a school under these circumstances:

- 1) Where, in the opinion of the Minister, any private school:
 - (a) has failed to provide national education whose category, nature or level is in the public interest; or

- (b) has been closed or its registration has been cancelled and it is not likely to be reopened; or
 (c) the owner or manager is no longer able to maintain the school; or
 (d) the service and facilities provided at the school would be enhanced for the benefit of the public if it were a public school.

The Minister of Education may, after consultation with the Minister for Finance, by order published in the *Gazette*, require the owner or manager of that school to hand over to the Commissioner the management and maintenance of the school.

3) Upon the takeover by the Government of any private school the Government shall pay such compensation to the former owner or manager of the school as the Minister for the time being responsible for finance shall consider to be fair, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

Goal 2: Holding schools accountable		
<i>Independent Private Schools</i>		
Item	Score	Justification
Does government set standards on what students need to learn and by when?	Advanced ●●●●	Government does set standards for what students need to learn, by when, and how well.
Are students required to take standardized exams, with results being disaggregated?	Advanced ●●●●	Standardized exams are administered in select grades annually, and results are disaggregated.
Are school inspections performed as determined by school need?	Established ●●●○	Government requires schools to undergo a standard term inspection.
Does the inspection report outline the strengths and weaknesses of the school?	Established ●●●○	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school and specific priorities for improvement.
Are sanctions administered based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams?	Advanced ●●●●	Sanctions include additional monitoring, and as a final measure school closures based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedure, the following **suggested policy options** would help Tanzania increase the accountability of private schools:

- Move towards a needs-based inspection system in order to reallocate resources to schools that need the most attention;
- Clarify the regulatory environment around improvement plans, to make sure that schools are required to submit one as part of the inspection process.

Goal 3: Empowering all Parents, Students, and Communities

Empowering parents, students and communities forms a foundational piece of providing quality learning opportunities for all students. Poor and marginalized children and youth disproportionately lack access to quality education services. To overcome this obstacle, governments need to increase providers' accountability to all clients, and to underserved groups, in particular. Educational access and performance of schools and students can be substantially impacted by openly disseminating comparable school performance information (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2009; Pandey, Goyal and Sundararaman 2009; Björkman 2007; Reinikka and Svensson 2005), increasing parental influence in the school (Skoufias and Shapiro 2006; King and Ozler 2005; Jimenez and Sawada 1999; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2008; Di Gropello and Marshall 2005), and offering demand-side interventions such as scholarships, vouchers, or cash transfers for the most vulnerable students (Orazem and King 2007; Filmer and Schady 2008; Lewis and Lockheed 2007; Patrinos 2002; Barrera-Osorio 2006). The effective policy practices for non-state providers include some of the indicators listed in Box 5.

Box 5. International best practice: Empowering all parents, students, and communities

- Information on standardized tests and school inspections is made available from multiple sources.
- Parents and students are included in the inspection and improvement planning processes.
- Admission processes for entry into publicly-funded schools are not based on student background; a lottery is used in cases of oversubscription.
- School choice is not hindered by financial contributions.
- Tax subsidies, scholarships, or cash transfers are available to families attending independent private schools

Empowering all Parents, Students, and Communities in Tanzania

Levels of Development

Private independent schools:



In Tanzania, policies for independent private schools with regard to empowering parents, students, and communities are **Established**.

The Education and Training Policy outlines the central role of parents in education:

4.3.4. “Parents are invaluable allies to the teachers. Where there is a good teacher-parent relationship, the development of the pupils is enhanced. The success of such education and training institutions is as much the concern of parents and communities as the teachers.”

Students and parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process (Whole School Inspection Checklist). However, the government is not required to give parents or students access to inspection reports. When information is made available, it is through school notice boards, letters to parents, or through a school newsletter or newspapers. Schools are ranked according to the results of school inspections, but the public can only access these rankings by request.

Parents receive information on standardized exams that is disaggregated by gender, school, region, and school ownership. National examination results are issued annually by NECTA and are available from the government website and newspapers.

There are no programs in place to provide information on standardized exam results to hard-to-reach groups. An attempt to prepare results in Braille format has yet to be realized. Schools are ranked based on their performance in standardized exams. These statistics are available online from the National Examinations Council website.

Tanzania currently offers no tax subsidies or cash transfers for families attending independent private schools.

Goal 3: Empowering all Parents, Students, and Communities		
<i>Independent Private Schools</i>		
Item	Score	Justification
Are standardized exam results and inspection reports provided regularly to parents?	Established ●●●○	Regular information is provided to parents on standardized exam results or inspection reports.
Are parents and students interviewed as part of the inspection process?	Advanced ●●●●	Students and parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process.
Does the government provide tax subsidies or cash transfers for families attending independent private schools?	Latent ●○○○	The government does not provide tax subsidies or cash transfers for families attending private schools.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedure for Tanzania, the following **suggested policy options** would help empower parents and students to influence the quality of education services provided by private schools:

- Consider improving the comparable information on the quality of schooling that is provided to parents, with specific attention on hard-to-reach groups.
- Consider strengthening the policy environment around equity, to ensure that low income and marginalized students have equal opportunities. Options that could be considered include vouchers or public-private partnerships (PPPs), with safeguards for ensuring equity built into them.

