



Policy Goals for Independent Private Schools

Status

1. Encouraging Innovation by Providers

In the absence of policy, independent private schools have authority to determine salary levels, to dismiss teachers and to set teacher standards. The school also has legal authority to appoint, deploy, and dismiss teachers, as well as to determine how curriculum is delivered. The government has set class size to a maximum of 50 students.

Advanced



2. Holding Schools Accountable

The government sets standards for what students need to learn for independent private schools, but there is no indication of when or how well. A standardized examination is set only for entry into the first grade of the secondary level. No other exams occur during other grades for this type of schools. Policy dictates that schools be inspected regularly but the term is not specified.

Established



3. Empowering All Parents, Students, and Communities

Parents have the right to be informed and participate in the functioning of the school. However, schools only provide ad-hoc information on examination results. Regarding the inspections, neither students nor parents are interviewed as part of the process. Schools are allowed to select students based on geography.

Emerging



4. Promoting Diversity of Supply

The government allows all of the following provider types to operate a school: not-for-profit, faith-based and for profit. Certification standards regarding land and facilities restrict entry of new schools into the market.

Established



Policy Goals for Government-Funded Private Schools

Status

1. Encouraging Innovation by Providers

In the absence of policy, government-funded private schools are able to determine salary levels, to dismiss teachers and to set teacher standards. The school also has authority to appoint, deploy, and dismiss teachers, as well as to determine how curriculum is delivered.

Advanced



2. Holding Schools Accountable

There is no existing legislation on setting standardized examinations and schools can apply their own rules on a case-by-case basis. There is no regulation which mandates that government-funded private schools be subject to inspection. No sanctions can be administered to these types of schools based on either examination or inspection results.

Latent



3. Empowering All Parents, Students, and Communities

Parents have the right to be informed and participate in the functioning of the school. However, schools only provide limited information on examination results. Schools have to prioritize enrolment of children whose parents live in the immediate vicinity. Furthermore, parental choice is restricted by compulsory monetary contributions from parents which, if not paid, prohibit the child from attending the school.

Emerging



4. Promoting Diversity of Supply

The government allows all the following types of organizations to operate a school: not-for-profit, faith-based, and for-profit. Certification standards regarding land and facilities prevent diversity of supply. Schools are given information on their allocations between 4 and 6 months before the start of the academic year.

Emerging



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
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Introduction

In recent years, private sector engagement in education—which includes a vibrant mix of non-profit, for-profit and faith-based organizations—has grown significantly around the world. **In the last two decades, the percentage of students in low-income countries attending private primary schools doubled, from 11 percent to 22 percent** (figure 1). This growth in private provision is closely connected to the boom in access that has taken place in low-income countries over the same two decades: primary net enrolment increased from 55 percent to 80 percent between 1990 and 2010.

As countries redouble their efforts to achieve learning for all at the primary and secondary levels, the private sector can be a resource for adding capacity to the education system. By partnering with private entities, the state can provide access to more students, particularly poor students who are not always able to access existing education services (Pal and Kingdon 2010; Patrinos, Barrera-Orsorio, and Guáqueta 2009; Hossain 2007). Additionally, evidence shows that governments have been successful at improving education quality and student cognitive outcomes in many countries through effective engagement with private education providers (Barrera-Orsorio and Raju 2010; French and Kingdon 2010; Barrera-Orsorio 2006).

Figure 1. Private enrolment as a percentage of total primary enrolments, by country income level



Source: Baum et al (2014).

This report presents an analysis of how effectively the current policies in Mauritania engage the private sector in basic (primary and secondary) education. The analysis draws on the Engaging the Private Sector (EPS)

framework, a product of the World Bank's Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER). SABER collects and analyzes policy data on education systems around the world, using evidence-based frameworks to highlight the policies and institutions that matter most to promote learning for all children and youth.

SABER-EPS research in Mauritania found that despite impressive gains in increasing enrollment and achieving gender parity at the primary level, access to post-primary schooling remains low, and ensuring equity in education is a challenge. School providers in Nepal include institutional schools, which are private, and community schools that receive government funding. Detailed information on institutional and community schools are provided in this report. Families have increasingly chosen to enroll children in private institutional schools, and learning outcomes stand to improve across the education system. Based on a review of existing policies SABER-EPS offers the following recommendations for Mauritania to enhance private sector engagement in education to meet the challenges of access, quality, and equity:

1. Improve the regulatory environment to support a greater supply of post-primary schools in underserved areas.
2. Strengthen accountability measures, including regularly collecting and disseminating comparable information on school performance, while increasing school autonomy.
3. Consider providing additional support to poor and marginalized students attending independent schools and post-primary schooling.

The rest of the report provides an overview of SABER-EPS, followed by a description of the basic education system in Mauritania, with a focus on the private sector and government policies related to private provision of education. The report then benchmarks Mauritania's policy environment utilizing the SABER-EPS framework, and offers policy options to enhance learning for all children in primary and secondary school.

Overview of SABER-Engaging the Private Sector

In many countries, the extent and activity of the private sector in education is largely undocumented and unknown. SABER-EPS is working to help change that. SABER-EPS assesses how well a country's policies are oriented toward ensuring that the services of non-state providers promote learning for all children and youth.

The aim of SABER-EPS is not to advocate private schooling. The intention is to outline the most effective evidence-based policies specific to each country's current approach toward non-state provision of education. SABER-EPS assesses the extent to which policies facilitate quality, access, and equity of private education services. Data generated by SABER-EPS can further the policy dialogue and support governments in engaging private providers to improve education results.

Four policy goals to engage the private sector

SABER-EPS collects data on four key policy areas that international evidence has found effective for strengthening accountability mechanisms among citizens, policymakers, and providers (box 1). These policy goals were identified through a review of rigorous research and analysis of top-performing and rapidly improving education systems.


The four policy goals enable a government to increase innovation and strengthen accountability among the critical actors in an education system (figure 2). Empowering parents, students, and communities enhances the ability of parents to express their voice and hold policymakers accountable for results. Additionally, when parents are empowered, in most contexts, they can have greater influence over provider behaviors. Increasing school accountability strengthens the quality- and equity-assurance mechanisms between the state and education providers. Encouraging innovation and promoting diversity of supply can allow providers to respond to local needs. Increasing school-level autonomy in critical decisions improves the services provided to students. Allowing a diverse set of providers to enter the market can increase client power and enable citizens to choose from a wider range of models. By developing these policy goals, a government can improve the accountability of all providers in an

education system and, subsequently, have a positive impact on educational outcomes.

Box 1. Key Private Sector Engagement Policy Goals

1. **Encouraging innovation by providers.** Local decision making and fiscal decentralization can have positive effects on school and student outcomes. Most high-achieving countries allow schools autonomy in managing resources (including personnel) and educational content. Local school autonomy can improve the ability of disadvantaged populations to determine how local schools operate.
2. **Holding schools accountable.** If schools are given autonomy over decision making, they must be held accountable for learning outcomes. Increases in autonomy should be accompanied by standards and interventions that increase access and improve quality. The state must hold all providers accountable to the same high standard.
3. **Empowering all parents, students, and communities.** When parents and students have access to information on relative school quality, they can have the power to hold schools accountable and the voice to lobby governments for better-quality services. For empowerment to work equitably, options for parents and students should not depend on wealth or student ability.
4. **Promoting diversity of supply.** By facilitating market entry for a diverse set of providers, governments can increase responsibility for results, as providers become directly accountable to citizens as well as to the state.

Figure 2. Relationships of accountability for successful service delivery



Source: Adapted from the World Bank (2003).

