Institutionalizing resilience in a post conflict context: How Rwanda addressed education system reform and social cohesion
About the ERA case report series

This report has been produced by the Education Resilience Approaches (ERA) team at The World Bank (HDNED) and analyzes the adversity, the resilience assets, and the education system response in a particular country or context. It makes use of available data collected through the ERA’s conceptual framework and/or tools, as well as review of other secondary sources. While the report complements those produced as part of the SABER series, the approach taken also differs in that it does not seek to benchmark or provide regional and international comparisons. Rather, in keeping with resilience theory and good practice (presented herein), the process is one of collecting and analyzing data as it pertains to the local relevance of education services in countries affected by significant adversities.

This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. This case report was mostly based on the original “Case Study in Institutional Education Resilience, Rwanda”, conducted by Richard Arden and Yisa Claver in 2011. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

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Glossary

FARG: Fonds d’Aide aux rescapés du Génocide (Genocide Survivor Assistance Fund)

GACACA: Traditional courts adopted to deal with the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi cases, because it would have taken too long to deal with these cases through ordinary courts.

GIRINKA: A cascade program to give one cow to each family. One of the strategies for poverty reduction and promotion of nutrition to children by provision of milk.

IMIHIGO: Performance contracts

INGANDO: Solidarity training centers

UBUDEHE: Communal support to the needy, e.g. during farming season

UMUGANDA: Communal services of common good, e.g. general cleaning of community surroundings. Carried out every last Saturday of the month.

UMWIHERERO: Senior Government Retreat, held every year in February to discuss and agree on progress of government key and priority issues.

UMUSHYIKIRANO: National Consultation forum with senior government officers, District Mayors and Executives and representatives from Rwandese Diaspora from different countries. It is held each a year in December.
Introduction

Education Resilience Approaches (ERA)

Violence, conflict and other contexts of adversity present a significant challenge to the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Moreover, as highlighted in the World Development Report 2011, countries affected by violence and conflict often face severe development challenges and many are characterized by weak institutional capacity and political instability. The impacts of pervasive violence and conflict are especially felt by the poor and traditionally excluded communities not least because such contexts often exacerbate existing inequity in social service delivery, including education services (World Development Report, World Bank 2011). However, research and practice in situations of adversity have also highlighted how education can protect vulnerable children and youth providing them with an appropriate environment within which to nurture their psychosocial well-being and better protect them.¹

Responding to the “Learning for All” objective of the World Bank’s Education Strategy 2020, the ERA program builds upon and complements the body of work on protection and emotional well-being in difficult contexts by focusing on the education system level features that can also support the pursuit of positive learning outcomes in adversity. Also, ERA addresses the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and its focus on resilience within country-led fragility assessments agreed in Busan (Korea). Learning and competence in contexts of adversity have been identified as resilience factors in individuals, along with other non-cognitive skills such as purpose, empathy, perseverance, etc.² Today’s resilience studies emphasize that individuals can recover, continue to perform, and transform positively in times of adversity by dynamically engaging with their environment (including other actors and relevant and accessible services). Schools and education systems can support this dynamic process for students through integrated approaches that target their protection, socioemotional well-being and learning outcomes.

For more than 40 years, resilience studies have tried to understand the capacity of human beings (and their communities and organizations) to recover from crises, to continue to perform in spite of adversities and to transform positively in the midst of difficulties.³ We now know that resilience is neither a special, super-human gift nor a trait in only a few individuals. Resilience occurs ordinarily in the interactions between people, as adversity triggers the need to understand our problems, to express our emotions and to develop competence and skills to overcome them—including academic and productive skills. Certainly, many studies identify schools and teachers as important contributors to resilience in children, adolescents and youth. What is more, in education systems resilience can be promoted through the provision of relevant and quality services that foster the interactions among students, teachers and parents to address both learning and well-being.

¹ See for example Nicolai and Triplehorn 2003; INEE Minimum Standards for Education (revised) 2010.
While the roots and forms of adversities—especially of violence and conflict—differ greatly from one country to the next, by applying resilience theory, the ERA Program has been able to develop an overarching framework through which to focus on learning outcomes and questions of relevance and quality even in times of pervasive adversity across varied contexts. As an approach, ERA does not provide rigid methods or formulas, rather it offers a guide to understand learning in spite of adversity. It does so through offering flexible diagnostic and research tools firstly to gather evidence of this process within a particular context and then to furnish general lessons learned. In so doing, ERA does not advocate for a specific intervention or stand-alone program. Instead, it employs a resilience lens to understand learning in contexts of adversity and identify the risks as well as assets present in education communities, with the aim of aligning those assets with existing education services and supports.

Thus unlike the other SABER domains, ERA does not benchmark nor provide regional and international comparisons. Instead, ERA complements them by offering lessons discerned from a process of collecting and analyzing data at a local level on the relevance of education services in difficult country contexts.