Goal 4: Promoting Diversity of Supply

By opening choice options to a more diverse set of providers, governments can increase client power and make providers directly accountable to students and parents for results. Although the public sector will always remain an important (and in most cases the predominant) provider of education services, educational choice can be used as part of a package of reforms to improve education access and quality in both public and private sectors (Hoxby 2003; Levin and Belfield 2003; De la Croix and Doepke 2009; McEwan 2002; Himmler 2007; Angrist et al. 2002; World Bank 2003). In order to facilitate quality improvements through increased school competition and choice, governments can allow multiple types of providers to operate; promote clear, open, affordable, and unrestrictive certification standards; and make government funding (and other incentives) available to non-state schools. This policy goal aims to increase the ability for diverse providers to provide education services. In order to do this, a number of policy indicators are suggested, as represented in Box 6.

Box 6. International best practice: Promoting diversity of supply

- Government allows different types of providers to operate a school.
- Certification standards do not prohibit entry into the market.
- Information on requirements to enter the market is available from multiple sources.
- Regulatory fees do not prohibit entry into the market.
- Publicly-funded non state schools and public schools receive equivalent student funding; funding is increased to meet specific student needs.
- Government provides incentives for market entry such as access to start-up funding, public land and public buildings.
- Schools are able to plan budgets six months preceding start of academic year.
- Privately-managed schools are not restricted by student numbers, school numbers, or location.
- Government does not restrict tuition levels for private independent schools.

Promoting Diversity of Supply in Tanzania

Levels of Development

Private independent schools:



In Tanzania, the policies in place to promote diversity of supply for independent private schools are **Established**, representing some instances of good practice.

Individuals, private organizations, and non-government organizations are legally permitted to own and operate private schools in Tanzania. These can be community, not-for-profit, faith-based, or for-profit providers.

Guidelines for registration are published only in the Education Act No. 25 of 1978. Criteria for registering a private school in Tanzania relate to the safety and suitability of buildings, facilities, and equipment; teacher qualifications and conditions of work; and the gap that the proposed school will fill in educational services. The applicant also needs to indicate ownership of buildings and land in the registration form for new providers. In total, there are 14 criteria upon which a school can be denied registration, including the following:

28. The Commissioner may refuse to register a private school if it appears to him:
 - a) that registration of that school would not be in the public interest;
 - b) that the school is not intended to provide national education wholly or mainly in technical fields of learning;
 - c) that the school is not likely to be able in the near future to provide national education wholly or mainly in technical fields of learning;
 - d) that there would be any danger to persons using the premises of the proposed school arising inside or outside those premises or that there would be a risk of that danger;
 - e) that the premises of the proposed school are, or are likely to be unsanitary or unsuitable for a school;
 - f) that the proposed school does not conform to any regulations made under this Act;
 - g) that the qualifications and experience of the proposed teachers are not adequate to ensure the efficient conduct of the school;
 - h) that the proposed terms and conditions of service of the teachers are not adequate to ensure the efficient performance of their duties; or

- i) that the premises of the proposed school or the equipment will not allow of effective tuition in the subjects to be taught in the school; or
- j) that adequate educational facilities already exist in the area in which it is proposed to establish the school.

These registration criteria, or rather justifications for refusal to register a school, are opaque in the sense that they do not specify detailed minimum criteria. For instance, a school can be refused registration if “the premises of the proposed school or the equipment will not allow of effective tuition in the subjects to be taught in the school”; however, what kinds of premises or equipment would allow effective tuition (teaching) is not stated.

Schools set their own tuition fees, but they are subject to review from the government. The Education and Training Policy outlines the following:

- 10.2.5. School and tuition fees, both government and non-government education and training institutions, shall be based on the actual unit cost of providing education and training at each level.
- 10.2.6. School and tuition fees for non-government education and training institutions shall be proposed by the respective owners and managers of these institutions and approved by government.

