



### Policy Goals for Independent Private Schools

#### Status

#### 1. Encouraging Innovation by Providers

Teacher standards are set by the central government, which also has authority over class sizes and delivery of the curriculum. Schools have autonomy over appointment, deployment, and dismissal of teachers, as well as teacher salaries.



#### 2. Holding Schools Accountable

The government sets standards for what students need to learn each year and for each class. Each year's program is set and needs to be followed by each school. Standardized exams are administered to selected grades annually; however, results are not disaggregated. Policy dictates that schools be inspected and the term of inspection depends on the results of previous inspections.



#### 3. Empowering All Parents, Students, and Communities

Parents are provided with regular information on standardized exams and the results of inspections. However, neither students nor parents are surveyed as part of the inspection process.



#### 4. Promoting Diversity of Supply

Private independent schools set fees subject to government review. The government allows all of the following provider types to operate a school: community, not for profit, faith based, and for profit. Certification standards on land, facilities, and assets prevent new providers from entering the market.



### Policy Goals for Government-Funded Private Schools

#### Status

#### 1. Encouraging Innovation by Providers

Teacher standards are set by the central government, which also has authority over class sizes and delivery of the curriculum. Schools have autonomy over appointment, deployment, and dismissal of teachers. In terms of management of school operating budgets, each school has authority over teacher salaries and other operating costs, apart from teachers who have been enlisted to receive Monthly Pay Orders (MPOs) and who receive salaries from the government.



#### 2. Holding Schools Accountable

The government sets standards for what students need to learn each year and for each class. Each year's program is set and needs to be followed by each school. Standardized exams are administered annually to selected grades. Policy dictates that schools be inspected and the term of inspection depends on the results of previous inspections. The government also requires schools to report on the use of public funds.



#### 3. Empowering All Parents, Students, and Communities

Only ad-hoc information is provided to parents on standardized exams and inspections, and neither students nor parents are surveyed as part of the inspection process. Schools are not allowed to select students and are required to conduct a lottery if a school is over-subscribed.



#### 4. Promoting Diversity of Supply

The government allows all of the following provider types to operate a school: community, not for profit, faith based, and for profit. Certification standards on land, facilities, and assets prevent new providers from entering the market. Academic operating budgets are not equivalent to per-student amounts in public schools.



## Table of Contents


Introduction .....	1
Overview of SABER-Engaging the Private Sector .....	2
Benchmarking Education Policies: The SABER-EPS Methodology .....	4
Education in Bangladesh .....	5
Performance of the Education System .....	6
Education Providers in Bangladesh .....	9
Secondary Education Providers .....	11
Private Education in Bangladesh—Administration and Performance .....	12
Benchmarking Bangladesh’s Private School Policies .....	16
From Analysis to Action: Policy Options for Bangladesh .....	26
<b>Policy Option 1: Improve information at the school level</b> .....	26
<b>Policy Option 2: Build on incentives for the poorest students to attend private schools</b> .....	27
Acknowledgements .....	31
References .....	31

## Introduction

In recent years, private sector engagement in education—which includes a vibrant mix of non-profit, for-profit and faith-based organizations—has grown significantly around the world. **In the last two decades, the percentage of students in low-income countries attending private primary schools doubled, from 11 percent to 22 percent** (figure 1). This growth in private provision is closely connected to the boom in access that has taken place in low-income countries over the same two decades: primary net enrolment increased from 55 percent to 80 percent between 1990 and 2010.

**As countries redouble their efforts to achieve learning for all at the primary and secondary levels, the private sector can be a resource for adding capacity to the education system.** By partnering with private entities, the state can provide access to more students, particularly poor students who are not always able to access existing education services (Pal and Kingdon 2010; Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, and Guáqueta 2009; Hossain 2007). Additionally, evidence shows that governments have been successful at improving education quality and student cognitive outcomes in many countries through effective engagement with private education providers (Barrera-Osorio and Raju 2010; French and Kingdon 2010; Barrera-Osorio 2006).

**Figure 1. Private enrolment as a percentage of total primary enrolments, by country income level**



Source: Baum et al (2014).

**This report presents an analysis of how effectively the current policies in Bangladesh engage the private sector in basic (primary and secondary) education.** The analysis

draws on the Engaging the Private Sector (EPS) Framework, a product of the World Bank’s Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER). SABER collects and analyzes policy data on education systems around the world, using evidence-based frameworks to highlight the policies and institutions that matter most for promoting learning for all children and youth.

SABER-EPS research in Bangladesh has found that access to primary education is nearly universal and that retention rates of students to the last grade of primary school have increased significantly. However, in 2012, only 48 percent of children enrolled in secondary school. At both the primary and secondary levels, quality and equity are challenges. The private sector plays a significant role in education at both levels. At the primary level, the range of school options is broad, with 24 different types of institutions. The private sector accounts for nearly a quarter of enrolments at this level. The secondary subsector is comprised almost entirely of private institutions and accounts for nearly 98 percent of enrolments. Based on a review of existing policies, SABER-EPS offers the following recommendations for Bangladesh to enhance private sector engagement in education to meet the challenges of access, quality, and equity:

- 1) Improve information at the school level.
- 2) Build on incentives for the poorest to attend private schools.
- 3) Increase outcome-based accountability of private schools.
- 4) Ensure the regulatory environment maintains standards of quality for providers entering both the primary and secondary school market.

The rest of the report provides an overview of SABER-EPS, followed by a description of the basic education system in Bangladesh with a focus on the private sector and government policies related to the private provision of education. The report then benchmarks Bangladesh’s policy environment utilizing the SABER-EPS Framework and offers policy options to enhance access and learning for all children in primary and secondary school.

## Overview of SABER-Engaging the Private Sector

In many countries, the extent and activity of the private sector in education is largely undocumented and unknown. SABER-EPS is working to help change that. SABER-EPS assesses how well a country's policies are oriented toward ensuring that the services of non-state providers promote learning for all children and youth.

The aim of SABER-EPS is not to advocate private schooling. The intention is to outline the most effective evidence-based policies specific to each country's current approach toward non-state provision of education. SABER-EPS assesses the extent to which policies facilitate quality, access, and equity of private education services. Data generated by SABER-EPS can further the policy dialogue and support governments in engaging private providers to improve education results.

### Four policy goals for engaging the private sector

SABER-EPS collects data on four key policy areas that international evidence has found effective for strengthening accountability mechanisms among citizens, policymakers, and providers (box 1). These policy goals were identified through a review of rigorous research and analysis of top-performing and rapidly improving education systems.


The four policy goals enable a government to increase innovation and strengthen accountability among the critical actors in an education system (figure 2). Empowering parents, students, and communities enhances the ability of parents to express their voice and hold policymakers accountable for results. Additionally, when parents are empowered, in most contexts, they can have greater influence over provider behaviors. Increasing school accountability strengthens the quality- and equity-assurance mechanisms between the state and education providers. Encouraging innovation and promoting diversity of supply can allow providers to respond to local needs. Increasing school-level autonomy in critical decisions improves the services provided to students. Allowing a diverse set of providers to enter the market can increase client power and enable citizens to choose from a wider range of models. By developing these policy goals, a government can

improve the accountability of all providers in an education system and, subsequently, have a positive impact on educational outcomes.

#### Box 1. Key private sector engagement policy goals

1. **Encouraging innovation by providers.** Local decision making and fiscal decentralization can have positive effects on school and student outcomes. Most high-achieving countries allow schools autonomy in managing resources (including personnel) and educational content. Local school autonomy can improve the ability of disadvantaged populations to determine how local schools operate.
2. **Holding schools accountable.** If schools are given autonomy over decision making, they must be held accountable for learning outcomes. Increases in autonomy should be accompanied by standards and interventions that increase access and improve quality. The state must hold all providers accountable to the same high standard.
3. **Empowering all parents, students, and communities.** When parents and students have access to information on relative school quality, they can have the power to hold schools accountable and the voice to lobby governments for better-quality services. For empowerment to work equitably, options for parents and students should not depend on wealth or student ability.
4. **Promoting diversity of supply.** By facilitating market entry for a diverse set of providers, governments can increase responsibility for results, as providers become directly accountable to citizens as well as to the state.

**Figure 2. Relationships of accountability for successful service delivery**



Source: Adapted from the World Bank (2003).

SABER-EPS recognizes that the four policy goals outlined in box 1 can assist governments in raising accountability for the education services provided in their countries. The tool allows governments to systematically evaluate their policies and implement practices that are effective across multiple country contexts.

### Four types of private provision of education

Across the world, governments can implement numerous strategies to improve educational outcomes by supporting non-state education provision. SABER-EPS benchmarks key policy goals across the four most common models of private service delivery:

1. **Independent private schools:** schools that are owned and operated by non-government providers and are financed privately, typically through fees.
2. **Government-funded private schools:** schools that are owned and operated by non-government providers, but receive government funding.
3. **Privately managed schools:** schools that are owned and financed by the government, but are operated by non-government providers.
4. **Voucher schools:** schools that students choose to attend with government-provided funding; these schools can be operated by the

government or non-government providers or both, depending on the system.

SABER-EPS analyzes laws and regulations to: (1) identify the types of private engagement that are legally established in each country and (2) assess each education system’s progress in achieving the four policy goals. **The aim of the SABER-EPS Framework is to provide policy guidance to help governments establish strong incentives and relationships of accountability among citizens, governments, and private education providers, with the goal of improving education results.**

## Benchmarking Education Policies: The SABER-EPS Methodology

The World Bank has developed a set of standardized questionnaires and rubrics for collecting and evaluating data on the four policy goals for each type of private school engagement established in a given country.

The policy goals are benchmarked separately for each type of private engagement. A point of emphasis here is that **these tools only assess official and established policies governing private education provision. Additional tools determine on-the-ground implementation of these policies.** The SABER-EPS information is compiled in a comparative database that interested stakeholders can access for detailed reports, background papers, methodology, and other resources; the database details how different education systems engage with the private sector.

For each indicator associated with the respective four policy goals, the country receives a score between 1 and 4 (figure 3), representing four levels of private sector engagement: 1 (latent), 2 (emerging), 3 (established), or 4 (advanced).

Figure 3. SABER rubric benchmarking levels



Source: Baum et al. (2014).

The overall score for each policy goal is computed by aggregating the scores for each of its constituent indicators. For example, a hypothetical country receives the following indicator scores for one of its policy goals:

Indicator A = 2 points

Indicator B = 3 points

Indicator C = 4 points

Indicator D = 4 points

The hypothetical country’s overall score for this policy goal would be:  $(2+3+4+4)/4 = 3.25$ . The overall score is converted into a final development level for the policy goal, based on the following scale:

Latent: 1.00 – 1.50

Emerging: 1.51 – 2.50

Established: 2.51 – 3.50

Advanced: 3.51 – 4.00

**The ratings generated by the rubrics are not meant to be additive across policy goals. That is, they are not added together to create an overall rating for engaging the private sector.**

### Use of the SABER-EPS tool

SABER-EPS is not intended to be used as a prescriptive policy tool, but rather, as a tool to generate an informed assessment of a country’s policies vis-à-vis current knowledge about effective approaches. The results of this benchmarking exercise serve as a good starting point to discuss potential policy options that could be considered, based on the nuances of the local context and national education system. Education systems are likely to be at different levels of development across indicators and policy goals. While intuition suggests it is probably better to be as developed in as many areas as possible, **the evidence does not clearly show the need to be functioning at the advanced level for all policy goals.** National education priorities lay at the center of recommended policy options; countries may prioritize higher levels of development in areas that contribute most to their immediate goals.

For more information on the global evidence underlying EPS and its policy goals, see the SABER framework paper, *What Matters Most for Engaging the Private Sector in Education* (Baum et al. 2014).

## Education in Bangladesh

This report will examine the current status of primary and secondary education in Bangladesh. This section provides an overview of the education system, outlining its organization, structure, and key performance indicators. It then discusses the diverse education providers in Bangladesh, differentiating between the primary and secondary sub-sectors, as education provision at these two levels falls under the jurisdiction of different ministries and provision at the two levels differ substantially. This is followed by a comparison of the performance of private schools with that of public schools.

Bangladesh is a low-income country located in South Asia. In the past decade, the country's gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at around 6 percent per year and human development advanced hand-in-hand with economic growth. In the same period, poverty dropped by nearly a third, coupled with increased life expectancy, literacy, and per capita food intake. More than 15 million Bangladeshis have moved out of poverty since 1992 (World Bank N.d.). However, Bangladesh is still facing many challenges in becoming a middle-income country. Around 80 percent of Bangladesh's population of nearly 150 million still live on less than US\$ 2 a day. Chronic malnutrition affects 56 percent of the poorest children. Bangladesh is among the most densely populated countries in the world, with 964 people per square kilometer. On nearly a yearly basis, over 40 percent of the country suffers from natural disasters (World Bank N.d.).