SABER-EPS recognizes that the four policy goals outlined in box 1 can assist governments in raising accountability for the education services provided in their countries. The tool allows governments to systematically evaluate their policies and implement practices that are effective across multiple country contexts.

Four types of private provision of education

Across the world, governments can implement numerous strategies to improve educational outcomes by supporting non-state education provision. SABER-EPS benchmarks key policy goals across the four most common models of private service delivery:

1. Independent private schools: schools that are owned and operated by non-government providers and are financed privately, typically through fees.
2. Government-funded private schools: schools that are owned and operated by non-government providers, but receive government funding.
3. Privately managed schools: schools that are owned and financed by the government, but are operated by non-government providers.
4. Voucher schools: schools that students choose to attend with government-provided funding;

these schools can be operated by the government or non-government providers or both, depending on the system.

SABER-EPS analyzes laws and regulations to: (1) identify the types of private engagement that are legally established in each country and (2) assess each education system's progress in achieving the four policy goals. **The aim of the SABER-EPS Framework is to provide policy guidance to help governments establish strong incentives and relationships of accountability among citizens, governments, and private education providers, with the goal of improving education results.**


Benchmarking Education Policies: the SABER-EPS Methodology

The World Bank has developed a set of standardized questionnaires and rubrics for collecting and evaluating data on the four policy goals for each type of private school engagement established in a given country.

The policy goals are benchmarked separately for each type of private engagement. A point of emphasis here is that **these tools only assess official and established policies governing private education provision. Additional tools determine on-the-ground implementation of these policies.** The SABER-EPS information is compiled in a comparative database that interested stakeholders can access for detailed reports, background papers, methodology, and other resources; the database details how different education systems engage with the private sector.

For each indicator associated with the respective four policy goals, the country receives a score between 1 and 4 (figure 3), representing four levels of private sector engagement: 1 (latent), 2 (emerging), 3 (established), or 4 (advanced).

Figure 3. SABER rubric benchmarking levels



Source: Baum et al. (2014).

The overall score for each policy goal is computed by aggregating the scores for each of its constituent indicators. For example, a hypothetical country receives the following indicator scores for one of its policy goals:

Indicator A = 2 points

Indicator B = 3 points

Indicator C = 4 points

Indicator D = 4 points

The hypothetical country's overall score for this policy goal would be: $(2+3+4+4)/4 = 3.25$. The overall score is converted into a final development level for the policy goal, based on the following scale:

- Latent: 1.00 – 1.50
- Emerging: 1.51 – 2.50
- Established: 2.51 – 3.50
- Advanced: 3.51 – 4.00

The ratings generated by the rubrics are not meant to be additive across policy goals. That is, they are not added together to create an overall rating for engaging the private sector.

Use of the SABER-EPS tool

SABER-EPS is not intended to be used as a prescriptive policy tool, but rather, as a tool to generate an informed assessment of a country's policies vis-à-vis current knowledge about effective approaches. The results of this benchmarking exercise serve as a good starting point to discuss potential policy options that could be considered, based on the nuances of the local context and national education system. Education systems are likely to be at different levels of development across indicators and policy goals. While intuition suggests it is probably better to be as developed in as many areas as possible, **the evidence does not clearly show the need to be functioning at the advanced level for all policy goals.** National education priorities lay at the center of recommended policy options; countries may prioritize higher levels of development in areas that contribute most to their immediate goals.

For more information on the global evidence underlying EPS and its policy goals, see the SABER framework paper, *What Matters Most for Engaging the Private Sector in Education* (Baum et al. 2014).

Education in Mauritania

Mauritania is a low-income country in Sub-Saharan Africa. The estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per-capita was US\$ 1,174 in 2012. Mauritania ranks 155th out of 185 countries in the 2013 UNDP Human Development Report. In 2006, GDP growth reached a high of 18.6 percent, before Mauritania saw a recession with its GDP shrinking by 1.2 percent in 2009. Since then, annual GDP growth rates have risen to reach 7.6 percent in 2012. Rapid urbanization has also created a near crisis situation in social services, including education (Global Partnership for Education 2013-2014). The rural/urban divide remains strong and in 2010, 58.6 percent of the population lived in rural areas. The urban population is mostly located in the District of Nouakchott, which holds around 20 percent of the country's population (Country Statistics Bureau 2014).

Over the last fifteen years, the Mauritanian Government has attached considerable importance to developing the education sector. In April 1999, Mauritania adopted a sweeping reform of its education system, which aimed at:

- consolidating its education system with the introduction of a single schooling track to help ensure full bilingual education;
- strengthening lower secondary education by adding one additional year of schooling, and introducing physics and information technology starting in years three and four; and
- Strengthening foreign language instruction.

Education in Mauritania follows a system that is organized into the following levels:

- Primary: 6 years beginning at age 6;
- Lower-secondary: 4 years starting at age 12;
- Secondary: 3 years starting at age 16.

The 2010 National State Report on the Education System in Mauritania (RESEN) identified key challenges that the education system faces over the next decades, such as demographic expansion and an increasing urban population which will contribute to a higher demand for education services that the Mauritanian government will face. The report offered an international comparative analysis of gross enrollment rates with other countries in the region in 2008, showing results above average for the

primary level, but recognizing that efforts need to be made at the secondary level (Table 1).


Table 1: Gross enrollment rates in countries with similar income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2008

	Primary	Lower secondary	Upper secondary
Benin	107	53.1	18.2
Burkina Faso	72.2	23.6	8.4
Cameroon	115.4	34.8	23.5
Cote d'Ivoire	80.7	35.6	18.1
Ghana	101.8	74.3	28.4
Mali	80	46.8	14.8
Mauritania	97.6	22.9	24.1
Djibouti	93.9	73.1	47.3
Senegal	83.5	37.9	15.4
Togo	112.1	57.9	21.2
Average	94.4	46.7	21

Source: RESEN: Pôle de Dakar, MEN/DSPC


To address these challenges, the Government of Mauritania has established the National Program for the Development of the Education Sector for 2011-2020 (PNDSE II – for its acronym in French). The plan outlines other challenges for primary education, which are related to quality of teaching and difficulties in access to education, especially in rural areas. Challenges identified for the secondary level are even greater. There still remain great disparities in terms of access and of provision of secondary education even though the transition rate from primary to secondary has increased from 36.6 percent in 2009 to 53 percent in 2011. The Government recognizes the role that the private sector plays “as a privileged partner of the Government of Education in the hope to satisfy the fundamental education needs” (Mauritania Sector Education Plan 2013-2014).

Public expenditure in education has risen from 2.5 percent of GDP in 2006 to 3.7 percent in 2011 (World Bank 2013). In 2011, the government of Mauritania spent 13 percent of its total budget on education. Government spending on primary education has been relatively stable in the last few years, rising from 42.6 percent of total educational expenditure in 2008 to 45 percent in 2011. However, educational expenditure at the secondary level has slightly decreased from 25.6 percent of total educational expenditure to 21.1 percent in 2011 (Figure 4). This shows that the Government of Mauritania is still focusing resources at the primary level.

Figure 4: Evolution of educational expenditure in primary and secondary levels (2008 to 2011)

Source: World Bank 2013


Access to education has also improved in Mauritania. In fact, a higher government share of spending at the primary level has led to significant strides in terms of access to education in the last few years. In 2004, the adjusted net enrolment rate was 72.2 percent compared to 75.1 percent in 2014. Similarly, the survival rate to the last grade of primary rose from 39.3 percent in 2004 to 81.2 percent in 2008 and then decreased to 64.1% in 2012 (Figure 5). In spite of this drop, it should be noted that this indicator improved in the past decade. Furthermore, more girls than boys complete primary school in Mauritania, with a gender parity index that rose from 1.01 in 2004 to 1.06 in 2014.