In order to operate, independent private schools are required to pay an inspection fee of 5000 Tanzanian shillings (3 USD) per student per year, as well as an examination fee of 15,000 Tanzanian shillings (9 USD) for each student in a grade where standardized examinations are administered. The government recently introduced an income tax and skills development levy for all private schools.¹

Goal 4: Promoting Diversity of Supply		
Independent Private Schools		
		For-profit
Are there minimum standards for registration or for independent private schools to be allowed to operate?	Established ●●●○	Certification standards that are not linked to education outcomes restrict entry, including one of the three following criteria: 1. land (undulating, distance from public venues etc.) or 2. facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes etc.) or 3. assets (ownership of land or buildings).
Are there guidelines clearly publicized by multiple sources outlining the requirements for school registration?	Established ●●●○	Registration/certification guidelines are made public but from a single source.
Are schools able to operate without paying fees?	Emerging ●●○○	Schools are able to operate while paying 2 or 3 types of fees.
Who has legal authority to determine tuition fee standards?	Established ●●●○	Schools set fees, but are subject to review from government.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedure for Tanzania, the following **suggested policy options** would help to better promote diversity of supply for independent private schools:

- Ensure that registration guidelines are readily available from multiple sources.
- Ensure that certification standards are clear in their minimum requirements and linked to education outcomes.
- Consider reducing the number of fees that private schools are required to pay.

Goal 4: Promoting Diversity of Supply		
Independent Private Schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Does the government allow multiple types of providers to operate a school?	Advanced ●●●●	The government allows all of the following types to operate a school: Community Not-for-profit Faith-based

¹ All information was obtained from interviews with the Ministry of Education in March 2014.

From Analysis to Action: Policy Options for Tanzania

Tanzania has made impressive progress in expanding primary education since 2001, but access to secondary education remains exceedingly low. In 2009, the enrolment rate for lower secondary school was 39 percent, and a mere 4 percent for upper secondary school. More important, access to secondary schooling hinges strongly on household wealth, with only 8 percent of poorest students being enrolled in secondary school in 2010, compared to 50 percent of their wealthiest peers. Similar gaps are visible in student achievement, although, as a nation, Tanzania's performance in regional assessments has been impressive. Classrooms remain crowded in the country, partly due to resource constraints and a shortage of qualified teachers. Further, there are a number of instances in the Tanzanian regulatory environment where quality could be better instilled as the primary guiding principle, especially policies that deal with certification standards, school autonomy, inspection systems and improvement planning.

As examined in the previous section, the status of Tanzania's policies regulating the private sector in education range from an overall score of "emerging" for the policy goal of encouraging innovation by providers, to "established" for empowering parents, students, and communities and for promoting diversity of supply, and lastly to "advanced" for holding schools accountable.

Based on the results of the SABER-EPS benchmarking of Tanzania's policies, there are two suggested policy options to strengthen the government's engagement with independent private schools to ensure learning for all:

1. Consider PPPs at the secondary level that target low income and marginalized students in order to support equity;
2. Ensure that the regulatory environment promotes consistent quality in existing non-state schools.

These policy options are supported by international evidence, best practice, and examples of countries that have used innovative interventions to improve from a variety of starting points.

Policy Option 1: Consider public-private partnerships at the secondary level that target low income and marginalized students in order to support equity

Poor and marginalized children and youth disproportionately lack access to quality education services. In Tanzania, only 8 percent of the poorest students had access to secondary education in 2010. To overcome this obstacle, governments need to use various mechanisms to equalize opportunity. Tanzania could consider introducing public-private partnerships (PPPs) that explicitly target low income and marginalized students. Such a step would reflect Tanzania's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, which sees a role for the private sector in improving public service delivery to the poor and vulnerable (United Republic of Tanzania 2010).

One form of PPPs that could be considered in the Tanzanian context is government-funded private schools. This model could incentivize investment in underserved locations and businesses that support the poor—something that the National Strategy also notes as critical—but it could also be set up to specifically target poor and marginalized students, for example through quotas. Quality assurance can also be ensured through government-funded private schools, as the continuation of funding can be tied to certain quality standards.

Another PPP option is for the government to provide vouchers for poor students to attend the school of their choice, including private schools. However, careful consideration of the binding constraints to accessing secondary education would have to be made before introducing vouchers. As students are selected into secondary schools based on the results of the Primary School Leaving Examination, the binding constraint to access for poor and rural students might well be poor results in addition to low affordability. Affordability is a critical challenge, but it may not be the only reason why students cannot access secondary education.

Targeting is critical for PPPs that expand access to poor and marginalized students without forgoing learning outcomes. Evidence from Cambodia suggests that in order to promote both equity and learning, it might be preferable to take a 'two-step' approach to targeting: first, target the poor, and second, among the poor, target

based on merit. These considerations should be made in both the case of vouchers and possible quotas in government-funded private schools.