The education sector in Bangladesh has low internal efficiency. Although net enrolment at the primary level has been above 90 percent for a number of years and persistence to the last grade of primary school has increased significantly—from 67.2 percent in 2010 to 80.5 percent in 2013—only 48 percent of school-age children were enrolled in secondary school in 2012. In 2012, the overall adult literacy rate was 59 percent (Bangladesh-DPE 2014b; World Bank N.d.). Over the past two decades, most government education programs have focused on children in rural areas. As such, rural enrolment rates have increased tremendously. For other hard-to-reach populations, such as disabled children, refugees, and ethnic minorities—in particular, those in eastern divisions of the country (including Dhaka,

Chittagong, and Sylhet)—primary and secondary enrolment rates are low (World Bank 2013).

A plethora of providers operate in Bangladesh and play a crucial role in providing education services, ranging from government-funded private schools to independent private schools. The provision of education at the primary level differs in many respects from provision at the secondary level, with a much greater range of school options available at the primary level and a far greater proportion of private institutions at the secondary level.

The list below outlines the main primary and secondary-level providers in Bangladesh divided by sub-sector, given how education provision varies vastly between the two levels. While a majority of students attend public schools at the primary level, almost all provision at the secondary level is private (though government funded). The primary sub-sector is marked by a diverse set of providers among government-funded and independent private schools. While less data is available on secondary schools, there is also a considerable range of providers at this level. Enrolments in *madrassas* (Islamic religious schools that can be either government-funded or fully private) are much higher at the secondary level than the primary level.

Bangladesh's primary and secondary levels are organized as follows:

- Primary: 5 years beginning at age 6
- Junior secondary: 3 years starting at age 11
- Secondary: 2 years starting at age 14
- Higher secondary (intermediate colleges): 2 years beginning at age 16

A parallel system of formal religious Islamic education is offered through *madrassas*. This stream falls into both the government-funded and independent private groupings at the primary and secondary level. This system follows the same sequence as the formal system. The *madrassas* provide additional religious instruction and the streams are (Bangladesh-MoPME 2003):


- *ebtedayee* (equivalent to primary): 5 years
- *dakhil* (equivalent to junior secondary): 5 years
- *alim* (equivalent to higher secondary): 2 years.

## Performance of the Education System

Government expenditure on education has been stable over the last decade, at 2.4 percent of GDP in 2000 and 2.1 percent of GDP in 2012 (Bangladesh-Ministry of Finance 2014). This is low compared to countries with similar levels of income in the region: India spent roughly 3.1 percent of GDP on education each year for the last decade; Nepal spent 3.2 percent in 2002 and 4.7 percent in 2009 (World Bank N.d.).

Government contributions to education have been allocated fairly evenly between the primary and secondary levels over the past decade, with some fluctuation (figure 4). Expenditures at the primary and secondary levels represented 45 percent and 40 percent of total education expenditures, respectively, in 2009.


**Figure 4. Evolution of educational expenditure by subsector in 2000, 2004, and 2009**



Source: World Bank (2013); EdStats.

Mirroring the stable public expenditure at the primary level, Bangladesh has had stable net enrolment at the primary level in recent years. Between 2005 and 2010, approximately 91 percent of primary-age children were enrolled in primary school. However, enrolment at the secondary level remains low, notwithstanding an increase from 42 percent to 46 percent between 2005 and 2010 (figure 5).

**Figure 5. Net enrolment rates at the primary and secondary levels, 2005 and 2010**




Source: World Bank (N.d).

Bangladesh is a global leader in achieving gender parity in access to schooling. In 2013, the female net enrolment rate at the primary level was 98.4 percent, slightly above the male net enrolment rate of 96.2 percent (Bangladesh-DPE 2014b). At the secondary level, enrolment rates are 48.3 percent and 43.8 percent for females and males, respectively (figure 6). On average in Bangladesh, girls receive 9.7 years of formal schooling, compared with 8.8 years for boys.




**Figure 6. Net enrolment rates by gender, 2013**



Source: Bangladesh-DPE (2014b); BANBEIS (2013).

In recent years there has been a positive trend in primary completion rates for both girls and boys in Bangladesh, increasing from a combined 57 percent in 2008 to 74 percent in 2011. Female and male primary completion rates have followed similar growth, reaching 80 percent and 70 percent, respectively, in 2011 (figure 7). This trend shows the great leaps that Bangladesh has achieved in primary education over the last decade.

**Figure 7. Evolution of primary completion rates between 2008 and 2011**




Source: World Bank (N.d.).

Nevertheless, differences within the population remain in terms of access to education and the possibility of completing education at the primary and secondary levels. In 2005, 96.5 percent of children from the richest quintile completed primary education while only 65.1 percent of children from the poorest quintile did. Similarly, while 49.5 percent of children from the richest quintile completed secondary education, only 33.7 percent of children from the poorest quintile did so (figure 8). The most recently available figures (from 2007) suggest that the wealthiest one-fifth of Bangladeshi children receive, on average, 3.5 more years of schooling than the poorest one-fifth (World Bank N.d.).

In general, there are great disparities in access to education between rich and poor. These disparities can be seen in the average per capita income associated with levels of schooling. On a national level, the average per capita income is US\$ 36 and US\$ 58 for male-headed and female-headed households, respectively.<sup>1</sup> The average drops to US\$ 26 and US\$ 32 for male- and female-headed households in which the head of household completed no primary-level classes; US\$ 31 and US\$ 47 for those that completed up to class 5; US\$ 38 and US\$ 48 for those that completed up to class 9; and then jumps to US\$ 58 and US\$ 85 for those that have completed a higher secondary certificate (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2010). According to the Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), the poorest 20 percent of children are 12 percent more likely to be out of school compared with the wealthiest 20 percent (Bangladesh-DPE 2014b).

<sup>1</sup> US\$ equivalents to Taka at the exchange rate prevailing in December 2010.


**Figure 8. Primary and secondary completion rates by income quintile, 2007**



Source: World Bank (N.d.).

In a regional comparison, Bangladesh rates poorly in terms of average years of schooling for each quintile (figure 9). However, in terms of the equity of schooling, Bangladesh comes only after Nepal: the difference in the average years of schooling between the poorest and wealthiest quintile is 3.2 years in Nepal, 3.4 years in Bangladesh, 3.8 years in India, and 4.2 years in Pakistan (figure 9).

**Figure 9. Average years of schooling (ages 15–19) by household wealth in Nepal, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, various years\***



Source: World Bank (N.d.); EdStats.

Note: \*All data from Demographic and Household Surveys: Nepal (2011), Bangladesh (2007), India (2005), Pakistan (2006).

## Education Providers in Bangladesh

### Primary education provision

Bangladesh has one of the largest primary education systems in the world, comprised of nearly 107,000 schools (Bangladesh-DPE 2014). As noted earlier, there are 24 types of formal and non-formal primary education institutions in Bangladesh, of which 13 are the most common (table 1). These schools fall under two streams of education provision: general and madrassa (BANBEIS 2013).

Among all children attending school at the primary level nationwide in Bangladesh in 2013, 76 percent were enrolled in public schools, which include government primary schools (GPS), newly nationalized primary schools (NNPS), and experimental schools (table 1). Nearly 24 percent of children at the primary level were enrolled in private institutions (independent and government funded) in 2013.

**Table 1. Primary education providers in Bangladesh**

School type	No. of schools	Share (%)	No. of students	Share (%)
<b>Public schools</b>				
GPS	37,700	35.3	10,564,331	53.9
NNPS/RNGPS	22,632	21.2	4,325,894	22.1
Experimental	56	0.05	11,499	0.06
<b>Total public</b>	<b>60,388</b>	<b>56.5</b>	<b>14,901,724</b>	<b>76.1</b>
<b>Independent private schools</b>				
Kindergartens	14,100	13.2	1,798,500	9.2
NRNGPS	2,799	2.6	443,724	2.3
BRAC schools	9,683	9.1	214,161	1.1
NGO schools (Class 1–5)	2,101	2.0	212,212	1.1
High school-attached primary schools	1,245	1.2	467,926	2.4
Community schools	1,244	1.2	207,526	1.1
<b>Total independent private</b>	<b>31,172</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>3,344,049</b>	<b>17.2</b>
<b>Government-funded private schools</b>				
Ebtedayee madrassas	2,623	2.5	344,120	1.8
High madrassa-	5,583	5.2	845,438	4.3

attached Ebtedayee				
ROSC schools	3830	3.6	93,993	0.5
Shishu Kallyan schools	112	0.1	11,030	0.06
<b>Total government-funded private</b>	<b>12,148</b>	<b>11.3</b>	<b>1,294,581</b>	<b>6.7</b>
Other schools	3,151	2.9	44,618	0.2
<b>Total primary schools</b>	<b>106,859</b>		<b>19,584,972</b>	

Source: BANBEIS (2013).

### Public providers

*Public providers* are schools that are owned, financed, and operated by the government.

Government primary schools (GPS). These schools are owned, operated, and funded by the government. They represent 53.9 percent of student enrolment at the primary level (table 1).

Newly nationalized primary schools (NNPS). Formerly known as registered non-government primary schools (RNGPS), these schools represent 22.1 percent of student enrolment at the primary level. The government recognizes and oversees registration at NNPS, but they were originally privately established. The government began to nationalize all RNGPS in January 2013 (TazaKhorbor 2013) with the intended goal of achieving education for all through increased infrastructure (Sommers 2011). Teachers at NNPS are now government employees and receive the same salary and benefits as GPS teachers. The transition via nationalization is occurring in three phases; once the process is complete, all NNPS will be classified as GPS by the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPME). At present, the main differences between these schools and GPS relate to:

- *Funding*: The government provides 90 percent of the funding for salaries and additional funds for infrastructure and other fixed costs. It is, however, unclear how schools finance the remaining 10 percent of their funding, if at all.
- *Administration*: NNPS have School Management Committees (SMC), which include parents and

local elites that make decisions on teacher selection, pay, and leave. The government still has final oversight over administrative decisions, however.

**Experimental Schools.** These schools are attached to Primary Teachers' Training Institutes (PTTIs). These schools are a government initiative to ensure quality education for trained and motivated teachers. They accordingly provide opportunities for teacher trainees to practice what they learn (USAID 2002). The share of experimental schools among all schools and their share of total enrolment is small: 0.05 percent and 0.06 percent, respectively.

### Independent private schools

*Independent private schools* are schools that are owned and operated by non-government providers. They are financed privately, typically through fees. In Bangladesh, the following types of primary providers are classified as independent private schools under SABER-Engaging the Private Sector:

**Kindergartens.** Kindergartens are owned and operated by non-government providers and are financed privately, typically through fees. These schools are the most widely found private independent provider and represent 6.7 percent of student enrolments at the primary level, offering instruction through grade 5. These schools do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Primary Education (DPE) (Bangladesh-MoPME 2013).

**Non-registered non-government primary schools (NRNGPS).** These schools are owned and operated by non-government providers and privately financed privately. They represent 1.2 percent of student enrolment at the primary level in Bangladesh. Though these schools are non-registered, they fall under the jurisdiction of the DPE (Bangladesh-MoPME 2013).

**High school attached primary schools.** These schools are attached to private secondary schools and offer primary education financed through student fees. They represent 2.4 percent of student enrolment at the primary level.

**NGO providers.** Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operate primary schools in Bangladesh and play an important role in providing education. BRAC schools, for example, have the largest enrolment of any NGO, but there are several other NGO education providers at the primary level. Some of these organizations are: Center for Mass Education in Science (CMES), Dhaka Ahsania Mission (DAM), Gonoshahajjo Sangstha (GSS), PROSHIKA, Friends in Village Development (FIVDB), Save the Children-USA, and the Underprivileged Children's Education Programs (UCEP) (World Bank 2013). While most public and private schools are overseen either by the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPME) or the Ministry of Education (MoE), as will be discussed in another section, NGO schools are under the oversight of the NGO Affairs Bureau of the government.

### NGO School Class 1–5

These schools are managed by NGOs (rather than individuals) and are funded either by the NGOs themselves or international donors through the NGOs. They provide formal education to 1.1 percent of students at the primary level. Other NGO schools provide non-formal education, including BRAC and others.

### BRAC

BRAC has been operating schools in Bangladesh since 1985 and has become the largest non-governmental organization and the largest secular non-government educational system in the world (Rosenberg 2013). BRAC primary schools are aimed at educating out-of-school children, including students who have dropped out. Schools operate under a one-room model, with a single cohort of students of many ages progressing through all years of primary school together under a single teacher. BRAC enrolments represent 1.1 percent of students at the primary level and 9.1 percent of all primary school facilities, signifying smaller class sizes.