Figure 5: Evolution of the net enrollment and survival rate (2004-2014)

Source: World Bank 2016

Note: The World Bank's database does not have yearly data for the survival rate indicator. This graph shows the trend for the last decade.

But there still remain differences within the population in terms of access to education and the possibility of completing education at the primary level. In Mauritania, there is a gap in terms of completion rates according to geographic location. In 2007, 75.8 percent of the children completed primary education in urban areas compared with 43.9 percent in rural areas. Similarly, 33.1 percent of children in urban areas completed secondary education, while only 7.8 percent did so in rural areas (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Primary completion rate by urban and rural areas (2007)

Source: World Bank 2013

Learning outcomes in Mauritania are poor. The Program for the Analysis of Francophone Education Systems (PASEC) analyses scores in French and math at the 5th Grade level. Out of 7 countries with similar income levels, Mauritania has scored the lowest on average in French and math, far behind the average. In 2004, on average, Mauritania's 5th grade students scored 22.8 percent in French and 20.9 percent in Math, way below the country averages which were 42.1 percent and 38.3 percent respectively for all 7 countries analyzed. According to PASEC, students who perform below 24% are below level 1 and they are considered to be failing scholastically (PASEC 2016). In its 2010 National State Report on the Education System (RESEN), the Government placed these results as a national priority to catch up with similar countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (RESEN 2010).


Table 2: Average scores in French and math for PASEC countries

Country	Average score in French for 5th Grade	Average score in Math for 5th Grade	Av.	Date
Cameroon	50	55.1	52.5	1996
Madagascar	58.3	42.3	50.3	1998
Burkina Faso	46.1	44	45	1996
Cote d'Ivoire	40.5	50	45	1996
Senegal	37.6	34.9	36.2	1996
Chad	32.6	20.9	27.2	1996
Mauritania	22.8	20.9	21.8	2004
Average	41.1	38.3		

Source: Synthèse PASEC VII-VIII-IX

Mauritania's education system also faces a great divide according to household income. In 2007, 89.4 percent of the children from the fifth quintile completed primary education while only 16.9 percent of the children from the first quintile could do so. Similarly, 63.7 percent of the children from the fifth quintile attended secondary school and only 0.6 percent of the first quintile attended secondary education (Figure 7). There are large differences of access according to household background at all levels of education in Mauritania.

Figure 7: Primary and secondary completion rates by Quintile (2007)



Source: World Bank 2013

The average household spending on schooling shows great disparities in terms of what households can afford. In 2008, on average, an urban household spent twice as much on primary education as a rural household. Furthermore, the 20 percent richest households spent nearly 4 times more on primary education than the 40 percent poorest households (Table 2). In the National Program for the Development of the Education Sector, the government has identified this trend and aims to find policy solutions that can help poor and rural households to be able to spend the same amount on education, and reach a national average in terms of access to schooling (RESEN 2010).

Table 3: Average household spending on education per student in 2008 in Mauritanian Ouguiya and US Dollars

	MO	US Dollars	MO	US Dollars
	Primary		Secondary	
Geographical				
Rural	3,457	9.7	11,594	32.5
Urban	6,957	19.4	42,015	117.7
Income-based				
40% poorest	3,391	9.5	17,392	48.7
40% middle income	5,697	15.9	21,356	59.8
20% richest	12,722	35.6	61,117	171.2

Source: adapted by author from RESEN.

Note: The exchange rate by the time of the production of this report was 356.96 Mauritanian Ouguiya per dollar.

Private Education in Mauritania

Within Mauritania, two types of non-state schools exist: independent private schools and government-funded private schools.


- Independent private schools are owned and operated independent of government intervention and receive no financial support from the state.
- Government-funded schools are defined as private schools receiving government funding in order to tackle illiteracy and poverty. These types of schools are community schools and generally have a cultural or religious vocation.

In its Education Sector Plan, the government of Mauritania believes that the private sector is essential to provide a universal and high-quality education at all levels (PNDSE II 2011-2020). It has pledged to support the private sector to strengthen:

- Administrative support, especially concerning learning programs, follow-up and controls;
- Specifications for the private sector;
- Specific educational support, in terms of access to educational tools and training for teachers; and
- Information systems, follow-up and the evaluation system.

Between 2002 and 2010, the total student intake at the primary level increased at an average annual rate of 4.4 percent (PNDSE II 2011-2020). However, the number of

public schools has not increased at a similar pace, from 3,793 schools in 2002 to 4,010 schools in 2010 and an annual average growth of 0.7 percent. The private sector has played an ever-growing part in maintaining provision of education in Mauritania. Between 2002 and 2012, the total number of enrollments in private schools at the primary level increased from 12,391 to 71,104 students. There has been a similar increase at the secondary level, where the number of students enrolled in a private school went from 6,955 to 37,994 in a decade (Figure 8; World Bank 2013).


Figure 8: Total number and share of students in the private sector at the primary and secondary levels

Source: World Bank 2013

Between 2002 and 2010, the share of the private sector in the total number of enrollments at the primary level has risen from 3.3 percent to 11.4. Similarly, the share of the private sector in the total number of enrollments at the secondary level has risen from 8.8 percent to 26.6 percent (World Bank 2013). The private sector plays a great role in delivering education at the higher level, representing a quarter of enrollments.

Access to private education is often linked to school expenses, and stark differences in school fees in Mauritania can explain the difficulty for poorer families to access private education. Private education in 2008 ranged on average from \$97 (current) in primary schools to \$173 (current) at the secondary level; while average schooling costs in public school were \$12 (current) for the primary level and \$16 (current) in secondary (Figure 9; RESEN 2010).

Figure 9: Average annual school expenses per child in Mauritania in 2008 (current USD)



Source: RESEN 2010

Benchmarking Mauritania's Private Schools

This report presents the results of *SABER-Engaging the Private Sector* for independent private schools, as Mauritania has decided to involve this type of provider in offering basic education services. The report discusses the benchmarking results against the established recommended practices. For more information on the global evidence underlying these policy goals, see the SABER framework paper, *What Matters Most for Engaging the Private Sector in Education* (Baum, Lewis, Lusk-Stover, and Patrinos 2014).

The main policies, laws and official documentation used to benchmark Mauritania include the following legislation:

1. Decree 81.212 of 24 September 1981 Governing the status of the private sector of education
2. Decree 82.015 bis of 12 February 1982 establishing the conditions to open and control private schools

Goal 1: Encouraging Innovation by Providers

The highly particular and contextualized nature of education delivery necessitates decision making at the school level. In order to be aware of and adapt to changing student needs, school leaders require autonomy over the most critical managerial decisions.

The methodologically rigorous studies assessing the impacts of local school autonomy on student learning outcomes generally find a positive relationship (Hanushek and Woessmann 2010; Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011). A few studies find evidence that local autonomy for school leaders is associated with increased student achievement, as well as reduced student repetition and failure rates (King and Özler 2005; Jimenez and Sawada 2003; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012).

Box 2. International best practice – Encouraging innovation by providers

The following decisions/processes are made at the school level:

- Establishment of teacher qualification standards.
- Appointment and deployment of teachers
- Teacher salary levels
- Teacher dismissals
- The way in which the curriculum is delivered
- Class-size decisions
- Management of the operating budgets

Development levels

Independent private schools:



Government-funded private Schools:



In Mauritania, only one legislative document has been found regulating the autonomy of non-state schools in terms of class size. Schools have a high degree of autonomy and both, Independent private schools and Government-funded private schools, achieve an overall score of **Advanced**.