In order to further engage the private sector in education, the government of Tanzania should also consider the extent to which its regulatory environment currently promotes adequate supply of education. This is especially salient in the context of population growth and migration, which leads to rapid changes in demand for education in some areas. In certain cases, private sector providers may be better positioned than the public system to rapidly respond to such demand. Tanzania should ensure that the regulatory environment promotes supply rather than restricts it.

i) Ensure that the regulatory environment promotes adequate supply

Tanzania should ensure that its policy environment does not hinder adequate supply. Currently, a new provider can be declined registration if it appears “that adequate educational facilities already exist in the area in which it is proposed to establish the school” (Education Act 1978). In a context of high population growth and migration, it can be a difficult task for central authorities to keep up with the needs and demand for education. A recent report by UNICEF suggests that the provision of basic services, including education, is not keeping pace with demand in rapidly growing urban areas in Tanzania (UNICEF 2012). The current criterion may therefore actually hinder the adequate supply of school places. Tanzania should reevaluate this criterion and ensure that policies promote adequate supply of educational services.

ii) Support private schools through government funding mechanisms

Supporting government-funded private schools entails payments from the government to schools that are owned and operated by non-government providers. Funding can come in the form of direct payments, bursaries, grants, subsidies, or the transfer of school resources such as textbooks or technological equipment. Ideally, funding is outlined through a contract or legal eligibility standards. In some cases private schools either enter into a formal contract or memorandum of understanding with the government, or meet established eligibility criteria to receive funding.

These criteria can include, but are not limited to, factors such as (1) the amount of tuition charged to students; (2) school and student achievement outcomes; (3) class-size restrictions; (4) curricular standards; and (5) for-profit or non-profit status of the school.

In order to promote equity, government-funded private schools should not, by default, be allowed to select students according to geographic location or academic ability without consideration of students’ household characteristics. Additional safeguards for ensuring equity for low income and marginalized children could also be built into the partnership. For example, government-funded private schools could be required to have a quota for poor students, or the government could offer a ‘pupil premium’ for each low income or marginalized student in the school. As mentioned earlier, targeting is a key consideration in order to promote both equity and learning.

Country example: Government-funded private schools

In Burkina Faso, a PPP was set up in order to increase enrolment in lower secondary schools from 20 percent in 2004 to 33.5 percent by 2009. Through this partnership, the government supported the construction and equipment of 80 private schools and hired and paid for two teachers per school. The schools aimed to reduce disparities in choice for secondary schools among the provinces. The 18 provinces with the lowest coverage would benefit from 70 percent of the program funding. These schools then operated at a lower cost than typical private schools. No recurrent costs were incurred by the government (World Bank 2006).

For more information on the Burkina Faso Post-Primary Education Project, see:

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/05/6827171/burkina-faso-post-primary-education-project>

Country example: Quotas and Pupil Premium

As part of its Right to Education Act, India outlines that 25 percent of places in private schools must be allocated to economically weaker section (EWS) and disadvantaged students (Government of India 2010).

For more information on the Right to Education Act see:

<http://mhrd.gov.in/rte>

In the UK, the government has introduced a pupil premium to raise the performance of students from disadvantaged backgrounds. The government created the policy after it recognized that students' level of attainment was linked to their social circumstances. In the pupil premium scheme, the government awards schools a grant (£900 in the 2013/14 financial year) for each pupil who is deemed disadvantaged according to set criteria. An additional premium is added for students at the primary level (Government of the United Kingdom, 2014).

For more information on the pupil premium, see <https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/raising-the-achievement-of-disadvantaged-children>.

Country example: Targeting

In Cambodia, two evaluations of the impact of scholarships for lower secondary school have shown substantial increases in school enrolment and attendance as a direct consequence of the programs. Recipients were 20–30 percentage points more likely to be enrolled and attending school as a result of the scholarships. Impacts on learning outcomes were limited (Filmer and Schady, 2008, 2009 and 2011). A new approach to scholarships at a primary level were subsequently tried with two different targeting mechanisms, one based on poverty level and the other on baseline test scores (“merit”). Both targeting mechanisms increased enrolment and attendance. However, only the merit-based targeting induced positive effects on test scores. The results suggest that in order to balance equity and efficiency, a two-step targeting approach might be preferable: first, target low-income individuals, and then, among them, target based on merit (Barrera-Osorio and Filmer 2013).

For more information on scholarships in Cambodia please see http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/07/23/000158349_20130723155137/Rendered/PDF/WPS6541.pdf

iii) Use Vouchers to Fund Education for Low Income Families

Voucher schools are a system where government provides funding to the school the student chooses to

attend; these can be government or non-government providers or both, depending on the system. Vouchers can be targeted to certain populations or they can be universal for all students in the system. A Colombian program that offered school vouchers to low-income families had positive impacts on student achievement and school completion (Angrist et al. 2002.) In the Netherlands, where there is a national voucher policy, school choice is used by the majority of parents, with over 70 percent of students enrolled in non-state schools. This includes families from across the income spectrum (Koning and Van der Wiel 2010).