**Community schools.** These schools are established and operated by a local community and do not receive any funding from the central government. They represent 2.8 percent of student enrolment at the primary level.

Qaumi ebtedayee madrassas. Qaumi madrassas are not regulated by the government and are predominantly private charitable schools that implement a primarily religious curriculum (Bangladesh Enterprise Institute 2011). Enrolment in Qaumi madrassas at the primary level represents 1.8 percent of students.

### Government-funded private schools

*Government-funded private schools* are schools that are owned and operated by non-government providers, but funded by the government. In Bangladesh, the following types of schools are classified as government-funded private schools under SABER-Engaging the Private Sector:

Aliya ebtedayee madrassas. As outlined above, there are two types of madrassas in Bangladesh. Aliya madrassas are known as mainstream madrassas and are supported financially by the state with a modified curriculum that includes general education courses. The Bangladesh Annual Primary School Census (APSC) does not differentiate between whether madrassas at the primary level are Qaumi or Aliya; thus for the purposes of reporting, all madrassa primary schools have been included under government-funded private schools in table 1. This classification choice reflect a recent study on the incidence of different types of madrassas that found the share of total primary enrolment at Aliya madrassas to be 8.4 percent, and at Qaumi madrassas, 1.9 percent (Asadullah 2009). The latter figure is higher than that indicated by the APSC, indicating that a much larger share of madrassas at the primary level are funded by the government and not independent, and that they provide a regulated secular education.

Reaching-Out-of-School Children (ROSC) Project. The ROSC Project reintegrates out-of-school children into education through learning centers (i.e, non-formal schools), called Ananda Schools (Schools of Joy), which provide education stipends to underprivileged children to lessen the financial burden on their families, as well as distribute free books, stationery, and school uniforms. Ananda Schools are established in *upazilas* (subdistricts) with high rates of poverty and low enrolment and completion rates. From its inception in 2004, the ROSC Project has provided “second-chance” primary

education to over 790,000 out-of-school children. Students, more than half of whom are girls, come from the 90 poorest upazilas in the country. The project is supported by funds and technical assistance from the International Development Association (IDA) (World Bank 2013).

Shishu Kallyan Trust Primary Schools. The Shishu Kallyan Trust (Child Welfare Trust) primary schools were set up to enable working children in urban areas to participate in the school system. Financed through the ROSC Project, grants and educational allowances provided to Shishu Kallyan Trust schools help working children enroll in the schools. The allowances are intended to cover direct and indirect costs of schooling, as well as to partially compensate for the opportunity cost of attending school (IFPRI 2006).

## Secondary Education Providers

There are three streams of secondary education in Bangladesh: general, technical-vocational, and madrassa (BANBEIS 2013).

The secondary education subsector in Bangladesh is dominated by non-state actors—98.8 percent of all secondary schools are owned and managed by non-state organizations (BANBEIS 2013). As shown in table 2; these organizations include both general and madrassa streams and both government-funded and independent private schools. There is limited data on the division between private independent and government-funded private schools, including the number of Qaumi and Aliya madrassas, respectively. As mentioned in the preceding section on primary schools, a 2009 World Bank study found that 18.5 percent of secondary enrolments were at Aliya madrassas (funded by the government), 2.2 percent were at Qaumi madrassas (independently funded), and 1.4 percent at other madrassas. These precise proportions may not hold for the data shown in table 2, but it can be surmised that the vast majority of private secondary school institutions receive government funding.

**Table 2. Secondary education providers in Bangladesh**

School type	No. of schools	Share (%)	No. of students	Share (%)
<b>Public schools</b>				
Government secondary schools	317	1.2	246,554	2.6
<b>Total public</b>	<b>317</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>246,554</b>	<b>2.6</b>
<b>Private schools</b>				
Private secondary schools (junior, secondary, higher secondary)	18,455	68.8	7,637,829	79.8
Dakhil and Alim madrassas	8,063	30.0	1,685,984	17.6
<b>Total private</b>	<b>26,518</b>	<b>98.8</b>	<b>9,329,813</b>	<b>97.5</b>
<b>Total secondary schools</b>	<b>26,835</b>		<b>9,570,367</b>	

Source: Adapted from BANBEIS (2013).

**Public providers**

Government Secondary Schools. These schools are owned, operated, and funded by the government. They represent 2.6 percent of student enrolment at the secondary level (table 2). Government secondary schools are known as model schools and are located primarily in district headquarters, typically in peri-urban areas. Entrance exams are required for admittance and there is a high level of competition for seats.

**Independent private providers**

NGO and for-profit private providers. Limited data is available on independent private providers in Bangladesh; however, a small percentage of elite private schools and low-cost private schools are run by NGOs, both of which are largely urban phenomena.

Qaumi Dakhil and Alim madrassas. As at the primary (ebtedayee) level, Qaumi madrassas at the secondary level are not regulated by the government. They may

receive accreditation by the government, but are not under its jurisdiction.

**Government-funded private schools**

Aliya Dakhil and Alim madrassas. As at the primary level, Aliya madrassas are government funded and impart secular as well as religious instruction to secondary students.

Other government-funded private schools. As noted earlier, nearly all schools at the secondary level are government-funded private institutions. While little disaggregated data is available on these types of schools, they include residential schools, military schools, public enterprise/corporation-sponsored autonomous schools (which are highly subsidized by the government), and technical/vocational schools. All of these schools receive monthly pay orders from the government, which largely cover teacher salaries. Technical/vocational schools are non-formal institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education (MoE) and are highly subsidized by the government, with funding also provided by donors such as the World Bank and NGOs.

**Private Education in Bangladesh—Administration and Performance**

As conveyed in the preceding section, a diverse range of education providers operate at both the primary and secondary levels in Bangladesh. This section will discuss the governance of the non-state sector in education and its performance at the primary and secondary levels.

As mentioned earlier, non-state primary and secondary schools in Bangladesh fall into two categories of the SABER-Engaging the Private Sector Framework, namely, independent private schools and government-funded private schools.

- **Independent private schools** are owned and operated independent of government intervention and receive no financial support from the state. Registered private schools are bound to follow government regulations regarding the curriculum, fees, and minimum

teacher qualifications. Non-registered schools are not bound by these regulations.

- **Government-funded private schools** have certain autonomy from government, but receive part of their funding from it. These schools are generally operated by NGOs or are madrassas.


In terms of administrative organization, Bangladesh has two ministries responsible for approving, monitoring, regulating, and otherwise engaging with the country’s recognized non-state school providers.

- The **Ministry of Primary and Mass Education** (MoPME) formulates policies regarding primary education and oversees government-recognized schools for this subsector. The Directorate of Primary Education (DPE) is responsible for program implementation.
- The **Ministry of Education** (MoE) oversees government-recognized schools at the secondary level. The Madrasa Education Board within the MoE oversees Aliya madrassas at both the primary and secondary levels. The MoE is also responsible for technical and vocational education and training, as well as higher education. The Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education is responsible for management and administration of education at these levels.

### Enrolment and performance

Clearly, the private sector plays a pivotal part in education provision in Bangladesh at both the primary and secondary levels. The number of enrolments in private primary schools has increased by nearly 1 million in the last decade, from 6,755,700 pupils in 2005 to 7,735,078 pupils in 2011 (figure 10). To reiterate, the share of private enrolment at the primary level is about 28 percent (table 1) and 98 percent at the secondary level (table 2). The number of primary schools that are funded, owned, and operated privately (including kindergartens and high school-attached primary schools) has increased from 3,567 in 2007 (DFID and CfBT 2013) to 15,345 in 2013 (Bangladesh-DPE, 2014a).

**Figure 10. Total enrolment in private primary and secondary schools (millions)**



Source: World Bank (N.d.).

According to a study that reviewed a household survey in four slums of Dhaka, there is a general perception among households that the private school system is of better quality than the public school system (Cameron 2011). The Bangladesh National Student Assessment (NSA) 2013 results from classes 3 and 5 (primary school) show that overall, GPS students performed marginally better than students at other types of schools. This assessment, however, did not capture all types of schools; included were GPS, RINGPS, high school-attached primary schools, kindergartens, ebtedayee madrassas, BRAC Centers, and ROSC. Not included were NRINGPS, experimental schools, NGO schools (other than BRAC), community schools, and Shishu Kallyan schools.

When disaggregated by subject, kindergarten students received the highest scores in Bangla in both grades 3 and 5, followed by high school-attached primary schools in grade 3, and by GPS in grade 5. BRAC students received the lowest scores in Bangla in grade 3, while madrasa students received the lowest scores in grade 5. In mathematics, kindergarten students scored the highest once again in grade 3, while BRAC students scored the lowest. In grade 5, GPS students received the highest scores, with BRAC students again receiving the lowest scores (table 3).

**Table 3. Primary student achievement (mean NSA scores) by school type**

	Grade 3 Bangla	Grade 5 Bangla	Grade 3 Math	Grade 5 Math
BRAC Centers	98.7	112.4	97.5	110.2
GPS	104.3	116.3	104.1	117.2
High school-attached primary	105.2	114.1	103.4	112.8
Kindergartens	107.1	118.2	105.0	116.8
Madrassas	103.5	110.4	104.2	112.7
RNGPS	103.2	113.1	102.3	113.9
ROSC	105.5	-	104.6	-
Total	104.2	115.2	103.7	115.8

Source: Adapted from Bangladesh-DPE (2014).

At the secondary level, schools that are part of the Secondary Education Quality and Access Enhancement Project (SEQAEP) are assessed in 125 out of a total of 488 upazilas (sub-districts) countrywide. Termed the LASI (Learning Assessment for SEQAEP Institutions), the evaluation is conducted in grades 6 and 8 in Bangla, English, and mathematics. Results are disaggregated by general education schools and madrasa education schools. Overall, LASI 2013 results show that general education school students achieved higher mean scores in all subjects in both grades 6 and 8. LASI is limited to SEQAEP schools, which are targeted to impoverished populations, and data is not further disaggregated by school type within the two streams of general education and madrassas.

**Table 4. Secondary student achievement (mean LASI scores), by education stream**

	Grade 6 Bangla	Grade 8 Bangla	Grade 6 English	Grade 8 English	Grade 6 Math	Grade 8 Math
Gen ed	248.8	286.6	275.2	297.1	284.6	301.0
Madrasa ed	242.8	267.7	266.3	281.4	281.5	291.4
Total	247.5	282.5	273.2	293.7	284.0	298.9

Source: Adapted from ACER (2014).

As previously discussed, gaps in access to education remain among wealth quintiles, with the cost of education having an impact on the schooling decisions of households in Bangladesh. The household survey of the four slums in Dhaka, for instance, highlighted that over

50 percent of the households chose public or NGO schools because they were the most affordable (Cameron 2011). The survey found that the average annual expenditure (including official and unofficial fees, transport, and lunch) for families sending children to government schools was US\$ 52, to an NGO school, only US\$ 24.<sup>2</sup> The average annual cost for sending a child to any type of school was US\$ 61 for households in Bangladesh (Table 5). These financial costs have a substantial impact on the school choice opportunities of households. Considering that around 80 percent of the population of Bangladesh lives on less than US\$ 2 a day, education still poses a great financial burden, even if children attend public schools.

**Table 5. Total annual school fees, by provider**

School type	Total annual fees	
	Tk	US\$*
GPS (government)	3,577	52
RNGPS (government)	6,033	88
NGO	1,627	24
For-profit kindergarten	11,117	161
Private secondary	12,255	178
Madrasa	6,608	96
Other	11,735	170
Average	4,177	61

Source: Cameron (2011)


Note: \*At the exchange rate prevailing in December 2008.

Non-state providers manage their budgets more efficiently than do public providers and can dedicate their resources to different aspects of education. At the primary level in urban areas, operating costs of private and NGO schools in Bangladesh are about half of that of public schools: US\$ 7,700 (Tk 600,000) for private schools versus US\$ 14,160 (Tk 1.1 million) for public schools (DFID and CfBT 2013). Furthermore, at the primary level, staff salaries represent 95 percent of operating costs in public schools compared to 73 percent in government-funded private schools and 62 percent in independent private schools (figure 11). That teacher salaries represent so much of the operating budget of public schools highlights the typically higher salaries paid in the public system.

<sup>2</sup> US\$ equivalents to Taka at the exchange rate prevailing in December 2008.



**Figure 11. Composition of operating costs by type of (urban) primary school**



Source: Adapted from DFID and CfBT (2013).

## Benchmarking Bangladesh’s Private School Policies

This section presents the SABER-EPS results for two types of private schools available at both the primary and secondary level: independent private schools and government-funded private schools. (This study considers selected private schools that receive monthly pay orders (MPOs) government-funded private schools.) The section then discusses the benchmarking results by comparing them to established recommended practices determined by the SABER-Engaging the Private Sector Framework. For more information on the global evidence underlying these policy goals, see the SABER framework paper, *What Matters Most for Engaging the Private Sector in Education* (Baum et al. 2014). A rubric that explains the criteria for the scoring categories for each indicator is included in the annex 1 to this report.