In both Independent private schools and Government-funded private schools, the school has autonomy over setting teacher standards, appointing and dismissing teachers and determining how the curriculum is set. For independent private schools, Article 4 of Decree 82015

Bis dated 12 February 1982 underlines the rules these types of school need to follow to be officially set up, and includes a teacher standards component. Indeed, an official document certifying the right to teach for each of the teachers working at the school has to be provided to the authorities as a requirement for the school to open.

Notwithstanding there is a lack of regulation on other aspects of school autonomy for non-state schools such as class size. The 1999 Government school reform has set class size to a maximum of 50 students in Independent private schools, but for Government-funded private schools, the school has the authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms without final review from central authorities (class size).

The lack of regulation highlights the lack of government oversight as to school accountability. The establishment of a regulatory framework pertaining to school autonomy could allow the government to have more information and monitoring power over schools.

Table 4: Encouraging Innovation by Providers

A. In-Common Policies: Independent Private Schools and Government-funded private schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Who has legal authority to set teacher standards?	Advanced ●●●●	The schools have legal authority to set their own teacher standards without final review from central authorities.
Who has legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers?	Advanced ●●●●	The school (school principal, school council, parent association etc.) has the legal authority to appoint teachers without review by central authorities.
Who has legal authority to determine teacher salary levels?	Advanced ●●●●	The school has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels without review by central authorities.
Who has legal authority to dismiss teachers?	Advanced ●●●●	The school has the legal authority to dismiss teachers without review by central authorities.
Who has legal authority to determine how curriculum is delivered (e.g., pedagogy, number of hours, learning materials)?	Advanced ●●●●	The school has the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered without final review from central authorities.

B. Policies for Independent Private School Policies		
Item	Score	Justification
Who has legal authority to determine maximum class size?	Emerging ●●○○	Regional or municipal government has the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms with final review from central authorities (class size).

C. Policies for Government-funded private schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Who has legal authority to determine maximum class size?	Advanced ●●●●	The school has the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms without final review from central authorities (class size).

Based on the benchmarking results for *Encouraging Innovation by Providers*, the **suggested policy options** for Mauritania include the following:

- Establish a regulatory framework for non-state schools in order to define clear rules of how to set teacher standards, appoint, deploy and dismiss teachers and to determine how curriculum is delivered.

Goal 2: Holding Schools Accountable

On average, students perform better in schools with higher levels of accountability to the state (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Woessmann et al. 2007; Hanushek and Raymond 2005). For non-state providers, when government funding is tied to accountability standards, schools are incentivized to perform more efficiently (Barrera-Orsorio and Raju 2010; Patrinos 2002). A strong accountability system requires that the government, parents, and educational professionals work together to raise outcomes. The government must play a role in ensuring that superior education quality is delivered by schools. SABER-EPS assesses multiple policy indicators to determine non-state provider accountability. A list of the key indicators is provided in box 3.

Box 3. International Best Practice – Holding Schools Accountable

- The central government sets standards regarding what students need to learn, including deadlines for meeting these standards.
- Students are required to take standardized examinations; exam results are disaggregated by school, socioeconomic status, gender, etc.
- Schools are required to report on the use of public funds as a condition of continued funding.
- The central government or an external agency performs school inspections as determined by school need.
- Schools produce school improvement plans.
- School performance is tied to sanctions and/or rewards.

Development levels

Private independent schools:



Government-funded Private schools:



In terms of establishing accountability between the government and schools, Mauritania's policies are **Established** for independent private schools and **Latent** for privately-managed schools. Accountability for both types of schools could be strengthened. Furthermore, there is no clear policy governing Government-funded private schools in terms of holding schools accountable.

The government does set standards for what students need to learn for either independent private schools or Government-funded private schools, but there is no indication of by when or how well. Curriculum is validated differently according to the school type. For independent private schools, a standardized examination is set only for entry onto the first grade of secondary level, also known as the "entry exam 1AS." No other exams occur during subsequent grades for private independent schools. For Government-funded private schools, there is no existing legislation on setting standardized examinations, and schools can apply their own rules on a case-by-case basis.

Articles 14 to 21 of Decree 82.015 concerning school inspections regulate the way inspections in independent private schools are run and how sanctions are administered. The Articles state that independent private schools undergo a constant inspection process.

However, there is no strict calendar to regulate this activity in this type of schools. Furthermore, article 24 stipulates that a report is sent to the relevant Minister, who can give observations, warnings or even sanctions leading to the possible closing of the school.

There is no regulation which mandates that government-funded private schools be subject to inspection. Therefore, the inspection mechanism does not support school improvement by outlining strengths and weakness or requiring the school to implement an improvement plan. A lack of standardized examinations and/ or inspection also prevents the government from implementing sanctions.

Table 5: Holding Schools Accountable

<i>A. In-Common Policies: Independent Private Schools and Government-funded Private Schools</i>		
Item	Score	Justification
Does government set standards on what students need to learn and by when?	Emerging ●●○○	Government does set standards for what students need to learn, but there is no indication of by when or how well
Are sanctions administered based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams?	Advanced ●●●●	Sanctions include additional monitoring, fines and as a final measure school closures based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams.

<i>B. Policies for Independent Private Schools</i>		
Item	Score	Justification
What is the current policy on standardized exams?	Established ●●●○	Standardized exams are administered annually.
Does government require schools to undergo an inspection?	Emerging ●●○○	Government requires schools undergo an inspection but no term is specified.

Does the inspection report outline the strengths and weaknesses of the school?	Emerging ●○○○	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school.
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C. Policies for Government-funded private Schools		
Item	Score	Justification
What is the current policy on standardized exams?	Latent ●○○○	Students do not take standardized exams
Are schools required to report to government on the use of public funds as a condition for the continuation of funding?	Latent ●○○○	Government does not require schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for the continuation of funding.
Does government require schools to undergo an inspection?	Latent ●○○○	Government does not require schools to undergo an inspection.
Does the inspection report outline the strengths and weaknesses of the school?	Latent ●○○○	Not applicable if the government does not require schools to take part in inspections.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedure, the following **suggested policy options** would help Mauritania increase the accountability of private schools:

- Establish learning standards and benchmarks within the set curriculum.
- Set a calendar for school inspections.
- Establish a regulatory framework for Government-funded private schools in order to define clear rules for schools to set up standardized exams, report back on the use of public funds, carry out school inspections and disseminate inspection reports.

Goal 3: Empowering all Parents, Students, and Communities

Empowering parents, students, and communities is one of the foundations for creating quality learning opportunities for all students. Poor and marginalized children, together with youth, disproportionately lack access to quality education services. To overcome this obstacle, governments need to increase providers' accountability to all clients, particularly underserved groups. Educational access and the performance of schools and students can be substantially impacted by **openly disseminating comparable school performance information** (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2009; Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman 2009; Björkman 2007; Reinikka and Svensson 2005); **increasing parental influence in the school** (Skoufias and Shapiro 2006; King and Özler 2005; Jimenez and Sawada 1999; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012; Di Gropello and Marshall 2005); and **implementing demand-side interventions**, such as scholarships, vouchers, or cash transfers, to help the most vulnerable students (Orazem and King 2007; Filmer and Schady 2008; Lewis and Lockheed 2007; Patrinos 2002; Barrera-Orsorio 2006). Effective policy practices for non-state providers include some of the indicators listed in box 4.