As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of a voucher program in the Tanzanian context would need to be carefully considered because of the potential performance constraint to access. In the latest SACMEQ (2007), students from poor households scored 56 points less than their wealthier peers in Reading. This represents a difference of over one year of schooling (Chitiga and Chinoona 2011). Thus, vouchers can be expected to have little effect in expanding access if low income students are not being accepted to secondary schools due to their low grades.

Country example

In Pakistan, the Punjab Education Foundation launched an Education Voucher Scheme (EVS) in 2006 to benefit children in less affluent and underprivileged areas, who otherwise could not access education due to financial and social constraints. The scheme was immensely popular due to its positive effects on poorer segments of society. The scheme enables children aged 4-17 years to attend a nearby EVS private school of their choice for free. The scheme particularly targets out-of-school children, orphans, children of widows and single parents, as well as children who cannot afford school. There are no up-front infrastructure costs, as existing schools express their interest in participating in the EVS. A partnership between the school and the EVS is dependent on continuous quality assurance, including school visits and bi-annual quality assurance tests (QAT) that assess improvements in student learning outcomes. (Punjab Education Foundation 2014)

For more information on the Education Voucher Scheme, see <http://www.pef.edu.pk/pef-departments-evs-overview.html>.

Policy Option 2: Ensure that the regulatory environment promotes consistent quality in existing non-state schools

There are a number of instances in the Tanzanian regulatory environment where quality could be better instilled as the primary guiding principle. The regulatory environment for independent private schools currently includes some provisions that are not directly linked to quality, including opaque minimum certification standards and restrictions on school autonomy. Meanwhile, the accountability mechanism does not specifically target the most underperforming schools. The policies for minimum certification standards, school autonomy, as well as the accountability regime could all benefit from strengthening.

For example, the minimum standards for certification could be reoriented to focus specifically on learning outcomes. Additionally, policies around school autonomy could be strengthened, especially in light of the global evidence that school autonomy generally has positive impacts on student performance. With regards to school accountability, Tanzania currently has an advanced mechanism for holding schools accountable, including standard term inspections and sanctions. However, the government of Tanzania could improve its accountability mechanism by focusing inspections on the most underperforming schools, as well as ensuring that improvement planning is enforced and made part of official policy.

i) **Ensure that certification standards are clear in their minimum requirements and linked to educational outcomes**

In Tanzania, schools currently need to fulfill numerous criteria to be allowed to operate. Further, policy is opaque on the exact minimum requirements concerning, for instance, school premises and equipment. International research has shown that the school infrastructure and pedagogical materials that have an impact on student outcomes are: adequate numbers of textbooks, exercise books, desks, tables, chairs, and blackboards, as well as electricity and high quality walls, roofs, and floors (Glewwe et al. 2011). Out of the more costly interventions, school libraries appear to have a generally positive impact, while the impact of computers is less clear.

Tanzania should clarify the exact minimum requirements for new providers, and ensure that these are strictly linked to health and safety of students, and educational outcomes. Additionally, guidelines for certification should be readily available from multiple sources.

Country example

In New York City (NYC), the Department of Education oversees and supports new charter schools to improve learning opportunities and meet community needs. Charters have the autonomy to determine their own policies, design their educational programs, and manage all human and financial resource aspects of the school. When a new charter school is established, a five-year performance contract, or a “charter”, is set up to ensure high student achievement. There are no set minimum criteria for registration, but instead the performance standards are organized under four guiding questions:

1. Is this school an academic success?
 - a. High Academic Attainment and Improvement
 - b. Mission and Academic Goals
 - c. Responsive Education Program
 - d. Learning Environment
2. Is this school a fiscally sound, viable organization?
 - a. Governance Structure and Organizational Design
 - b. School Climate and Community Engagement
 - c. Financial and Operational Health
3. Is this school in compliance with its charter and all applicable laws and regulations?
 - a. Approved Charter and Agreement
 - b. Applicable Federal and State Law
 - c. Applicable Regulations (such as safe and secure school facilities)
4. What are the school's plans for its next charter term?
 - a. School Expansion and Model Replication
 - b. Organizational Sustainability
 - c. School or Model Improvements

(Source: New York City Department of Education 2013)

For more information on charter school certification in NYC, see:

http://schools.nyc.gov/community/planning/charters/Accountability_Oversight.htm.

ii) Strengthen policies around school autonomy

Overall, the methodologically rigorous studies assessing the impacts of local school autonomy on student learning outcomes generally find a positive relationship (Hanushek and Woessmann 2010; Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011). International education research shows that teacher credentials, including factors such as years of experience, certification, and education, fail to predict student learning (Dobbie and Fryer 2011; Goldhaber and Anthony 2004; Goldhaber and Brewer 2000; Hedges et al. 1994; Hanushek 1997).