Recognizing the varying engagement of the private sector in primary and secondary education, this section provides an overall review of the policies in place that govern the private provision of education at both levels, noting contextual differences where applicable. All benchmarking scores reflect the education sector as a whole. As noted in the introduction, this benchmarking analysis focuses on official, established laws, regulations, and policies governing education provision. There is often a difference between official policy “on the books” and implementation “on the ground.” The following analysis focuses on official policy as a starting point considering potential reform and, in a few cases, notes differences between policy and implementation.

The main policies, laws, and official documentation used to benchmark the regulatory environment in Bangladesh include the following:

- Recognized Non-Government Secondary School Teachers (Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Dhaka) Terms and Conditions of Service Regulations 1979.
- Registration of Private Schools Ordinance, 1962.
- School-1, Section S.R.O. No. 263-Law/2011, Section 4 (15, 16 (1)). Published August 18, 2011, in the Bangladesh Gazette by the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education.

- Rules and Regulations under the Education Ministry for Establishing, Starting and Approving Private Schools, Colleges and Madrassas (23/4/97).

### Goal 1: Encouraging innovation by providers

The highly particular and contextualized nature of education delivery necessitates decision making at the school level. In order to be aware of and adapt to changing student needs, school leaders require authority over the most critical managerial decisions.

Methodologically rigorous studies assessing the impact of local school autonomy on student learning outcomes generally find a positive relationship (Hanushek and Woessmann 2013; Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). A few studies find evidence that local autonomy for school leaders is associated with increased student achievement, as well as reduced student repetition and failure rates (King and Özler 2005; Jimenez and Sawada 2003; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012).

### Box 2. International best practice – encouraging innovation by providers

The following decisions/processes are made at the school level:

- Establishment of teacher qualification standards
- Appointment and deployment of teachers
- Teacher salary levels
- Teacher dismissals
- The way in which the curriculum is delivered
- Class-size decisions
- Management of the operating budgets

### Development level

*Independent private schools:*



*Government-funded private schools:*



In Bangladesh, education policies allow for a relatively high degree of school-level autonomy in independent private and government-funded private schools. Based on Bangladesh’s current policies, laws, and other official documentation, an overall score of **established** is assigned to both types of schools, as current policies reflect systematic good practice.

In Bangladesh, teacher standards in independent private schools vary by provider. These standards also differ

from those for government-funded private schools, which are set by the central government. The exception to this rule is non-profit schools such as those of BRAC schools, which employ local women who receive 12 days of training before they begin teaching. For government-funded private schools at the secondary level, the minimum qualification requirements are set as follows by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education:

- **Headmaster:** Second-class honors master's degree with B. Ed. or its equivalent degree from a recognized university and 10 years' experience in teaching or educational administration.
- **Assistant Headmaster:** Second-class honors bachelor degree with B. Ed. or its equivalent degree from a recognized university and 8 years' experience in teaching or educational administration.
- **Senior Teacher:** Bachelor degree with B. Ed. or its equivalent degree from a recognized university or a Kamil degree from a recognized madrasa.
- **Assistant Teacher:** Bachelor degree from a recognized university or a Fazil degree from a recognized madrasa.
- **Junior teacher:** High school or secondary school certificate from a recognized Board, with training from an institute recognized by the Board, or an Alim certificate from a recognized madrasa.

In some areas, the government has delegated its control over education provision. According to Article 3-1 of the Bangladesh Gazette, Part VI, dated the 6th December 1979, both private independent and government-funded private schools retain the principal authority to appoint and deploy teachers, as well as to affect their eventual dismissal. In terms of teacher salary levels, the Registration of Private Schools Ordinance, 1962; Section 4 (2b) states that the school has authority in this matter in both independent private and government-funded private schools.

According to Articles 15 and 16 of the School-1, Section S.R.O. No-263 from the Law of 2011, the government determines maximum class size and every non-government primary school has to have an average student-teacher ratio of 30:1. If the student-teacher ratio

exceeds 30:1, a new section for the class must be opened with the authorization from the registration authority. Current policies provide no indication as to the maximum number of students permitted in non-state secondary school classrooms.

In terms of how the curriculum is delivered, the Registration of Private Schools Ordinance of 1962, Section 2e–2f highlights that all types of private schools have the freedom to choose a curriculum; however, this curriculum must be approved by local authorities.

In government-funded private schools, the government has the responsibility to provide the basic salary of selected teachers in these schools. Only those teachers who have been enlisted to receive MPOs receive salaries from the government. The rest receive salaries from the school's governing body, which also covers other school expenditures.

Based on benchmarking results for goal 1, encouraging innovation by providers, the **suggested policy options** for Bangladesh include:

- Consider giving schools increased authority to adapt class sizes and tailor delivery of the curriculum to support enhanced student learning outcomes, provided such adaptability is in line with accountability measures.

**Table 6. Goal 1: Encouraging innovation by providers**

A. Common Policies: Independent Private Schools and Government-Funded Private Schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Who has legal authority to set teacher standards (e.g., teaching certification, years of experience, etc.)?	Latent ●○○○	Central government has legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers.
Who has legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers?	Advanced ●●●●	The school (school principal, school council, parent association, etc.) has the legal authority to appoint teachers without review by central authorities.
Who has legal authority to determine teacher salary levels?	Advanced ●●●●	The school has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels without review by central authorities.
Who has legal authority to dismiss teachers?	Advanced ●●●●	The school has the legal authority to dismiss teachers without review by central authorities.
Who has legal authority to determine maximum class size?	Latent ●○○○	Central government has the legal authority to establish class size.
Who has legal authority to determine how curriculum is delivered (e.g., pedagogy, number of hours, learning materials)?	Emerging ●●○○	The school can determine how the curriculum is delivered with final review from central authorities.
B. Policies for Government-Funded Private Schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Who has legal authority over the management of school operating budget?	Established ●●●○	Only those teachers who have been enlisted to receive MPOs receive salaries from the government. The rest receive salaries from the school's governing body, which also covers other school expenditures.

Woessmann et al. 2007; Hanushek and Raymond 2005). For non-state providers, when government funding is tied to accountability standards, schools are incentivized to perform more efficiently (Barrera-Osorio and Raju 2010; Patrinos 2002). A strong accountability system requires that the government, parents, and educational professionals work together to raise outcomes. The government must play a role in ensuring that superior education quality is delivered by schools. SABER-EPS assesses multiple policy indicators to determine non-state provider accountability. A list of the key indicators is provided in box 3.

**Box 3. International best practice – holding schools accountable**

- The central government sets standards regarding what students need to learn, including deadlines for meeting these standards.
- Students are required to take standardized examinations; exam results are disaggregated by school, socioeconomic status, gender, etc.
- Schools are required to report on the use of public funds as a condition of continued funding.
- The central government or an external agency performs school inspections, as determined by school need.
- Schools produce school improvement plans.
- School performance is tied to sanctions and/or rewards.

**Development level**

*Private independent schools:*



*Government-funded private schools:*



In terms of establishing school accountability, Bangladesh’s policies are **established** for both independent private and government-funded private schools. However, accountability for both types of schools could be strengthened.

The government does set standards for what students need to learn each year and for each class in Bangladesh. Private schools have the freedom to set standards initially, but these standards then need to be approved by the government. The government also approves the international curriculum set by institutions such as Edexcel, Cambridge, and the International Baccalaureate

**Goal 2: Holding schools accountable**

On average, students perform better in schools with higher levels of accountability to the state (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; Carnoy and Loeb 2002;

Organization. Furthermore, standardized examinations are administered at the end of each year in grades 5, 8, 10, and 12 in both private independent and government-funded private schools to validate student achievement.

The Rules and Regulations under the Education Ministry for Establishing, Starting and Approving Private Schools, Colleges and Madrassas (23/4/97), Section 4, Articles 2, 5, and 7, describe the process for inspections and supervision of independent private and government-funded private schools. The government requires both types of schools to undergo inspections, with the frequency of inspection dependent on results of the previous round. The law stipulates that schools will be visited within four months of their opening in order to analyze the relevant papers and records, at which time the primary approval or rejection decision is taken. This decision will be made known in writing. Three years after opening, a second inspection will occur and based on exam results, the school enrolment rate, class attendance, and the number of students sitting for the final exams, an additional five-year approval will be given.

Sanctions are based on how well schools perform in terms of these indicators. The law highlights that if any rules are broken at any time, the government can ultimately close down a school. Associated legal documents also suggest that the private schools unable to meet these conditions can be denied registration status.

The government requires government-funded private schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition of continued funding, but there is no standard term specified for such reporting.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedure, the following **suggested policy options** would help Bangladesh increase the accountability of private schools:

- Establish learning standards that specify what students need to learn, by when, and how well.
- Require schools to submit a school improvement plan following inspections, including specific priorities for improvement.

For government-funded private schools:

- Require schools to report on the use of public funds on a standard schedule.

**Table 7. Goal 2: Holding schools accountable**

<i>A. Common Policies: Independent Private Schools and Government-Funded Private Schools</i>		
<b>Item</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Justification</b>
Does government set standards on what students need to learn and by when?	Emerging ●●○○	Government does set standards for what students need to learn, but there is no indication of by when or how well.
What is the current policy on standardized exams?	Established ●●●○	Standardized exams are administered annually.
Does government require schools to undergo an inspection?	Advanced ●●●●	Government requires schools to undergo an inspection; the frequency of inspection is dependent on results of the previous inspection.
Does the inspection report outline the strengths and weaknesses of the school?	Emerging ●●○○	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school, but schools are not required to submit improvement plans.
Are sanctions administered based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams?	Advanced ●●●●	Sanctions include additional monitoring and fines, which are administered based on the results of school inspections or performance on standardized exams.
<i>B. Policies for Government-Funded Private Schools</i>		
<b>Item</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Justification</b>
Are schools required to report to government on the use of public funds as a condition of continued funding?	Emerging ●●○○	Government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition of continued funding, but requirements are ad hoc and there is no standard schedule.

### Goal 3: Empowering all parents, students, and communities

Empowering parents, students, and communities is one of the foundations for creating quality learning opportunities for all students. Poor and marginalized children, together with youth, disproportionately lack access to quality education services. To overcome this obstacle, governments need to increase providers’ accountability to all clients, particularly underserved groups. Educational access and the performance of schools and students can be substantially impacted by **openly disseminating comparable school performance information** (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2009; Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman 2009; Björkman 2007; Reinikka and Svensson 2005); **increasing parental influence in the school** (Skoufias and Shapiro 2006; King and Özler 2005; Jimenez and Sawada 1999; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012; Di Gropello and Marshall 2005); and **implementing demand-side interventions**, such as scholarships, vouchers, or cash transfers, to help the most vulnerable students (Orazem and King 2007; Filmer and Schady 2008; Lewis and Lockheed 2007; Patrinos 2002; Barrera-Osorio 2006). Effective policy practices for non-state providers include some of the indicators listed in box 4.

#### Box 4. International best practice—empowering all parents, students, and communities

- Information on standardized tests and school inspections is made available by multiple sources.
- Parents and students are included in the inspection and improvement-planning processes.
- Admission processes for entry into publicly funded schools are not based on student background; a lottery is used in cases of oversubscription.
- School choice is not hindered by mandatory financial contributions.
- Tax subsidies, scholarships, or cash transfers are available to families whose children attend independent private schools.

#### Development level

*Independent private schools:*



*Government-funded private schools:*



In Bangladesh, the policies on independent private schools to empower parents, students, and communities are **established**. Policies governing government-funded private schools are **emerging**. Additional policy strategies are needed to increase the client power of parents and better allow them to hold providers accountable for results.

The way in which information is provided to parents differs according to the type of school students attend. Indeed, regular information is provided to parents on standardized exam results and/or in inspection reports in independent private schools, usually through websites or notice boards for grades 5, 8, 10, and 12. Concerning government-funded private schools, only ad-hoc information is provided to parents for the same grades via similar information platforms. This information has been provided by consulting experts in Bangladesh, as no legal document was found regarding the regulation of the provision of information to parents in non-state schools in Bangladesh.

As seen previously, the Rules and Regulations under the Education Ministry for Establishing, Starting and Approving Private Schools, Colleges and Madrassas (23/4/97) regulate the way in which the inspection process works in non-state schools. This legal document, however, does not stipulate that parents and students are to be interviewed as part of the inspection process.

In terms of the affordability of private education options, Bangladesh is one of few countries to have operated conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs for over three decades. The government has introduced two major CCT programs over that period:

- **Primary Education Stipend Program (PESP):** initiated in 2002, PESP aims to support more than 5 million pupils (Tietjen 2003).
- **Female Stipend Program (FSP):** introduced in 1982, FSP targets girls at the secondary level in order to increase enrolment and retention (Raynor and Wesson 2006).