Box 4. International best practice – Empowering all Parents, Students, and Communities

- Information on standardized tests and school inspections is made available by multiple sources.
- Parents and students are included in the inspection and improvement-planning processes.
- Admission processes for entry into publicly funded schools are not based on student background; a lottery is used in cases of oversubscription.
- School choice is not hindered by mandatory financial contributions.
- Tax subsidies, scholarships, or cash transfers are available to families whose children attend independent private schools.

Development levels

Private independent schools:

Emerging
●●○○

Government-funded Private schools:

Emerging
●●○○

In Mauritania, the policies toward both independent private schools and Government-funded private schools

to empower parents, students, and communities are **Emerging**. Additional policy strategies could increase the client power of parents and enable parents and students to hold providers accountable.

According to Decree 81.212 approved on September 24, 1981, Independent private schools only provide limited information on standardized exam results for the entry exam of the first grade of Secondary school, also known as “entry exam 1AS.” Furthermore, this type of school only discloses information regarding certain inspection reports. This information is usually shared on billboards in front of the school, although other information tools are used on an ad-hoc basis at the school level. Regarding the inspections, neither students nor parents are interviewed as part of the process.

There is currently no policy that mandates Government-funded private schools to inform parents and students on school and student performance. Information is shared on a school-by-school basis, based on the communities’ usual practices.

Concerning the entry selection process in Government-funded private schools in Mauritania, schools have to prioritize enrolment of children whose parents live in the area of the school in question.

For Government-funded private schools, parental choice is restricted by compulsory parental monetary contributions which, if not paid, ban the child from attending the school.

Table 6: Empowering all Parents, Students, and Communities

<i>A. Policies for Independent Private Schools</i>		
Item	Score	Justification
What is the current policy on providing information to parents/students on the results of standardized exams?	Emerging ●●○○	Ad hoc information is provided to parents on standardized exam results or inspection reports
Are students interviewed as part of the inspection process?	Emerging ●●○○	Neither students or parents are surveyed as part of an inspection process
Does the government provide tax subsidies or cash transfers for families attending independent private schools? Please describe.	Latent ●○○○	The government does not provide tax subsidies or cash transfers for families attending private schools.

<i>B. Policies for Government-funded private Schools</i>		
Item	Score	Justification
What is the current policy on providing information to parents/students on the results of standardized exams?	Latent ●○○○	No information is provided to parents on the results of standardized exams or inspection reports
Are students interviewed as part of the inspection process?	Latent ●○○○	Not applicable if the government does not require schools to take part in inspections.
Are schools allowed to apply selective admission criteria when selecting students?	Emerging ●●○○	Schools are allowed to select students based on geography.
Schools are allowed to charge the following fees or accept contributions	Established ●●●○	Parental choice is restricted by voluntary non-monetary parent contributions i.e. in kind labor or goods

Informed by the results of the benchmarking process for Mauritania, the following **suggested policy options** would help empower parents and students to influence the quality of education services provided by private schools:

- Increase access to information on school quality to parents, including examination and school inspection reports, and allow them to make informed decisions on their child's schooling.
- Remove school selection criteria which may discriminate against marginalized groups.

For Government-funded private schools:

- Establish a legislative framework to regulate information at the school level for standardized exams and inspections to empower parents.
- Ease compulsory parental monetary contributions to allow poorer families to access government-funded private schools.

Goal 4: Promoting Diversity of Supply

By opening education to a more diverse set of providers, governments can increase client power and make providers directly accountable to students and parents for results. Although the public sector will always remain an important (and, in most cases, the predominant) provider of education services, educational choice can be used as part of a package of reforms to improve education access and quality in both the public and private sectors (Hoxby 2003; Levin and Belfield 2003; De la Croix and Doepke 2009; Carnoy and McEwan 2003; Himmler 2007; Angrist et al. 2002; World Bank 2003). In order to facilitate quality improvements through increased school competition and choice, governments can (i) allow multiple types of providers to operate; (ii) promote clear, open, affordable, and unrestrictive certification standards; and (iii) make government funding (and other incentives) available to non-state schools. This policy goal aims to increase the ability of diverse providers to provide education services. In order to do so, a number of policy indicators are suggested, as outlined in box 5.

Box 5. International best practice – Promoting diversity of supply

- The central government allows different types of providers to operate schools.
- Certification standards do not prohibit market entry.

- Information on market-entry requirements is available from multiple sources.
- Regulatory fees do not prohibit market entry.
- Publicly funded non state schools and public schools receive equivalent student funding; funding is increased to meet specific student needs.
- The central government provides incentives for market entry, such as access to start-up funding, public land, and public buildings.
- Schools are able to plan budgets six months in advance of the academic year.
- Privately managed schools are not restricted by student numbers, school numbers, or location.
- The central government does not restrict tuition levels at private independent schools.

Development levels

Private independent schools:



Government-funded Private schools:



In Mauritania, the policies in place to promote diversity of supply for independent private schools have achieved an overall score of **Established**, representing some instances of good practice. Policies for Government-funded Private schools achieved an overall score of **Emerging**, underlining the need for additional policies governing the promotion of diversity of supply.

Private independent schools set their own tuition fees without any review from government. The government also allows all of the following provider types to operate a school: not-for-profit, faith-based and for-profit.

In terms of certification standards, private schools have to follow restrictions on land and facilities. Furthermore, according to Article 4 of Decree 82015, private independent schools have to comply with the following certification criteria.

For the school:

- An authorization document indicating the nature of the school, its education objective, its utility in terms of the general country education policy and the number of students the school will enroll;
- A document outlining the number of envisaged personnel working at the school, teaching and

non-teaching personnel, and the qualifications needed for each position;

- An official document certifying the right to teach for each teacher;
- A document outlining the diplomas that will be awarded by the school and the number of classes;
- The timetable and curriculum for each class; and
- A plan of each building, for both teacher housing and classrooms.

The person establishing the school must provide:

- A birth certificate;
- A proof of nationality;
- A criminal record;
- A copy of all diplomas;
- A copy of the authorization to teach;
- A complete work history;
- A document stating fulfillment of military service;
- A certificate of employment (if the person has previously worked in an official ministry or organization);
- A medical certificate signed by two doctors;
- A list of all other schools the applicant might possess or other applications submitted; and
- A signed paper outlining that the applicant complies with the national curriculum, official teaching hours, that the applicant agrees to teaching and medical inspections and to report in a timely fashion on the status of their school.

Registration and certification guidelines for Government-funded private schools are not officially outlined. These schools usually work at the community level and their registration differs from area to area. These schools do not have to pay any fees in order to operate, enabling diversity of supply.

In Government-funded private schools, academic operating budgets are equivalent to per-student amounts in public schools. However, the government does not offer incentives, such as access to government land or unused buildings.

Government-funded private schools are given information on the allocations to be transferred to them between 4 and 6 months before the start of the

academic year. In 2013, government-funded private schools received approximately \$528,000 (current) in funding, around 305,000 for Koranic schools and 223,000 for Mahadras schools. However, there are no rules of how to use funds once they are received.

Table 7: Promoting Diversity of Supply

<i>A. In-Common Policies: Independent Private Schools and Government-funded Private Schools</i>		
Item	Score	Justification
Which organizations have legal authority to operate a school?	Established ●●●○	The government allows three of the following types to operate a school: Not for profit Faith based For profit
Are there minimum standards for registration or for independent private schools to be allowed to operate?	Latent ●○○○	Certification standards that are not linked to education outcomes restrict entry including all of the following: 1.land (undulating, distance from public venues etc.) or 2.facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes etc.) or 3. assets(ownership of land or buildings)

<i>B. Policies for Independent Private Schools</i>		
Item	Score	Justification
Who has legal authority to determine tuition fee standards?	Advanced ●●●●	Schools set fees without any review from government.
Are there clearly publicized guidelines from government outlining the steps or requirements for independent private schools to receive registration/authorization?	Established ●●●○	Registration/certification guidelines are made public but from a single source.
Are independent private schools required to pay any of the following fees in order to operate?	Advanced ●●●●	Schools are able to operate without paying fees.