In Tanzania, schools currently have the autonomy to appoint and dismiss teachers, as well as determine teacher salary levels. These currently informal policies could be strengthened in official policy documents. Regarding other aspects of school autonomy, such as teacher standards, class sizes, and curriculum delivery, there are currently restrictions for independent private schools. The highly particular and contextualized nature of education delivery necessitates decision making at the school level. In order to be aware of and adapt to changing student needs, school leaders require autonomy over the most critical managerial decisions. Tanzania could consider expanding the autonomy of independent private schools.

Country examples

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) Primary Schools currently serve over 670,000 students, 64 percent of whom are girls. Students attending BRAC schools do not pay fees. BRAC uses an innovative school model: the one-teacher school is operated by the same teacher for the same cohort of children for the entire period of four years. The teacher delivers lessons in all subjects, and the length of the school day is based on local needs. A typical BRAC teacher is a female community member with 10 years of schooling (completed high school). Teachers undergo an initial 12-day training course in order to repeat basic information on teaching and learning and to enhance their teaching abilities. They subsequently participate in monthly, subject-based refresher courses (BRAC 2013).

In England, private independent schools and privately managed schools (known as Free Schools and Academies) are able to make their own personnel decisions and adapt the curriculum. For example, some schools opt to use the government teacher standards while other schools tailor these to meet the needs of the local community. They are also able to tailor the curriculum providing it is balanced and broad. Schools are still required to teach English, Mathematics and Science and to make provision for the teaching of Religious Education (England Department for Education 2013).

For more information about the Academies Act of 2010, see:

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/32/pdfs/ukpga_20100032_en.pdf

iii) Focus on improving the quality of the most underperforming schools by moving to a needs-based inspection system

A country's accountability mechanism is crucial in ensuring high quality service delivery. On average, students perform better in schools with higher levels of accountability to the state (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011; Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Woessmann et al. 2007; Hanushek and Raymond 2005). An effective inspection process, including appropriate follow-up, can be an important means of school improvement.

Tanzania has an advanced accountability system, but resources could be more effectively used to improve the quality of the most underperforming schools. Every school is currently required to undergo an inspection at least once a year, even if they are high-performing. Tanzania could consider moving towards a needs-based inspection system, whereby the most underperforming schools are given the attention they need and high-performing schools are inspected less frequently.

Country examples: Inspection Process

In Malawi, the inspection framework covers private independent schools, religious schools, and public schools. Schools are inspected once every two years. Malawi also has inspections based on need using the following criteria:

- a) Schools with poor examination results
 - b) Schools which are poorly managed
 - c) Schools which have not been inspected for more than two years
 - d) High-performing schools in order to learn the good practices
- Malawi has four different types of inspection (Table 2).

Table 2: Types of inspection in Malawi


Type of inspection	Objective	Who carries it out	Duration
Full inspection	Evaluation of all aspects of the school (curriculum, organization of teaching and learning, general school administration and documentation, provisions of buildings and grounds, equipment)	Team of inspectors (3-6 inspectors depending on size of school)	Full day
Follow-up inspection	Evaluation of extent to which recommendations made in the full inspection report have been implemented	1-2 advisors	2 hours
Partial inspection	Examination and evaluation of one or a limited number of aspects of the school life	1-2 advisors	Depends on gravity of aspect
Block inspection	Improve inspection coverage of schools in a specific period of time	6- 8 supervisors from different districts	1-2 weeks

Source: Government of Malawi

The inspection report includes the type of school visited, enrolment, staffing, and rating of school performance in various aspects of the school and the general strengths and weaknesses of the schools. After the inspection, staff members and the head teacher are briefed on the school findings. This discussion gives a chance to the staff and head teacher to start working on the weaknesses identified in the school.

In the Netherlands a new risk-based inspection framework was introduced in 2007. The new inspection mechanism aims to reduce the burden felt by schools and makes inspections more effective. Schools delivering a good education (no risks detected) and good results do not require inspection, allowing the Inspectorate to focus on the rapid improvement of schools that supply a poorer education (risks detected) and get unsatisfactory results (Onderwijs Inspectie 2010). (See Figure 10)

Figure 10: Risk-based inspections in the Netherlands



Source: Modified from Onderwijs Inspectie (Dutch Inspectorate of Education) <http://www.onderwijsinspectie.nl/english>

iv) Strengthen policies concerning improvement planning

Improvement planning can facilitate positive change as a school strives to deliver better educational outcomes for all students. School improvement plans have been an important piece of multiple successful education programs in developing countries (Brunns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). Improvement plans traditionally outline the goals that the school desires to achieve, the strategies to achieve those goals, and the practical actionable steps needed to be taken by each individual within the school.

Improvement planning is currently informal policy in Tanzania. The government could strengthen official policies to ensure that all schools are required to submit an improvement plan as part of the inspection and quality monitoring process.