Government-funded private schools are not allowed to select students and are required to conduct a lottery if a school is over subscribed. However, parental choice is restricted by voluntary monetary parent contributions.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedure for Bangladesh, the following **suggested policy options** would help empower parents and students to influence the quality of education services provided by private schools:

- Consider interviewing parents and students as part of the inspection process.

For government-funded private schools:

- Increase parents’ access to information on school quality, including examination and school inspection reports, in order to allow them to make informed decisions on their children’s schooling.
- Ease voluntary monetary parent contributions to allow lower-income families to access these types of schools.

**Table 8. Goal 3: Empowering all parents, students, and communities**

<i>A. Common Policies: Independent Private Schools and Government-Funded Private Schools</i>		
<b>Item</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Justification</b>
Are students interviewed as part of the inspection process?	Emerging ●●○○	Neither students nor parents are surveyed as part of the inspection process.
<i>B. Policies for Independent Private Schools</i>		
<b>Item</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Justification</b>
What is the current policy on providing information to parents/students on the results of standardized exams?	Established ●●●○	Regular information is provided to parents on standardized exam results and/or inspection reports.
Does the government provide tax subsidies or cash transfers to families whose children attend independent private schools?	Established ●●●○	The government provides tax subsidies and cash transfers to families whose children attend private schools.
<i>C. Policies for Government-Funded Private Schools</i>		
<b>Item</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Justification</b>
What is the current policy on providing information to parents/students on the results of standardized exams?	Emerging ●●○○	Ad-hoc information is provided to parents on standardized exam results or inspection reports.
Are schools allowed to apply selective admission criteria when selecting students?	Advanced ●●●●	Schools are not allowed to select students and are required to conduct a lottery if a school is over subscribed.
Are schools allowed to charge additional fees or accept contributions from parents?	Emerging ●●○○	Parental choice is restricted by voluntary monetary parent contributions, that is, contributions to a school fund.

### Goal 4: Promoting diversity of supply

By opening education to a more diverse set of providers, governments can increase client power and make providers directly accountable to students and parents for results. Although the public sector will always remain an important (and, in most cases, the predominant) provider of education services, educational choice can be used as part of a package of reforms to improve education access and quality in both the public and private sectors (Hoxby 2003; Levin and Belfield 2003; De la Croix and Doepke 2009; Carnoy and McEwan 2003; Himmler 2007; Angrist et al. 2002; World Bank 2003). In order to facilitate quality improvements through increased school competition and choice, governments can (i) allow multiple types of providers to operate; (ii) promote clear, open, affordable, and unrestrictive certification standards; and (iii) make government funding (and other incentives) available to non-state schools. This policy goal aims to increase the ability of diverse providers to provide education services. In order to do so, a number of policy indicators are suggested, as outlined in box 5.

#### Box 5. International best practice—promoting diversity of supply

- The central government allows different types of providers to operate schools.
- Certification standards do not prohibit market entry.
- Information on market-entry requirements is available from multiple sources.
- Regulatory fees do not prohibit market entry.
- Publicly funded non-state schools and public schools receive equivalent student funding; funding is increased to meet specific student needs.
- The central government provides incentives for market entry, such as access to start-up funding, public land, and public buildings.
- Schools are able to plan budgets six months in advance of the academic year.
- Privately managed schools are not restricted by student numbers, school numbers, or location.
- The central government does not restrict tuition levels at private independent schools.

### Development level

*Private independent schools:*



*Government-funded private schools:*



In Bangladesh, the policies in place to promote diversity of supply for independent private schools have achieved an overall score of **established**, representing some instances of good practice. Government-funded private schools have achieved an overall score of **emerging**, showing the need to promote more diversity of supply for these types of schools.

Guidelines outlining the steps or requirements for non-state schools to receive registration/authorization are made public, but these are available from only a single source. Indeed, the Rules and Regulations under the Education Ministry for Establishing, Starting and Approving Private Schools, Colleges and Madrassas (25/5/97), Section 9, Table 1 (1–13) regulates the registration criteria for non-state schools in Bangladesh. The following rules apply to different types of schools in Bangladesh:

#### Registration criteria for primary schools:

- *Primary approval:* For primary approval, Form Ka (equivalent to Form A), has to be filled out and a specific fee must be deposited with the government. The form must be submitted to the Directorate of Primary Education. Within 60 days, DPE will visit the school to see if all requirements are met. If yes, approval will be given for one year.
- *Temporary registration:* After one year, for temporary registration, Form Go (equivalent to Form D), has to be filled out and a fee determined by government must be submitted to the Treasury. The form must be submitted to DPE. The Registration Authority will visit the school and if it is found satisfactory, the authority will grant approval for a three-year registration.
- *Registration:* Sixty days before the end of these three years, Form Cha (equivalent to Form F), must be filled out and a fee determined by the government submitted to the Registration Authority. If the criteria in the form are satisfied,



the school will receive a registration for five years.

#### **Registration criteria for secondary schools (grade 6–8):**

- Minimum distance from one institution to another: 1 kilometer within a municipality or industrial area; 6 kilometers in a rural area.
- Minimum population where the institution will be set up: 8,000.
- Own land: 0.2 acre for a city corporation area; 0.30 acre in a municipality area; 0.5 acre in a rural area.
- School building/ own room: 1 sq. yard per student, with a minimum of 1,000 square yards for a concrete/semi-concrete/tin shed building.
- Number of teachers and employees are allotted according to the school's staffing pattern and qualifications or as per school laws.
- Library requirement: 1,000 books.
- Funding: Tk 30,000 in reserve funds, as well as Tk 30,000 in general funds.
- To name a school after an individual, a fee of Tk 600,000 must be paid.
- Curriculum: NCTB (National Curriculum Text Board)-approved
- Extracurricular activities: sports, games, cultural program, planting trees, scouts/girl guides, and cleaning, etc., must be maintained.
- School management: As per the law, a School Management Committee must be present in the school.

#### **Registration criteria for secondary schools (grades 8–10) and Dakhil madrassas (grades 1–10)**

- Minimum distance from one institution to another: 1 kilometer for a municipality or industrial area; 6 kilometers for a rural area.
- Minimum population where the institution will be set up: 10,000.
- Own land: 0.25 acre for a city corporation area; 0.5 in a municipality; 0.75 acre in a rural area.
- School building/own room: 1 square yard per student. Minimum square yardage dependent on the school's student requirements.
- Number of teachers and employees are allotted according to the school's staffing pattern and qualifications, or as per school laws.

- Library requirement: 2,000 books.
- Funding: Tk 50,000 in reserve funds, as well as Tk 30,000 in general funds.
- To name a school after a individual, a fee of Tk. 1,000,000 must be paid.
- Curriculum: NCTB (National Curriculum Text Board)-approved.
- Extracurricular activities: Sports, games, cultural program, planting trees, scouts/girl guides, and cleaning, etc., must be maintained.
- School management: As per law, a School Management Committee must be present in the school.

#### **Registration criteria for higher secondary school (grades 11–12) and Alim madrassas (grades 1–12)**

- Minimum distance from one institution to another: 1 kilometer for a municipality or industrial area; 6 kilometers for a rural area.
- Minimum population where the institution will be set up: 75,000.
- Own land: 0.5 acre for a city corporation area; 0.75 acre in a municipality; 1 acre in a rural area.
- School building/own room: 1 square yard per student, with a minimum dependent on the school's student requirements.
- Number of teachers and employees are allotted according to the school's staffing pattern and qualifications or as per school laws.
- Library requirement: 2,000 books.
- Funding: Tk 10,000 in reserve funds, as well as Tk 50,000 in general funds.
- To name a school after an individual, a fee of Tk 1,500,000 must be paid.
- Curriculum: NCTB- approved
- Extracurricular activities: Sports, games, cultural program, planting trees, scouts/girl guides, cleaning, etc., must be maintained.
- School management: As per law, a School Management Committee must be present in the school.
- School Management Committee: 1997 regulations must be followed. For madrassas, 1979 regulations must be followed.

In terms of regulatory operating fees, both private independent and government-funded private schools have to pay fees to the government. Fees for each type of school are outlined below:

- **Independent private primary schools:** ongoing certification fee and optional name search fee.
- **Independent private secondary schools:** registration fee (in three installments) and optional name search fee.
- **Government-funded private schools:** registration fee, as indicated by “Rules and Regulations under the Education Ministry for Establishing, Starting and Approving Private Schools, Colleges and Madrassas (23.04.1997).”

For independent private schools, according to Article 4-C of the Registration of Private Schools Ordinance of 1962, schools must set adequate tuition fees. The amount that satisfies the requirement of “adequate” has, however, not been mentioned in any legal document, but the government does review the tuition fees set by the schools.

In government-funded private schools, academic operating budgets are not equivalent to per-student amounts in public schools. The government provides more funding to public schools than government-funded private schools (i.e., MPO-enlisted private schools). This includes funding for both academic budgets (including teaching salaries, learning materials, technology) and non-academic budgets (including facilities, transport, utilities, infrastructure, etc.). All public school expenditures are borne by the government. For MPO-enlisted private schools, the government only pays the salaries of selected teachers who are enlisted to receive monthly pay orders. All other school expenses of these schools are borne by the school governing body. Government-funded private schools also do not receive any start-up funding or grants from the government. Furthermore, these schools are provided information on the government allocations to be transferred to them less than one month before the start of the academic year.

**Table 9. Goal 4: Promoting diversity of supply**

A. Common Policies: Independent Private Schools and Government-Funded Private Schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Does the government allow multiple types of providers to operate a school?	Advanced ●●●●	The government allows all of the following organizational types to operate a school: Community; Not for profit; Faith based; For profit.
What are the criteria for school registration?	Latent ●○○○	Certification standards not linked to education outcomes restrict entry, including the following criteria: - land (undulating, distance from public venues, etc.) - facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes, etc.) - assets (ownership of land or buildings)
Are there clear guidelines publicized by multiple sources that outline the requirements for school registration?	Established ●●●○	Registration/certification guidelines are made public, but only by a single source.
Are schools required to pay fees in order to operate?	Latent ●○○○	Schools are able to operate while paying more than 4 types of fees
B. Policies for Independent Private Schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Who has legal authority to determine tuition fee standards?	Established ●●●○	Schools set fees, which are subject to review by the government.
C. Policies for Government-Funded Private Schools		
Item	Score	Justification
Does the government provide equivalent funding of academic budgets (i.e., teaching salaries, learning materials, technology) for public and government-funded private schools?	Latent ●○○○	Academic operating budgets are not equivalent to per-student amounts in public schools.
Do government-funded private schools receive any start-up funding/grants?	Latent ●○○○	No incentives exist for private providers.
How far in advance of the beginning of the academic year are privately managed schools provided information on the amount of their upcoming government funding?	Latent ●○○○	Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them less than one month before the start of the academic year.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedure for Bangladesh, the following **suggested policy options** would help better promote diversity of supply for private schools:

- Ease the minimum standards on land and facilities required for schools to be allowed to operate.
- Reduce the number of fees schools are required to pay in order to operate; ensure that the fees enable a safe learning environment.

Government-funded private schools:

- The government could provide equivalent targeted funding to meet specific student needs, such as those of low-income students, girls, and/or other marginalized groups.
- Consider start-up funding if the government wishes to support additional government-funded private schools.

## From Analysis to Action: Policy Options for Bangladesh

At both the primary and secondary levels in Bangladesh, we find diverse types of education providers, including public schools, independent private schools, and government-funded private schools. As examined in the previous section, policies regulating the private sector in basic education in Bangladesh range from “emerging” in such aspects as empowering parents, students, and communities in government-funded private schools, to “advanced” in several aspects such as encouraging innovation by providers in both types of private schools at primary and secondary levels. Given the results of the SABER-EPS benchmarking exercise, policy options are offered for government consideration. Recognizing the wide supply of schools, particularly at the primary level, these recommendations focus primarily on quality and equity in the education system.

As previously noted, net enrolment at the primary level has been above 90 percent for a number of years and persistence to the last grade of primary school has increased significantly—from 67.2 percent in 2010 to 80.5 percent in 2013. Yet only 48 percent of school-age children were enrolled in secondary school in 2012. While enrolment in private primary schools has grown tremendously in recent years, this trend has shifted since 2013 with the nationalization of RNGPS to NNPS, as these formerly government-funded private institutions are now considered public. At the secondary level, enrolment in private schools has significantly increased in the last decade, showing the growing role of this sector in the provision of education in Bangladesh. The analysis of policy documents regulating the private sector in both private independent and government-funded private schools has shed light on some areas for improvement.