C. Policies for Government-funded private Schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Are there clearly publicized guidelines from government outlining the steps or requirements for government-funded private schools to receive registration/authorization?	Latent ●○○○	Registration/certification guidelines are not officially outlined.
Are government-funded private schools required to pay any of the following fees in order to operate?	Advanced ●●●●	Schools are able to operate without paying fees.
Does the government provide equivalent funding of academic budgets (teaching salaries, learning materials, technology) for public and government-funded private schools?	Emerging ●●○○	Academic operating budgets are equivalent to per-student amounts in public schools.
Do government-funded private schools receive any startup funding/grants?	Latent ●○○○	No Incentives
How far in advance of the beginning of the academic year are government-funded private schools provided information on the amount of their upcoming government funding?	Advanced ●●●●	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them between 4 and 6 months before the start of the academic year.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedure for Mauritania, the following **suggested policy options** would help to better promote diversity of supply:

For both types of schools:

- Ease the minimum standards on land and facilities required for schools to be allowed to operate.

Government-funded private schools:

- Establish publicized guidelines outlining the steps or requirements for government-funded private schools to receive funding as well as registration/authorization.
- The government should consider providing funding to target specific student populations such

as low income, girls and/ or other marginalized groups.

From Analysis to Action: Policy Options for Mauritania

Mauritania is facing increasing demographic pressures and urbanization and a clear divide of its population between rural and urban areas which are affecting the way its education system is organized. Net enrollment rates at the primary level are at just over 70 percent and they have not evolved since 2004, and learning outcomes compared to similar income countries are poor. But there are encouraging signs, as survival rate to the last grade of primary has more than doubled from 39.3 percent in 2004 to 64.1 percent in 2012. Furthermore, there are more girls than boys who complete primary school in Mauritania, with a gender parity index of 1.05 in 2011.

The Government of Mauritania has identified the private sector as a key player for education provision. Between 2002 and 2012, the total number of enrollments in private schools at the primary level has multiplied by nearly 6 times and, in 2010, it represented 11.4 percent of enrollments at the primary level and 26.6 percent at the secondary level. However, private education is still much more expensive than public schools, and only the wealthiest share of the population of Mauritania can have access. Based on the results of the benchmarking exercise, four suggested policy options, to strengthen the government's engagement with the independent private school sector to ensure learning for all, are outlined below. The policy options focus on:

1. Establish a regulatory framework for government-funded private schools in order to define clear rules
2. Increase accountability of private schools through more inspections and follow-up action as well establishing sanctions for school improvement
3. Ensure information is easily accessible to parents and ban schools from using inequitable entrance selection criteria for students
4. Providing greater incentives to support a diverse number of private school providers while ensuring equitable access

These policy options are supported by international evidence and/or examples of countries that have used such interventions to strengthen their systems and improve service delivery. The country examples include international best practices, systems that have continued to improve from a variety of starting points, and countries that have taken innovative approaches.

Policy option 1: Establish a regulatory framework for Government-funded private schools and increase accountability

Legislation with regards to government-funded private schools is unclear across all of the identified policy goals, and for private independent schools, in terms of school autonomy. There are no legal standards requiring schools that receive financial or material support from the government to act any differently than unfunded schools. The Government of Mauritania could establish a clear regulatory framework governing the functioning of Government-funding schools. Furthermore, a clear regulatory framework could be coupled with increased actions in terms of school accountability by implementing better inspections and providing incentives and/or sanctions that contribute to school improvement. The three recommendations are outlined below.

1. Establish a framework for school autonomy for both independent private schools and government-funded schools

In Mauritania, there is currently no regulation as to how government-funded private schools and private independent schools set teacher standards, appoint, deploy and dismiss teachers and to determine how curriculum is delivered. By default, this means that these types of schools do have autonomy as to how they decide these rules at their level. However, the fact that non-state schools have autonomy because of lack of regulation does not mean that regulation should not be implemented or that a strong regulatory framework should not exist. The government should design and implement regulations that ensure that government-funded schools comply with quality standards.

The Government of Mauritania could establish a framework to set clear rules to comply with the above-mentioned criteria, and still grant these schools the autonomy that they need to set a clear regulatory

framework within existing schools and provide support to non-state schools that will be created in the future.

The methodologically rigorous studies assessing the impacts of local school autonomy on student learning outcomes generally find a positive relationship (Hanushek and Woessmann 2010; Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011). A few studies find evidence that local autonomy for school leaders is associated with increased student achievement, as well as reduced student repetition and failure rates (King and Özler 2005; Jimenez and Sawada 2003; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012). Moreover, such regulations on personnel and curriculum may limit the potential for private providers to operate and expand. For instance, certain schools may be unable to employ a sufficient number of qualified teachers.

Country examples

In England, private independent schools and privately managed schools (known as Free Schools and Academies) are able to make their own personnel decisions and adapt the curriculum. For example, some schools opt to use the government teacher standards while other schools tailor these to meet the needs of the local community. They are also able to tailor the curriculum providing it is balanced and broad. Schools are still required to teach English, Mathematics and Science and to teach religious education in the case of faith-based schools (England Department for Education 2013).

The Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) is the largest charter management organization in the United States. There are currently 141 KIPP schools, serving 50,000 students and over 86 percent of the students are from disadvantaged backgrounds (KIPP 2013a). KIPP set their teacher competencies framework- the KIPP Framework for Excellent Teaching. The framework has four areas: knowledge, the teaching cycle, self and others, and classroom culture (KIPP 2013b). An evaluation of 43 KIPP middle schools found an average estimated impact of 0.36 standard deviations in math (representing roughly 11 months of learning) (Tuttle et al. 2013). In addition, KIPP schools have had success increasing levels of student and parent satisfaction. KIPP is currently expanding its model to developing countries through its One World Program, which aims to create a global

network of transformational, breakthrough schools that will be run by local, independent partner organizations.

2. Hold schools accountable through better inspections

In Mauritania, there is also no current legislation defining the rules for Government-funded schools to set up standardized exams, report back on the use of public funds, and conduct school inspections, including inspection reports. Strong accountability systems consist of more than minimum standards; they also require mechanisms to continually improve school performance.

A review of quality assurance and school monitoring systems across eight Asian Pacific countries found that a number of countries proceed beyond basic minimum standards and effectively use accountability mechanisms to ensure continual improvement (Mok et al. 2003). The Office for Education Standards in Education (Ofsted) in England and the National Inspectorate in the Netherlands adopted a risk-based inspection approach, allowing schools performing well and continually improving to face less frequent inspection, while schools performing below standard are inspected more frequently and rigorously (Dutch Inspectorate of Education 2013; Ofsted 2013). This approach reinforces the accountability relationships at two levels, providing autonomy to high performers and targeting accountability to schools in greatest need. An effective inspection process, including appropriate follow-up, can be an important means of school improvement. Inspection frameworks should outline strengths and weaknesses of schools and priorities for improvement. Improvement planning can facilitate positive change as a school strives to deliver better educational outcomes for all students. Incentives such as sanctions and rewards can then be used to reinforce the accountability mechanism.