Country examples

Western Cape, South Africa, requires schools to submit individual school improvement plans. Particular attention is given to those schools that did not achieve the required pass rate on the state examinations. The number of underperforming schools has declined every year, from 85 in 2009 to 26 in 2012 (Western Cape Government 2013). Western Cape is also cited in a study that reviewed how the most improved schools continue to improve (Mourshed 2010).

Use of the SABER-EPS tool

The SABER tool is to be used not as prescriptive policy but rather as an informed assessment of the country policies in reference to the current knowledge of effective approaches. The results of this benchmarking serve as a good starting point for discussions of potential policy options to be considered in light of the nuances of the local context and national education system.

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Annex I: SABER-Engaging the Private Sector Rubrics

The following tables display the indicators and scales utilized for benchmarking each country's engagement with the private sector through policy. Across the four types of private schools, the indicators pertaining to each goal are largely the same; where a certain indicator pertains only to certain school types, this context is noted within the table.

Policy Goal: Encouraging innovation by providers				
Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Teacher standards	Central government has legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers.	Regional or municipal government has legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers with final review from central authorities.	Regional or municipal government has legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers without final review from central authorities.	The schools has legal authority to set their own teacher standards without final review from central authorities.
Teacher appointment and deployment	Central government has the legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers.	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers. Appointments are subject to final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal government has legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers without review by central authorities.	The school (school principal, school council, parent association etc.) has the legal authority to appoint teachers without review by central authorities.
Teacher salary	Central government has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels.	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels without review by central authorities.	The school has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels without review by central authorities.
Teacher dismissal	Central government has the legal authority to dismiss teachers.	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority to dismiss teachers with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority to dismiss teachers without review by central authorities.	The school has the legal authority to dismiss teachers without review by central authorities.

Policy Goal: Encouraging innovation by providers				
Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Curriculum delivery	Central government has the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered.	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered with final review from central authorities.	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered without final review from central authorities.	The school has the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered without final review from central authorities.
Classroom resourcing	Central government has the legal authority over how resources are allocated to the classroom (class size).	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms with final review from central authorities (class size).	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms without final review from central authorities (class size).	The school has the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms without final review from central authorities (class size).
Budget autonomy <i>(not applicable for independent private schools)</i>	Central government has the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets.	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets with final review from central authorities.	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets without final review from central authorities.	The school has the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets without final review from central authorities.

Policy Goal: Holding schools accountable				
Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Student Standards	Government does not set standards on what students need to learn	Government does set standards for what students need to learn, but there is no indication of by when or how well	Government does set standards for what students need to learn and also indicates EITHER by when OR how well they need to be learned	Government does set standards for what students need to learn, by when, and how well

Policy Goal: Holding schools accountable				
Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Student Assessment	Students do not take standardized exams.	Standardized exams are administered, but not annually.	Standardized exams are administered annually.	Standardized exams are administered annually, and results are disaggregated by school, socioeconomic background, gender and other types of disadvantage.
Inspection	Government does not require schools to undergo an inspection.	Government requires schools undergo an inspection but no term is specified.	Government requires schools to undergo a standard term inspection.	Government requires schools to undergo an inspection, and frequency of inspection depends on results of previous inspection.
Improvement planning	Not applicable if the government does not require schools to take part in inspections.	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school.	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school and specific priorities for improvement.	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school, Specific priorities for improvement and schools are required to submit a school improvement plan following the inspection.
Sanctions and rewards	Sanctions are not administered based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams.	Sanctions include additional monitoring/ warnings and are administered based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams.	Sanctions include additional monitoring and fines are administered based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams. <i>For government-funded, privately managed, and voucher schools: rewards may also be used.</i>	Sanctions include additional monitoring, fines and as a final measure school closures based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams. <i>For government-funded, privately managed, and voucher schools: rewards are also used.</i>

Policy Goal: Holding schools accountable			
Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established
Financial reporting <i>(not applicable for independent private schools)</i>	Government does not require schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for the continuation of funding.	Government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for the continuation of funding but adhocly/ no standard term.	Government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for the continuation of funding during a standard term.
			Advanced Government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for the continuation of funding during a standard term with greater monitoring of schools that have failed to adhere in the past.