Based on the results of the benchmarking exercise, four policy options are suggested to strengthen the government’s engagement with independent private and government-funded private schools to ensure learning for all:

1. Improve information at the school level.
2. Build on incentives for the poorest students to attend private schools.

3. Increase outcome-based accountability of private schools.
4. Ensure the regulatory environment maintains standards of quality for providers entering the primary and secondary education market.

These options are supported by international evidence, best practice, and examples of countries that have used innovative interventions to improve the performance of their education systems from a variety of starting points.

### Policy Option 1: Improve information at the school level

In Bangladesh, schooling choices for households are impacted by factors such as financial cost and information about school quality. While Bangladesh was one of the first countries to implement conditional cash transfer programs in its education system, and these programs have increased schooling options for students at the primary and secondary levels, the amount of information available to households depends on the type of school. Regular information is available for independent private schools, but only ad-hoc information is available for government-funded private schools. The current regulatory framework for non-state providers in the country shows that efforts could be made to improve information made available to parents.

The government of Bangladesh could increase the information provided to parents, which could include school report cards, classroom assessment results, examination results, and inspection reports. Giving parents greater access to school information with disaggregated data can allow families to make better-informed choices on their children’s schooling. Global evidence has shown that empowering parents through increased information and supporting their understanding of school operations can lead to greater transparency, as well as enable them to influence school quality. Interventions that give parents access to school performance information have had significant impacts in both developed and developing countries.

### Country examples

Interventions that give access to school performance information have had significant impacts in both developed and developing countries. In Punjab, Pakistan, providing school report cards to parents, communities,

and teachers improved student performance by 0.15 standard deviations and reduced fees in high-quality private schools by over 20 percent. The largest learning gains (0.34 standard deviations) were for initially low-performing (below median baseline test scores) private schools (Andrabi et al. 2009).

In the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, a USAID-funded program—Civic Engagement for Education Reform in Central America (CERCA)—implemented a school report card that focused on indicators in four areas:

1. **Context:** basic profile information (i.e., number of students in each grade, etc.) and access to services at the school (i.e., sanitation, electricity, etc.).
2. **Inputs:** class size, access to resources (e.g., notebooks, pens, etc.), and access to social services (e.g., school meals, health programs, etc.).
3. **Processes:** student and teacher attendance, school plan implementation, and parent participation.
4. **Results:** coverage and efficiency (for the latter, repetition and retention rates are reported).

The results of the school report card are used by communities to develop and monitor implementation of school action plans (CERCA 2006).

## Policy Option 2: Build on incentives for the poorest students to attend private schools

### 1. Build on existing demand-side incentives for the poorest students to attend private schools.

Currently, the government of Bangladesh provides tax subsidies or cash transfers to enable children to attend private schools at the primary and secondary levels: Primary Education Stipend Program (PESP) and the Female Stipend Program (FSP). PESP is poverty-targeted; however, primary completion rates are considerably lower (65 percent) for students from the poorest wealth quintile compared with students from the wealthiest quintile (97 percent; see figure 8). As previously noted, net enrolment in secondary education overall is low: 47.7 percent in 2012 (World Bank N.d.). The FSP has been shown to be effective in increasing female enrolment in secondary school; at present, there is even a reverse gender gap in secondary education.

The Secondary Education Quality and Access Enhancement Project (SEQAEP) was implemented in 2008 with several objectives, one of which was to improve equitable access to secondary school for poor boys and girls through the provision of stipends and tuition, based on pro-poor targeting and educational criteria (e.g., maintaining passing grades and regular attendance). SEQAEP has been shown to have a significant impact in increasing the enrolment of poor students in the upazilas (sub-districts) where the program was implemented.

The government of Bangladesh could consider expanding this program to additional upazilas to encourage the poorest students in all areas of the country to complete primary schooling and make the transition to secondary school. Since an overwhelming majority of institutions are private at the secondary level and parental choice is restricted by financial costs, increasing existing poverty-targeted secondary education stipend programs such as SEQAEP could increase overall enrolment in secondary education. Additionally, recognizing that Bangladesh has a low completion rate for lower secondary school—58.4 percent in 2011 (World Bank N.d.)—the government could strengthen oversight of educational criteria for programs such as SEQAEP to ensure that targeted students do not drop out.

By providing additional financial benefits such as cash transfers to families to enable their children to attend private secondary schools, the state can protect marginalized groups while simultaneously promoting a diverse supply of quality providers. Additionally, such demand-side mechanisms are cost-effective approaches for expanding access to education services. Future education policy needs to target marginalized groups more purposefully; flat-rate subsidies to all households should be avoided in favor of directing subsidies to the poorest. This option has budget implications for the government and requires further analysis before a detailed policy discussion could take place.

### Country example

In Cambodia, two evaluations of the impact of scholarships for lower secondary school have shown substantial increases in school enrolment and attendance. Recipients were 20–30 percentage points more likely to be enrolled and attending school as a result

of the scholarships. Impacts on learning outcomes were, however, limited (Filmer and Schady 2008, 2009, and 2011). A new approach to scholarships at the primary level were subsequently tried, using two different targeting mechanisms, one based on a student's poverty level and the other on baseline test scores ("merit"). Both targeting mechanisms increased enrolment and attendance. However, only the merit-based targeting induced positive effects on test scores. The results suggest that in order to balance equity and efficiency, a two-step targeting approach might be preferable: first, target low-income individuals and then, among them, target based on merit (Barrera-Osorio and Filmer 2013).

For more information on scholarships in Cambodia please click [here](#).

## **2. Consider implementing other programs, such as voucher schemes, to increase poor students' access to education, particularly at the secondary level.**

The secondary education subsector is dominated by government-funded private providers. Public schools are few in number and exist primarily in district headquarters. Access to public secondary schools is limited, particularly for children in rural areas, and there is a high level of competition for seats, with places awarded to students who score higher on entrance exams. Thus, for most students, school choice at the secondary level is limited to private schools. The government could consider implementing a voucher program that would allow poor students to attend the school of their choice. Many private secondary schools already receive government funding; however this is largely in the form of MPOs for teacher salaries. Funding for private schools could also be made available based on their ability to attract students and encourage enrolment in secondary education.

Voucher schools are a system whereby a government provides funding to the school chosen by a student; these schools can be operated by government or non-government providers, or both, depending on the system. Vouchers can be targeted to certain populations or they can be universal for all students in the system. A Colombian program that offered school vouchers to low-income families had positive impacts on student achievement and school completion (Angrist et al. 2002).

In the Netherlands, which has a national voucher policy, school choice is used by the majority of parents, with over 70 percent of students enrolled in non-state schools. This includes families from across the income spectrum (Koning and van der Wiel 2010).

### **Country example**

In Pakistan, the Punjab Education Foundation launched an Education Voucher Scheme (EVS) in 2006 to benefit children in less affluent and underprivileged areas who otherwise could not access education due to financial and social constraints. The scheme is immensely popular due to its positive effects on poorer segments of society. It enables children aged 4–17 years to attend a nearby EVS private school of their choice for free, targeting in particular out-of-school children, orphans, children of widows and single parents, as well as children who cannot afford school. There are no up-front infrastructure costs, as existing schools express their interest in participating in the EVS. A partnership between a school and EVS is dependent on continuous quality assurance, including school visits and bi-annual quality assurance tests (QAT) that assess improvements in student learning outcomes (Punjab Education Foundation 2014).

For more information on the Education Voucher Scheme, click [here](#).

### **Policy Option 3: Increase outcome-based accountability of private schools.**

Currently in Bangladesh there are limited incentives and support structures to improve schools. Policies on inspections could be reinforced in order to increase accountability at the school level. Furthermore, the government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition of continued funding, but no standard schedule is specified in the current legislative framework. Two specific policy options identified by this analysis are to require schools to submit school improvement plans and to require government-funded private schools to regularly report on the use of public funds.

Require schools to submit a school improvement plan. In Bangladesh, the regulatory framework clearly sets a framework for how inspections are conducted. However,

there are no clear rules as to how schools are held accountable. One policy option that the government might consider is to require schools to submit a school improvement plan following inspections, including specific priorities for improvement. Improvement planning can facilitate positive change as a school strives to deliver better educational outcomes for all students. School improvement plans have been an important piece of multiple successful education programs in developing countries (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). These plans traditionally outline the goals that the school desires to achieve, strategies for achieving those goals, and practical actionable steps needed to be taken by each individual within the school. Research has shown that improvement plans can be successful when they clearly define goals; pursue simple actions with consistency; align standards, curriculum, instruction, and assessment; and create a culture of achievement (Schmoker and Marzano 1999; Reeves 2006; Collins 2005). Changes at the school level, however, will only occur when relationships in the school are also strengthened. School leaders must ensure that improvement plans are meaningful to all stakeholders and purposeful actions are taken throughout the school (Fullan 2007).

### Country examples

Western Cape, South Africa, requires schools to submit individual school improvement plans. Particular attention is given to those schools that did not achieve the required pass rate on state examinations. The number of underperforming schools has declined every year since the requirement was established, from 85 in 2009 to 26 in 2012 (Western Cape 2013).

In Brazil, the Ministry's Plano de Desenvolvimento da Escola (PDE) project required schools to identify their most serious problems and develop their own school improvement plans. PDE also required schools to focus their plans on two or three effectiveness factors (EFs), one of which must be effective teaching and learning; the other EFs are chosen from a list of general areas detailed in the PDE manual. Students in PDE schools saw greater increases in grade passing rates than students in non-PDE schools (Carnoy et al. 2008).

For more information on Brazil's PDE and use of school improvement plans, please click [here](#).

Require government-funded private schools to report on the use of public funds on a standard schedule. For government-funded private schools in Bangladesh, greater accountability on the use of public funds also needs to be strengthened. Greater transparency and more rigorous compliance would ensure that this funding is used efficiently by private providers.

### Country examples

In Uganda, a survey in 1991 showed that only 13 percent of government funds were reaching schools. This led the government to disseminate information on monthly transfers to the districts via newspapers and radio. Schools were also required to show use of the intended funds per student. By 1999, around 90 percent of funding had reached schools and was being used to support student learning (Reinikka and Svensson 2005).

For more information, click [here](#).

### Policy Option 4: Ensure the regulatory environment maintains standards of quality for providers entering the primary and secondary education market.

Bangladesh is noted for its diversity of education providers, especially at the primary level. With such a diverse market, regulatory frameworks must be enforced to ensure that each provider is held accountable to the same standards of quality. School registration and certification criteria are linked only to inputs, with restrictions particularly stringent at the secondary level. The government could consider linking certification standards to educational outcomes at schools in order to increase schools' accountability to students, families, and communities and to ensure that higher-quality learning opportunities are offered to all students.

Evidence suggests that the effect of school autonomy on student achievement is tied closely to the level of accountability in a school system (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2009; Woessmann et al. 2007; OECD 2009). That is, for school autonomy to have the strongest positive effect on student performance, it must be accompanied by strong

mechanisms of accountability. Local decision making works best in contexts where schools are held accountable for their results (Hanushek and Woessmann 2013).

At the primary level, the government could expand the National Student Assessment (NSA) to all types of schools. Currently only school type is included in its implementation, meaning that schools that are not tested are held to a different degree of accountability. Bangladesh could make funding for private schools contingent upon their participation in and success rates of these assessments.

Similarly, at the secondary level, where a vast majority of schools are government-funded private institutions, the government could consider providing increased funding to schools that maintain higher retention rates as well as pass rates on both the secondary school certificate and higher secondary certificate. The government could also consider expanding SEQAEP to additional upazilas, as recommended under policy option 2.1.

### Country examples

In Jordan, the education system has undergone a number of reforms, one of which has been the establishment of clear student learning standards. The Ministry of Education in Jordan states that education must promote high levels of student success, measured by performance indicators meant to bolster learning outcomes (Jordan-Ministry of Education 2006). Between 1999 and 2007, Jordan experienced a sustained period of improvement in student scores on the international TIMSS exam.

In Namibia, following an evaluation of the adequacy of the education and training system in supporting national development goals, new learning standards were put in place to define the core knowledge and skills to be acquired at the end of each school phase. The knowledge and skills were explicitly chosen to support Namibia's goal of being a knowledge based economy by 2030 (Namibia-Ministry of Education 2007).

In British Columbia, Canada, the top-performing Canadian province on international assessments, the Education Standards Order (ESO) requires all children

educated by independent private providers to reach expected intellectual, human, social, and career development goals. The ESO also sets standards for education delivery for students with special educational needs. Schools are expected to implement Individual Student Education Plans to support them (British Columbia 2013).

Additional information on the Education Standards Order in British Columbia can be found [here](#).