3. Provide incentives and/ or sanctions for school improvement

Incentives at the school level can also help to strengthen buy-in and raise accountability. For non-state providers, when government funding (such as vouchers or subsidies to non-state schools) is tied to accountability standards, it creates an incentive for schools to perform more efficiently (Patrinos 2002).

Country example

In Pakistan, Punjab Education Foundation's Assisted Schools (FAS) program provides monthly per-student cash subsidies and free textbooks to low-cost private schools. The program grew exponentially from 8,573 students and 54 schools in 2005 to over 1 million students and 3,000 schools in 2012. Participation in the program requires that schools achieve a minimum student pass rate in a semi-annual multi-subject exam – Quality Assurance Test (QAT). At least two-thirds of tested students must score above 40 percent on the QAT. If a school fails to achieve the minimum pass rate on two consecutive QATs, it is permanently disqualified for funding. A rigorous evaluation of the program found that these accountability measures had a positive causal impact on student learning. Schools in risk of losing access to subsidies were nearly always successful in raising student scores to meet the minimum pass rate on subsequent exams. In 2007, only 49 percent of schools in the study met the minimum pass rate in November of 2007, compared to nearly 100 percent of these same schools in March of 2008. The program also offers two cash bonus benefits. The first is a teacher bonus for achieving a high level in school test performance. In this sense, Punjab Education Foundation awards an annual bonus of 10,000 rupees (US\$118) to a maximum of five teachers per school. In order to qualify for to this bonus, the school has to be a program participant and at least 90% of its students should obtain a score of 40% or higher in the QAT. The second is a competitive school bonus for top school test performance. The foundation grants this annual bonus of 50,000 rupees (US\$588) to the program school of each of the seven main program districts with the highest share of students who score 40% or above in the QAT (Barrera-Osorio and Raju 2010).

For more information on Foundation Assisted Schools see <http://www.pef.edu.pk/pef-departments-fas-overview.html>

Policy Option 2: Ensure information is easily accessible to parents and prohibit schools from using inequitable entrance selection criteria for students

Based on current policies, the government of Mauritania could increase the information provided to parents on school quality. Access to comparative information could enable parents and students to influence school quality

through increased choice and direct voice to providers. Evidence from Pakistan found that school report cards improved learning by 0.1 standard deviations and reduced fees by almost 20 percent. The largest learning gains (0.34 standard deviations) were for initially low-performing (below median baseline test scores) private schools, with the worst of these more likely to close (Andrabi 2009).

Country examples

An early adopter of school report cards was Parana state in Brazil. Between 1999 and 2002 report cards were introduced to inform school communities and stimulate greater involvement in the school improvement process. The report cards were disseminated to a wider range of stakeholders including all schools, parent-teacher associations (PTAs), municipal education authorities and all 70,000 state education employees, including 46,000 teachers. Overall results were reported in the state education secretariat's monthly newsletter, used in teacher and PTA workshops, disseminated via press releases and press conferences (EQUIP2).

In the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, a USAID-funded program – Civic Engagement For Education Reform in Central America – implemented a school report card that focused on indicators in four areas:

1. **Context:** basic profile information (number of students in each grade, etc.) and access to services at the school (sanitation, electricity, etc.)
2. **Inputs:** class size, access to resources (notebooks, pens, etc.), and access to social services (school meals, health programs, etc.)
3. **Processes:** student and teacher attendance, school plan implementation, and parent participation
4. **Results:** coverage and efficiency (repetition and retention)

The results of the school report card are used by communities to develop and monitor implementation of school action plans (CERCA 2006).

For more information on CERCA School Report Cards visit: <http://bit.ly/CERCAcards>

Policy Option 3: Providing greater incentives to support a diverse number of private school providers

A meta-analysis of education studies in developing countries found that adequate numbers of textbooks, exercise books, blackboards, chairs, desk and high quality roof, walls and floors and electricity are more important for student learning than computers and other more costly interventions (Paul Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage and Ravina, 2011). The Government of Mauritania could ease its criteria for school registration in terms of land and facilities. Even though these criteria to open a private school contribute to a higher school quality for new schools, they should not be stricter than those applied to public schools. This would facilitate the market entry and expand access to a more diverse set of providers. The government can increase the responsibility for results, as providers subsequently become directly accountable to citizens as well as to the state. In order to do so, a conducive regulatory environment is needed to promote diversity of supply.

Country example

In New York City, the Department of Education oversees and supports new charter schools to improve learning opportunities and meet community needs. Charters have the autonomy to determine their own policies, design their educational programs, and manage all human and financial resource aspects of the school. When a new charter school is established, a five-year performance contract, or a “charter”, is set up to ensure high student achievement. There are no set minimum criteria for registration, but instead the performance standards are organized under four guiding questions:

1. Is this school an academic success?
 - a. High Academic Attainment and Improvement
 - b. Mission and Academic Goals
 - c. Responsive Education Program
 - d. Learning Environment
2. Is this school a fiscally sound, viable organization?
 - a. Governance Structure and Organizational Design

- b. School Climate and Community Engagement
 - c. Financial and Operational Health
- 3. Is this school in compliance with its charter and all applicable laws and regulations?
 - a. Approved Charter and Agreement
 - b. Applicable Federal and State Law
 - c. Applicable Regulations (such as safe and secure school facilities)
- 4. What are the school's plans for its next charter term?
 - a. School Expansion and Model Replication
 - b. Organizational Sustainability
 - c. School or Model Improvements

Source: New York City Department of Education 2013

For more information on charter school certification in NYC, see:

http://schools.nyc.gov/community/planning/charters/Accountability_Oversight.htm.

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Annex I: SABER-Engaging the Private Sector Rubrics

The following tables display the indicators and scales utilized for benchmarking each country's engagement with the private sector through policy. Across the four types of private schools, the indicators pertaining to each goal are largely the same; where a certain indicator pertains only to certain school types, this context is noted within the table.

The following tables display the indicators and scales utilized for benchmarking an individual country's policy on private sector engagement in education. Across the four types of private schools, the indicators pertaining to each goal are largely the same; where a certain indicator pertains only to certain school types, this is noted within the table.

Table A1.1 Policy Goal: Encouraging Innovation by Providers

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Teacher standards	The central government has the legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers, with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers without final review by central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority to set their own teacher standards without final review by central authorities.
Teacher appointment and deployment	The central government has the legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers. Appointments are subject to final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers without review by central authorities.	Schools (i.e., individual school principals, school councils, parent associations, etc.) have the legal authority to appoint teachers without review by central authorities.
Teacher salary	The central government has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels, with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels without review by central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels without review by central authorities.

Table A1.1 Policy Goal: Encouraging Innovation by Providers

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Teacher dismissal	The central government has the legal authority to dismiss teachers.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to dismiss teachers, with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to dismiss teachers without review by central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority to dismiss teachers without review by central authorities.
Curriculum delivery	The central government has the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered, with final review from central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered without final review from central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered without final review by central authorities.
Classroom resourcing	The central government has the legal authority over how resources are allocated to the classroom (e.g., class sizes).	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms, with final review from central authorities (e.g., class sizes).	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms without final review by central authorities (e.g., class size).	School have the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms without final review by central authorities (e.g., class sizes).
Budget autonomy <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	The central government has the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets, with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets without final review by central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets without final review by central authorities.