Policy Goal: Empowering all parents, students and communities			
Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established
Information	No information is provided to parents on the results of standardized exams or inspection reports	Ad hoc information is provided to parents on standardized exam results or inspection reports	Regular information is provided to parents on standardized exam results or inspection reports
			Advanced Regular information is provided to parents on standardized exam results (disaggregated by school, socioeconomic background, gender, other types of disadvantage, etc.) and inspection reports from a variety of sources. Policy outlines information interventions to targeted disadvantaged groups

Policy Goal: Empowering all parents, students and communities				
Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Voice	Not applicable if the government does not require schools to take part in inspections	Neither students or parents are surveyed as part of an inspection process	Students or parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process	Student and parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process
Selection <i>(not applicable for independent private schools)</i>	Schools are allowed to select students based on both academic performance and geography.	Schools are allowed to select students based on academic performance or geography.	Schools are not allowed to select students but schools are not required to use a lottery if oversubscribed.	Schools are not allowed to select students and are required to conduct a lottery if school is over-subscribed.
Contributions <i>(not applicable for independent private schools)</i>	Parental choice is restricted by compulsory monetary parent contributions which if not paid prohibits the child from attending the school.	Parental choice is restricted by voluntary monetary parent contributions i.e. contributions to a school fund	Parental choice is restricted by voluntary non-monetary parent contributions i.e. in kind labor or goods	Parental choice is not restricted by any type of parental contributions
Tuition fees <i>(for independent private schools only)</i>	Government sets standardized tuition fees.	Government does not set standardized tuition fees but imposes cap (overall amount or % increases on tuitions fees).	Schools set fees, but are subject to review from government.	Schools set fees without any review from government.
Financial support <i>(for independent private schools only)</i>	The government does not provide tax subsidies or cash transfers for families attending private schools.	The government provides tax subsidies for families attending private schools.	The government provides tax subsidies and cash transfers which can be used by families attending private schools.	The government provides targeted cash transfers which can be used by disadvantaged families attending private schools.

Policy Goal: Promoting diversity of supply				
Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Ownership	The government allows one of the following types to operate a school: Community for profit based Faith based For profit	The government allows two of the following types to operate a school: Community for profit based Faith based For profit	The government allows three of the following types to operate a school: Community for profit based Faith based For profit	The government allows all of the following types to operate a school: Community for profit based Faith based For profit
Certification Standards	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, restrict entry including all of the following: 1.land (undulating, distance from public venues etc.) or 2.facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes etc.) or 3. assets(ownership of land or buildings)	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, restrict entry including two of the three following criteria: 1.land (undulating, distance from public venues etc.) or 2.facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes etc.) or 3. assets(ownership of land or buildings)	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, restrict entry including one of the three following criteria: 1.land (undulating, distance from public venues etc.) or 2.facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes etc.) or 3. assets(ownership of land or buildings)	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, do not restrict entry
Market entry information	Registration/certification guidelines are not officially outlined.	Registration/certification guidelines are not made public and only available on request.	Registration/certification guidelines are made public but from a single source.	Registration/certification guidelines are made public and from multiple sources.
Regulatory fees	Schools are able to operate whilst paying 4 + types of fees.	Schools are able to operate whilst paying 2-3 types of fees.	Schools are able to operate whilst paying 1 type of fee.	Schools are able to operate without paying fees.
Funding <i>(not applicable for independent private schools)</i>	Academic operating budgets are not equivalent to per-student amounts in public schools.	Academic operating budgets are equivalent to per-student amounts in public schools.	All budgets academic and additional budgets (facilities and transport) are equivalent to per student amounts in public schools. Schools do not receive targeted funding to meet specific student needs.	All budgets academic and additional (facilities and transport) are equivalent to per student amounts in public school. School receives targeted funding to meet specific student needs.
Incentives	No Incentives	Schools are supported by one of the following 1. startup funding similar to	Schools are supported by two of the following 1. startup funding similar to public schools,	Schools are supported by three of the following 1.startup funding similar

Policy Goal: Promoting diversity of supply				
Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
<i>(not applicable for independent private schools)</i>		public schools, 2. access to government landed or unused facilities or 3. exempt from local taxes (property taxes) similar to public schools	2. access to government landed or unused government facilities or 3. exempt from local taxes (property taxes) similar to public schools	to public schools 2. access to government landed or unused government facilities or 3. exempt from local taxes (property taxes) similar to public schools
Planning <i>(not applicable for independent private schools)</i>	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them less than 1 month before the start of the academic year.	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them between 1 and 3 months before the start of the academic year.	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them between 4 and 6 months before the start of the academic year.	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them more than 6 months before the start of the academic year.
Coverage <i>(for privately managed schools only)</i>	Coverage of charters is restricted by three of the following: student and school numbers and location (certain cities or districts). Only new or only existing schools are able to become charters.	Coverage of charters is restricted by two of the following: student numbers, school numbers, location (certain cities or districts). No restrictions due to new/existing school status.	Coverage of charters is restricted by one of the following: student numbers, school numbers, location (certain cities or districts).	No Restriction. Charters are not restricted by student numbers, school numbers, or location (certain cities or districts).

The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative collects data on the policies and institutions of education systems around the world and benchmarks them against practices associated with student learning. SABER aims to give all parties with a stake in educational results—from students, administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, detailed, objective snapshot of how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn.

This report focuses specifically on policies in the area of engaging the private sector in education.

This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