## Acknowledgements

This report presents country data collected using the SABER-EPS instrument and reflects an ever-evolving policy environment. The report was authored by Rachel Cooper with key inputs from Minju Choi. A previous version of the report was prepared by Hugo Wesley in collaboration with Professor Najmul Hossein (principal investigator) in Bangladesh. The current version reflects shifts in the policy landscape and addresses the nuances of a complex system. Critical guidance throughout the process was provided by John Anderson, Nazmul Chaudhury, Laura Lewis, and Oni Lusk-Stover. The report was prepared in consultation with the government of Bangladesh. The SABER-EPS team gratefully recognizes the leadership, support, and feedback of the World Bank Bangladesh education team during the report process: T. M. Asaduzzaman, Syed Rashed Al Zayed Josh, Saurav Dev Bhatta, Shinsaku Nomura, and Ayesha Vawda. The SABER-EPS team acknowledges the support of all who contributed to the report.

In addition, the SABER-EPS team would like to thank the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) for its support for the Education Markets for the Poor research study that enabled this research report.

## References

- Abdulkadiroglu, A., J. D. Angrist, S. M. Dynarski, T. J. Kane, and P. A. Pathak. 2009. "Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots." NBER Working Paper No. 15549. NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research), Cambridge, MA.
- . 2011. "Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126 (2): 699–748.
- Andrabi, T., J. Das, and A. Khwaja. 2009. "Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets." Unpublished manuscript. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Angrist, J., E. Bettinger, E. Bloom, and E. King. 2002. "Vouchers for Private Schooling in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment." *American Economic Review* 92 (5): 1535–58.
- Asadullah, Mohammad Niaz. 2009. Secondary School Madrasas in Bangladesh: Incidence, Quality, and Implications for Reform. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Australian Council for Education Research (ACER). 2014. "2013 Learning Assessment of SEQAEP Institutions." ACER, Melbourne, Australia.
- Bangladesh, Government of People's Republic of. Bureau of Statistics). 2010. "Report of the Household Income & Expenditure Survey 2010."
- . BANBEIS (Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics). 2013. Basic Education Statistics 2013. [http://192.254.190.210/~banbeis/data/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=662&Itemid=224](http://192.254.190.210/~banbeis/data/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=662&Itemid=224)
- . DPE (Directorate of Primary Education). 2014a. "National Student Assessment 2013 for Grades 3 and 5." DPE, Dhaka.
- . 2014b. "Bangladesh Primary Education Annual Sector Performance Report—2014." DPE, Dhaka.
- . Ministry of Finance. 2014. "Medium-Term Macroeconomic Policy Statement FY15–FY17, Ch. 3: Government Spending and Sectoral Priorities." Ministry of Finance, Dhaka.
- . MoPME (Ministry of Primary and Mass Education). 2003. "Education for All: National Plan of Action II 2003–2015." MoPME, Dhaka.
- . 2013. "Annual Primary School Census 2013." MoPME, Dhaka.
- Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 2011. Modernization of Madrassa Education in Bangladesh: A Strategy Paper. Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Dhaka.
- Barrera-Osorio, F. 2006. "The Impact of Private Provision of Public Education: Empirical Evidence from Bogotá's Concession Schools." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4121. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Barrera-Osorio, F., and D. Filmer. 2013. Incentivizing Schooling for Learning: Evidence on the Impact of Alternative Targeting Approaches. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6541.
- Barrera-Osorio, F., and D. Raju. 2010. "Short-Run Learning Dynamics under a Test-Based Accountability System: Evidence from Pakistan." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5465. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Baum, D., L. Lewis, O. Lusk-Stover, and H. A. Patrinos. 2014. "What Matters Most for Engaging the Private Sector in Education: A Framework Paper." SABER Working Paper. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Björkman, M. 2007. "Does Money Matter for Student Performance? Evidence from a Grant Program in Uganda." IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research) Working Paper 326. IGIER, Bocconi University, Italy.

- British Columbia, Government of. 2013. Educational Standards Order, Independent School Act, Section 4 (1) (b).
- Bruns, B., D. Filmer, and H. A. Patrinos. 2011. *Making Schools Work: New Evidence on Accountability Reforms*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Cameron, S. 2011. "Whether and Where to Enroll? Choosing a Primary School in the Slums of Urban Dhaka, Bangladesh." *International Journal of Educational Development* 31 (4): 357–66.
- Carnoy, M., A. K. Gove, S. Loeb, J. H. Marshall, and M. Socias. 2008. "How Schools and Students Respond to School Improvement Programs: The Case of Brazil's PDE." *Economics of Education Review* 27 (1): 22–38.
- Carnoy, M., and S. Loeb. 2002. "Does External Accountability Affect Student Outcomes? A Cross-State Analysis." *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 24 (4): 305–31.
- Carnoy, M., and P. J. McEwan. 2003. "Does Privatization Improve Education? The Case of Chile's National Voucher Plan." In *Choosing Choice: School Choice in International Perspective*, ed. D. N. Plank and G. Sykes, 24–44. New York: Teachers College Press.
- CERCA (Civic Engagement for Education Reform in Central America). 2006. School Report Card. Academy for Educational Development, Washington, DC.
- Collins, J. C. 2005. *Good to Great and the Social Sectors: A Monograph to Accompany Good to Great*. New York: Harper Collins Business.
- De la Croix, D., and M. Doepke. 2009. "To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy." *The Review of Economic Studies* 76 (2): 597–628.
- DFID (Department for International Development) and CfBT Education Trust. 2013. "Study into the Role of the Private Sector in Primary Education for the Urban Poor in Bangladesh." DFID and CfBT Education Trust, Reading, UK.
- Di Gropello, E., and J. H. Marshall. 2005. "Teacher Effort and Schooling Outcomes in Rural Honduras." In *Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America*, ed. E. Vegas, 307–58. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Edstats (database). World Bank, Washington, DC. <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/>.
- Filmer, D., and N. Schady. 2008. "Getting Girls into School: Evidence from a Scholarship Program in Cambodia." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 56 (2): 581–617.
- . 2009. "School Enrollment, Selection, and Test Scores." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4998. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- . 2011. "Does More Cash in Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Always Lead to Larger Impacts on School Attendance?" *Journal of Development Economics* 96 (1): 150–57.
- French, R., and G. Kingdon. 2010. "The Relative Effectiveness of Private Government Schools in Rural India: Evidence from ASER Data." Department of Quantitative Social Science Working Paper 10-03. Institute of Education, University of London.
- Fullan, M. 2007. *The New Meaning of Educational Change*. 3d ed. New York and London: Teacher's College and RoutledgeFalmer.
- Gertler, P., H. A. Patrinos, and M. Rubio-Codina. 2012. "Empowering Parents to Improve Education: Evidence from Rural Mexico." *Journal of Development Economics* 99 (1): 68–79.
- Hanushek, E. A., and M. E. Raymond. 2005. "Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student Performance?" *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 24 (2): 297–327.
- Hanushek, E. A., and L. Woessmann. 2013. "Does School Autonomy Make Sense Everywhere? Panel Estimates from PISA." *Journal of Development Economics* 104: 212–32.
- Himmler, O. 2007. "The Effects of School Choice on Academic Achievement in the Netherlands." Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, Sweden.
- Hossain, N. 2007. "Expanding Access to Education in Bangladesh." In *Ending Poverty in South Asia: Ideas that Work*, ed. D. Narayan and E. Glinskaya, 304–25. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Hoxby, C. M. 2003. "School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States." *Swedish Economic Policy Review* 10: 9–65.
- IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute). 2006. "Evaluating the Reaching Out-of-School Children Project in Bangladesh: A Baseline Study." IFPRI, Washington, DC.
- Jimenez, E., and Y. Sawada. 1999. "Do Community-Managed Schools Work? An Evaluation of El Salvador's EDUCO Program." *World Bank Economic Review* 13 (3): 415–41.
- Jimenez, E., and Y. Sawada. 2003. "Does Community Management Help Keep Kids in Schools? Evidence Using Panel Data from El Salvador's EDUCO program." CIRJE Discussion Paper F-236. CIRJE (Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy), Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- World Bank. 2006. *World Data on Education: Jordan*. 6<sup>th</sup> ed. World Bank, Washington, DC. <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/hnp/files/edstats/JORwde07.pdf>.
- King, E. M., and B. Özler. 2005. "What's Decentralization Got to Do with Learning? School Autonomy and Student

- Performance.” Discussion Paper 054. Interfaces for Advanced Economic Analysis, Kyoto University. [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVANTICORR/Resources/3035863-1291223960989/Nicaragua\\_Teacher\\_Staffing\\_and\\_Monitoring.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVANTICORR/Resources/3035863-1291223960989/Nicaragua_Teacher_Staffing_and_Monitoring.pdf)
- Koning, P., and K. van der Wiel. 2010. “School Responsiveness to Quality Rankings: An Empirical Analysis of Secondary Education in the Netherlands.” IZA Discussion Paper 4969. IZA (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor), Bonn, Germany.
- Levin, H. M., and C. R. Belfield. 2003. “The Marketplace in Education.” *Review of Research in Education* 27: 183–219.
- Levin, H. M. and P. J. McEwan, eds. 2002. *Cost-Effectiveness and Educational Policy. Yearbook of the American Education Finance Association*. New York: Routledge.
- Lewis, M., and M. Lockheed. 2007. *Exclusion, Gender, and Education: Case Studies from the Developing World*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
- Mcloughlin, C. 2013. Low-Cost Private Schools: Evidence, Approaches and Emerging Issues. EPS Peaks, UK. <https://partnerplatform.org/?96t3b0qv>.
- Namibia, Government of. Ministry of Education. 2007. Education Training Sector Improvement Programme (ETSIP). Planning a Learning Nation, Windhoek, Namibia.
- Nath, S. 2012. “Competencies Achievement of BRAC School Students: Trends, Comparisons and Predictors.” Research Monograph Series 51. Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC, Dhaka.
- OECD. 2009. *Education at a Glance 2009*. Paris: OECD.
- Orazem, P. F., and E. M. King. 2007. *Handbook of Development Economics* 4: 3475–3559.
- Pal, S., and G. G. Kingdon. 2010. Can Private School Growth Foster Universal Literacy? Panel Evidence from Indian Districts. Discussion Paper 5274. FZA (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor), Bonn, Germany.
- Pandey, P., S. Goyal, and V. Sundararaman. 2009. “Community Participation in Public Schools: Impact of Information Campaigns in Three Indian States.” *Education Economics* 17 (3): 355–75.
- Patrinos, H. A. 2002. “A Review of Demand-Side Financing Initiatives in Education.” Draft paper. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Patrinos, H. A., F. Barrera-Osorio, and J. Guáqueta. 2009. *The Role and Impact of Public-Private Partnerships in Education*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Punjab Education Foundation. 2014. Education Voucher System. Punjab Education Foundation, Lahore, Pakistan.
- <http://www.pef.edu.pk/pef-departments-evs-overview.html>.
- Raynor, J., and K. Wesson. 2006. “The Girls’ Stipend Program in Bangladesh.” *Journal of Education for International Development* 2 (2): 1–12.
- Recognized Non-Government Secondary School Teachers (Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Dhaka) Terms and Conditions of Service Regulations 1979.
- Registration of Private Schools Ordinance, 1962.
- Reinikka, R., and J. Svensson. 2005. “Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda.” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3(2–3): 259–67.
- Rosenberg, T. 2013. “Where Private School is Not a Privilege.” *The New York Times*, May 8 2013. [http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/where-private-school-is-not-a-privilege/?\\_php=true&\\_type=blogs&\\_r=0](http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/where-private-school-is-not-a-privilege/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0).
- Rules and Regulations under the Education Ministry for Establishing, Starting and Approving Private Schools, Colleges and Madrassas (23/4/97). Reeves, D. B. 2006. *The Learning Leader: How to Focus School Improvement for Better Results*. Alexandria, VA: ASCD (Association of Curriculum & Development).
- Schmoker, M., and R. J. Marzano. 1999. “Realizing the Promise of Standards-Based Education.” *Educational Leadership* 56: 17–21.
- School-1, Section S.R.O. No. 263-Law/2011, Section 4 (15, 16 (1)). Published August 18, 2011, in the Bangladesh Gazette by the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education.
- Skoufias, E., and J. Shapiro. 2006. “The Pitfalls of Evaluating a School Grants Program Using Non-Experimental Data.” Policy Research Working Paper 4036. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Sommers, C., 2011. *Primary Education in Rural Bangladesh: Degrees of Access, Choice, and Participation of the Poorest*. Research Monograph 75. Falmer, UK: CREATE (Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions, and Equity), University of Sussex.
- “26,000 Primary Schools will be Nationalized Today.” TazaKhabor website, January 8, 2013. <http://tazakhobor.com/national/2293-26000-primary-schools-will-be-nationalized-today>.
- Tietjen, Karen. 2003. The Bangladesh Primary Education Stipend Project: A Descriptive Analysis. World Bank, Washington, DC. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099080014368/BangladeshStipend.pdf>.
- USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development). 2002. “Bangladesh Education Sector Review: Report No. 4;

Teachers and Teacher Training (Formal and Non-formal).” Groundwork, Inc., Washington, DC.