Table A1.2 Policy Goal: Holding Schools Accountable

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Student Standards	The national government does not set standards on what students need to learn.	The national government does set standards for what students need to learn, but it does not indicate how well or by when.	The national government does set standards for what students need to learn and also indicates EITHER by when OR how well.	The national government does set standards for what students need to learn, by when, and how well.
Student Assessment	Students do not take standardized exams.	Standardized exams are administered, but not annually.	Standardized exams are administered annually.	Standardized exams are administered annually and results are disaggregated by school, socioeconomic background, gender, and other criteria of student disadvantage.
Inspection	The central government does not require schools to undergo inspections.	The central government requires schools to undergo inspections, but no term is specified.	The central government requires schools to undergo standard term inspections.	The central government requires schools to undergo inspections, with the frequency of inspections depending on the results of the previous inspection.
Improvement planning	Not applicable if the government does not require schools to take part in inspections.	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school.	Inspection reports include the strengths and weaknesses of a school, as well as specific priorities for improvement.	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school. Schools are required to submit a school improvement plan with specific priorities for improvement following the inspection.

Sanctions and rewards	Sanctions are not administered based on the results of school inspections or school performance on standardized exams.	Sanctions include additional monitoring and/or warnings; they are administered based on the results of school inspections or school performance on standardized exams.	Sanctions include additional monitoring and/or fines, which are administered based on the results of school inspections or school performance on standardized exams. <i>For government-funded, privately managed, and voucher schools: rewards may also be used.</i>	Sanctions include additional monitoring, fines, and as a final measure, school closures; decisions are made based on the results of school inspections or school performance on standardized exams. <i>For government-funded, privately managed, voucher schools: rewards are also used.</i>
Financial reporting <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	The central government does not require schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for the continuation of funding.	The government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for continued funding, but on an ad-hoc basis and not according to a standard-term schedule.	The central government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for continued funding according to a standard term.	The central government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for continued funding on a standard-term basis, with greater monitoring of schools that have failed to adhere to report requirements in the past.

Table A.1.3. Policy Goal: Empowering All Parents, Students and Communities

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Information	No information is provided to parents on the results of standardized exams or inspection reports.	Ad-hoc information is provided to parents on standardized exam results or inspection reports.	Regular information is provided to parents on standardized exam results or inspection reports.	A variety of sources provide parents regular information provided on standardized exam results (disaggregated by school, socioeconomic background, gender, and other criteria of student disadvantage.) and inspection reports. Policy specifies information on interventions designed to targeted disadvantaged student groups.

Table A.1.3. Policy Goal: Empowering All Parents, Students and Communities

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Voice	Not applicable if the government does not require schools to take part in inspections.	Neither students nor parents are surveyed as part of the inspection process.	Students and/or parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process.	Student and parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process.
Selection <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	Schools are allowed to select students based on both academic performance and geography.	Schools are allowed to select students based on academic performance or geography.	Schools are not allowed to select students but schools are not required to use a lottery if oversubscribed.	Schools are not allowed to select students and are required to conduct a lottery if school if over-subscribed.
Contributions <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	Parental choice is restricted by compulsory monetary parent contributions that, if not paid, prohibits a child from attending the school.	Parental choice is restricted by voluntary monetary contributions (i.e., contributions to a school fund).	Parental choice is restricted by voluntary nonmonetary contributions (i.e., in-kind labor or goods) to a school.	Parental choice is not restricted by any type of required parental contributions.
Financial support <i>(for independent private schools only)</i>	The central government does not provide tax subsidies or cash transfers to families whose children attend private schools.	The central government provides tax subsidies to families whose children attend private schools.	The central government provides tax subsidies and cash transfers to families, which can be used to enable their children to attend private schools.	The central government provides targeted cash transfers that can be used by disadvantaged students attending private schools.

Table A.1.4. Policy Goal: Promoting Diversity of Supply

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Ownership	The central government allows one of the following types of organizations to operate schools: Community Not-for-profit Faith-based For-profit	The central government allows two of the following types of organizations to operate schools: Community Not-for-profit Faith-based For-profit	The central government allows three of the following types of organizations to operate schools: Community Not-for-profit Faith-based For-profit	The government allows all of the following types of organizations to operate schools: Community Not-for-profit Faith-based For-profit
Certification standards	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, restrict market entry. These include all of the following: 1. land (undulating, distance from public venues, etc.) 2. facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes, etc.) 3. assets (ownership of land or buildings)	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, restrict market entry. These include two of the three following criteria: 1. land (undulating, distance from public venues, etc.) or 2. facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes, etc.) 3. assets (ownership of land or buildings)	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, restrict market entry. These include one of the three following criteria: 1. land (undulating, distance from public venues, etc.) 2. facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes, etc.) 3. assets (ownership of land or buildings)	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, do not restrict market entry.
Market entry information	Registration/certification guidelines are not officially outlined.	Registration/certification guidelines are not made public and available only upon request.	Registration/certification guidelines are made public, but by a single source.	Registration/certification guidelines are made public and by multiple sources.
Regulatory fees	Schools are able to operate while paying four or more types of fees.	Schools are able to operate while paying two to three types of fees.	Schools are able to operate while paying one type of fee.	Schools are able to operate without paying fees.
Tuition fees <i>(for independent private schools only)</i>	The central government sets standardized tuition fees.	The central government does not set standardized tuition fees, but imposes a tuition cap (an overall amount or percentage increase).	Schools set fees, but those fees are subject to review by the central government.	Schools set fees without any review by the central government.

Table A.1.4. Policy Goal: Promoting Diversity of Supply

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
Funding <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	Academic operating budgets are not equivalent to per-student funding amounts in public schools.	Academic operating budgets are equivalent to per-student funding amounts in public schools.	All budgets — academic and other, such as for facilities and transport — are equivalent to per-student funding amounts in public schools. Schools do not receive targeted funding to meet specific student needs.	All budgets — academic and other, such as for facilities and transport — are equivalent to per-student funding amounts in public school. Schools receive targeted funding to meet specific student needs.
Incentives <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	No incentives exist.	Schools are supported by one of the following: 1. start-up funding similar to that provided to public schools 2. access to government land or unused government facilities 3. exemption from local taxes (i.e., property taxes) similar to that granted to public schools	Schools are supported by two of the following 1. Start-up funding similar to that provided to public schools 2. access to government land or unused government facilities 3. exemption from local taxes (i.e., property taxes) similar to that granted to public schools	Schools are supported by all of the following 1. Start-up funding similar to that provided to public schools 2. access to government land or unused government facilities 3. exemption from local taxes (i.e., property taxes) similar to that granted to public schools
Planning <i>(not applicable for independent private schools)</i>	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them less than 1 month before the start of the academic year.	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them between 1 and 3 months before the start of the academic year.	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them between 4 and 6 months before the start of the academic year.	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them more than 6 months before the start of the academic year.
Coverage <i>(for privately managed schools only)</i>	Coverage of charters is restricted by three of the following: 1. student numbers 2. school numbers and location (i.e., certain cities or districts) 3. only new or only existing	Coverage of charters is restricted by two of the following: 1. student numbers 2. school numbers and location (i.e., certain cities or districts)	Coverage of charters is restricted by one of the following: 1. student numbers 2. school numbers and location (i.e., certain cities or districts).	No restrictions. Charters are not restricted by student numbers, school numbers, or location (i.e., certain cities or districts).

Table A.1.4. Policy Goal: Promoting Diversity of Supply

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
	schools are able to become charters	No restrictions due to new/existing school status.		

The **Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER)** initiative produces comparative data and knowledge on education policies and institutions, with the aim of helping countries systematically strengthen their education systems. SABER evaluates the quality of education policies against evidence-based global standards, using new diagnostic tools and detailed policy data. The SABER country reports give all parties with a stake in educational results—from administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, objective snapshot showing how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn.

This report focuses specifically on policies in the area of **Engaging the Private Sector in Education**.

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