Ullah, A., 2013. “An Analysis of the Impact of Educational Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs in Bangladesh 2005–2010.” Ph.D. thesis, University of Canberra, Australia.

Western Cape, Government of. 2013. “Plan to Address the Needs of our Underperforming Schools, 24/03/2013.” Press Release. Government of Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa. [http://wced.pgwc.gov.za/comms/press/2013/24\\_24Mar.html](http://wced.pgwc.gov.za/comms/press/2013/24_24Mar.html)

Woessmann, L., E. Ludemann, G. Schutz, and M. R. West. 2007. “School Accountability, Autonomy, Choice, and the Level of Student Achievement: International Evidence from PISA 2003.” Education Working Paper 13. OECD, Paris.

World Bank. N.d. Data: Bangladesh. World Bank, Washington, DC. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/bangladesh>.

———. 2003. World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People. Washington, DC: World Bank.

———. 2013. Bangladesh Education Sector Review: Seeding Fertile Ground: Education That Works for Bangladesh. Report 80613-BD. Human Development Sector, World Bank, Washington, DC.

———. N.d. Data: Bangladesh. World Bank, Washington, DC. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/bangladesh>

### Annex I: SABER-Engaging the Private Sector Rubrics

The following tables display the indicators and scales utilized for benchmarking an individual country’s policy on private sector engagement in education. Across the four types of private schools, the indicators pertaining to each goal are largely the same; where a certain indicator pertains only to certain school types, this is noted within the table.

**Table A1.1 Policy Goal: Encouraging Innovation by Providers**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Latent</b>	<b>Emerging</b>	<b>Established</b>	<b>Advanced</b>
<b>Teacher standards</b>	The central government has the legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers, with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers without final review by central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority to set their own teacher standards without final review by central authorities.
<b>Teacher appointment and deployment</b>	The central government has the legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers. Appointments are subject to final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers without review by central authorities.	Schools (i.e., individual school principals, school councils, parent associations, etc.) have the legal authority to appoint teachers without review by central authorities.
<b>Teacher salary</b>	The central government has the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels, with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels without review by central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority to determine teacher salary levels without review by central authorities.
<b>Teacher dismissal</b>	The central government has the legal authority to dismiss teachers.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to dismiss teachers, with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority to dismiss teachers without review by central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority to dismiss teachers without review by central authorities.

**Table A1.1 Policy Goal: Encouraging Innovation by Providers**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Latent</b>	<b>Emerging</b>	<b>Established</b>	<b>Advanced</b>
<b>Curriculum delivery</b>	The central government has the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered, with final review from central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered without final review from central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority over how the curriculum is delivered without final review by central authorities.
<b>Classroom resourcing</b>	The central government has the legal authority over how resources are allocated to the classroom (e.g., class sizes).	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms, with final review from central authorities (e.g., class sizes).	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms without final review by central authorities (e.g., class size).	Schools have the legal authority over how resources are allocated to classrooms without final review by central authorities (e.g., class sizes).
<b>Budget autonomy</b> <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	The central government has the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets, with final review by central authorities.	Regional or municipal governments have the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets without final review by central authorities.	Schools have the legal authority over the management of school operating budgets without final review by central authorities.

**Table A1.2 Policy Goal: Holding Schools Accountable**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Latent</b>	<b>Emerging</b>	<b>Established</b>	<b>Advanced</b>
<b>Student Standards</b>	The national government does not set standards on what students need to learn.	The national government does set standards for what students need to learn, but it does not indicate how well or by when.	The national government does set standards for what students need to learn and also indicates EITHER by when OR how well.	The national government does set standards for what students need to learn, by when, and how well.

<b>Student Assessment</b>	Students do not take standardized exams.	Standardized exams are administered, but not annually.	Standardized exams are administered annually.	Standardized exams are administered annually and results are disaggregated by school, socioeconomic background, gender, and other criteria of student disadvantage.
<b>Inspection</b>	The central government does not require schools to undergo inspections.	The central government requires schools to undergo inspections, but no term is specified.	The central government requires schools to undergo standard term inspections.	The central government requires schools to undergo inspections, with the frequency of inspections depending on the results of the previous inspection.
<b>Improvement planning</b>	Not applicable if the government does not require schools to take part in inspections.	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school.	Inspection reports include the strengths and weaknesses of a school, as well as specific priorities for improvement.	Inspection reports include strengths and weaknesses of the school. Schools are required to submit a school improvement plan with specific priorities for improvement following the inspection.
<b>Sanctions and rewards</b>	Sanctions are not administered based on the results of school inspections or school performance on standardized exams.	Sanctions include additional monitoring and/or warnings; they are administered based on the results of school inspections or school performance on standardized exams.	Sanctions include additional monitoring and/or fines, which are administered based on the results of school inspections or standardized exams. <i>For government-funded, privately managed, and voucher schools: rewards may also be used.</i>	Sanctions include additional monitoring, fines, and as a final measure, school closures; decisions are made based on the results of school inspections or school performance on standardized exams. <i>For government-funded, privately managed, voucher schools: rewards are also used.</i>

<p><b>Financial reporting</b> <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i></p>	<p>The central government does not require schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for the continuation of funding.</p>	<p>The government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for continued funding, but on an ad-hoc basis and not according to a standard-term schedule.</p>	<p>The central government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for continued funding according to a standard term.</p>	<p>The central government requires schools to report on the use of public funds as a condition for continued funding on a standard-term basis, with greater monitoring of schools that have failed to adhere to report requirements in the past.</p>
--	---	---	--	--

**Table A.1.3. Policy Goal: Empowering All Parents, Students and Communities**

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
<p><b>Information</b></p>	<p>No information is provided to parents on the results of standardized exams or inspection reports.</p>	<p>Ad-hoc information is provided to parents on standardized exam results or inspection reports.</p>	<p>Regular information is provided to parents on standardized exam results or inspection reports.</p>	<p>A variety of sources provide parents regular information provided on standardized exam results (disaggregated by school, socioeconomic background, gender, and other criteria of student disadvantage.) and inspection reports. Policy specifies information on interventions designed to targeted disadvantaged student groups.</p>
<p><b>Voice</b></p>	<p>Not applicable if the government does not require schools to take part in inspections.</p>	<p>Neither students nor parents are surveyed as part of the inspection process.</p>	<p>Students and/or parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process.</p>	<p>Student and parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process.</p>



**Table A.1.3. Policy Goal: Empowering All Parents, Students and Communities**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Latent</b>	<b>Emerging</b>	<b>Established</b>	<b>Advanced</b>
<b>Selection</b> <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	Schools are allowed to select students based on both academic performance and geography.	Schools are allowed to select students based on academic performance or geography.	Schools are not allowed to select students but schools are not required to use a lottery if oversubscribed.	Schools are not allowed to select students and are required to conduct a lottery if school if over-subscribed.
<b>Contributions</b> <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	Parental choice is restricted by compulsory monetary parent contributions that, if not paid, prohibits a child from attending the school.	Parental choice is restricted by voluntary monetary contributions (i.e., contributions to a school fund).	Parental choice is restricted by voluntary nonmonetary contributions (i.e., in-kind labor or goods) to a school.	Parental choice is not restricted by any type of required parental contributions.
<b>Financial support</b> <i>(for independent private schools only)</i>	The central government does not provide tax subsidies or cash transfers to families whose children attend private schools.	The central government provides tax subsidies to families whose children attend private schools.	The central government provides tax subsidies and cash transfers to families, which can be used to enable their children to attend private schools.	The central government provides targeted cash transfers that can be used by disadvantaged students attending private schools.

**Table A.1.4. Policy Goal: Promoting Diversity of Supply**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Latent</b>	<b>Emerging</b>	<b>Established</b>	<b>Advanced</b>
<b>Ownership</b>	The central government allows one of the following types of organizations to operate schools: Community Not-for-profit Faith-based For-profit	The central government allows two of the following types of organizations to operate schools: Community Not-for-profit Faith-based For-profit	The central government allows three of the following types of organizations to operate schools: Community Not-for-profit Faith-based For-profit	The government allows all of the following types of organizations to operate schools: Community Not-for-profit Faith-based For-profit

**Table A.1.4. Policy Goal: Promoting Diversity of Supply**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Latent</b>	<b>Emerging</b>	<b>Established</b>	<b>Advanced</b>
<b>Certification standards</b>	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, restrict market entry. These include all of the following: 1. land (undulating, distance from public venues, etc.) 2. facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes, etc.) 3. assets (ownership of land or buildings)	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, restrict market entry. These include two of the three following criteria: 1. land (undulating, distance from public venues, etc.) 2. facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes, etc.) 3. assets (ownership of land or buildings)	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, restrict market entry. These include one of the three following criteria: 1. land (undulating, distance from public venues, etc.) 2. facilities (separate science labs, weather vanes, etc.) 3. assets (ownership of land or buildings)	Certification standards, which are not linked to education outcomes, do not restrict market entry.
<b>Market entry information</b>	Registration/certification guidelines are not officially outlined.	Registration/certification guidelines are not made public and available only upon request.	Registration/certification guidelines are made public, but by a single source.	Registration/certification guidelines are made public and by multiple sources.
<b>Regulatory fees</b>	Schools are able to operate while paying four or more types of fees.  The central government sets standardized tuition fees.	Schools are able to operate while paying two to three types of fees.  The central government does not set standardized tuition fees, but imposes a tuition cap (an overall amount or percentage increase).	Schools are able to operate while paying one type of fee.  Schools set fees, but those fees are subject to review by the central government.	Schools are able to operate without paying fees.  Schools set fees without any review by the central government.
<b>Tuition fees</b> <i>(for independent private schools only)</i>	The central government sets standardized tuition fees.	The central government does not set standardized tuition fees, but imposes a tuition cap (an overall amount or percentage increase).	Schools set fees, but those fees are subject to review by the central government.	Schools set fees without any review by the central government.
<b>Funding</b> <i>(not applicable to independent private schools)</i>	Academic operating budgets are not equivalent to per-student funding amounts in public schools.	Academic operating budgets are equivalent to per-student funding amounts in public schools.	All budgets — academic and other, such as for facilities and transport — are equivalent to per-student funding amounts in public schools. Schools do not receive targeted funding to meet specific student needs.	All budgets — academic and other, such as for facilities and transport — are equivalent to per-student funding amounts in public school. Schools receive targeted funding

**Table A.1.4. Policy Goal: Promoting Diversity of Supply**

Indicator	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
<p><b>Incentives</b> (<i>not applicable to independent private schools</i>)</p>	<p>No incentives exist.</p>	<p>Schools are supported by one of the following:                      1. start-up funding similar to that provided to public schools                      2. access to government land or unused government facilities                      3. exemption from local taxes (i.e., property taxes) similar to that granted to public schools</p>	<p>Schools are supported by two of the following                      1. Start-up funding similar to that provided to public schools                      2. access to government land or unused government facilities                      3. exemption from local taxes (i.e., property taxes) similar to that granted to public schools</p>	<p>Schools are supported by all of the following                      1. Start-up funding similar to that provided to public schools                      2. access to government land or unused government facilities                      3. exemption from local taxes (i.e., property taxes) similar to that granted to public schools</p>
<p><b>Planning</b> (<i>not applicable for independent private schools</i>)</p>	<p>Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them less than 1 month before the start of the academic year.</p>	<p>Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them between 1 and 3 months before the start of the academic year.</p>	<p>Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them between 4 and 6 months before the start of the academic year.</p>	<p>Schools are provided information on the allocations to be transferred to them more than 6 months before the start of the academic year.</p>
<p><b>Coverage</b> (<i>for privately managed schools only</i>)</p>	<p>Coverage of charters is restricted by three of the following:                      1. student numbers                      2. school numbers and location (i.e., certain cities or districts)                      3. only new or only existing schools are able to become charters</p>	<p>Coverage of charters is restricted by two of the following:                      1. student numbers                      2. school numbers and location (i.e., certain cities or districts)                      No restrictions due to new/existing school status.</p>	<p>Coverage of charters is restricted by one of the following:                      1. student numbers                      2. school numbers and location (i.e., certain cities or districts).</p>	<p>No restrictions. Charters are not restricted by student numbers, school numbers, or location (i.e., certain cities or districts).</p>

The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative collects data on the policies and institutions of education systems around the world and benchmarks them against practices associated with student learning. SABER aims to give all parties with a stake in educational results—from students, administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, detailed, objective snapshot of how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn.

This report focuses specifically on policies in the area of engaging the private sector in education.

This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