Finally, the findings related to the assets and strengths of students under stress should not be seen to preclude or negate challenges faced by education communities (students, families, teachers and education administrators) nor by the education system itself. ERA’s approach to this study does not diminish the need for wider and comprehensive efforts to address the sources of adversity in each context. Rather, adopting a resilience approach provides a means for education systems to understand both risks and assets in education communities in order to align their institutional policies, programs and available resources to better address the needs of at-risk children and youth.

**ERA methodology**

For education systems, ERA complements other diagnostic tools such as the World Bank’s System Approach for Better Education Results (SABER). Unlike SABER—an approach based on quantitative metrics against which the performance and status of education systems can be assessed—ERA provides a more flexible framework to collect information on what matters most to foster education resilience. It focuses on risks, assets, interactions and available supports, although these are defined independently in each country context. Similar to SABER, ERA has organized the available evidence on Education Resilience around policy goals (which are called Resilience Components) and Resilience Levers, which guide data collection of the evidence to facilitate understanding of the resilience process in each context and to share lessons across countries. Figure 1 below presents the ERA program’s components and levers.
The ERA program relies primarily on the collection of mixed-methods data. Three primary tools are being developed:

(i) **Resilience in Education Systems (RES-360°):** A process for a rapid 360° diagnosis of the risks, education community assets and potentially relevant education programs in a country;

(ii) **Resilience in Schools (RES-School):** An assessment of how resilience can be fostered through the core school functions (access and permanence, teaching and learning, school management, school climate and community relations); and

(iii) **Resilience in Education Settings Research (RES-Research):** An education resilience research training module for universities, local researchers and agencies working in fragile, conflict and violence affected contexts.

The Rwanda case study is the first of five initial pilot country case studies that supported—through consultations, prototyping and pilot applications—the development of the ERA methodology and the program tools listed above. The sequence and focus of the five pilot country cases is presented in the table below.
Table 1: Sequencing of the ERA program development and respective country case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ERA framework component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Development of the Education Resilience framework (institutional resilience component)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Initial prototype of an education resilience research approach with a university based in a fragile context (RES-Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)</td>
<td>Further development of the ERA framework and piloting of the qualitative education resilience training module (RES-Research). Findings guided the initial design of the resilience in schools questionnaire (RES-School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America (Colombia, Nicaragua and Honduras)</td>
<td>Development and piloting of the mixed-methods (qualitative and quantitative) education resilience research training module (RES-Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Development and piloting of the RES-360° tool</td>
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The approach for the Rwanda case study

Rwanda was selected as one of the major case studies to inform the development of ERA tools and background materials because of its remarkable recovery economically, socially, and politically from the impact of the terrible 1994 Genocide. This recovery has been particularly marked in the education sector which has undergone a series of reforms designed to promote peaceful social transformation.

As already noted, the Rwanda case study was seminal in the development of the Education Resilience Approaches general framework. It was the first case to explore the use of a resilience lens to understand both the challenges faced by education systems in contexts of adversity (such as violence, conflict and post-conflict) and the role of education systems in mitigating risks, continuing to perform and even undergoing positive transformations. Today’s four resilience components of the ERA program cut across individual, school and system level analysis. However, as the first exploratory case, the Rwanda study sheds light only on the “Understanding Education in Adversity” and “Aligned Education System Support” components. The student assets, education community engagement and relevant school support are not reviewed. The focus is on the relevant education system level policy, planning and strategic direction in contexts of adversity.

This ERA country case examines the initial response and recovery mechanisms in Rwanda and discusses the transition between early education approaches and innovations to later education reform consolidation, institutionalization and transformation. This case study is qualitative as the mixed-methods approaches of ERA evolved later in the program design. Evidence was compiled through a review of relevant secondary literature dealing with Rwanda’s educational transition process, as well as in-depth interviews with Rwandese former and current education policy and decision makers. Focus groups with education stakeholders (civil society and UN staff) were also conducted. Key findings were then discussed with the then current authorities.
of the Ministry of Education in a final verification process.

While accepting that every country’s experience of conflict and reconstruction is unique in a way, an attempt is made to draw some lessons and recommendations on how education systems can provide strategic guidance to strengthen resilience through system policies, programs and resources. Specifically, the lessons to be taken from the Rwanda case study were the effort to explicitly understand the nature of the adversity that affected the country (institutionalized discrimination that was rooted in strong state structures building up to an intense and chronic humanitarian crisis) and the subsequent policy and programmatic response (widespread cross-sector reforms that included and prioritized education alongside social cohesion). These lessons may prove especially useful for the development of education resilience approaches during the immediate response phase and for supporting meaningful transitions across humanitarian and developmental agendas, in particular in terms of supporting national education priorities in an integrated way with attempts to promote social cohesion.

The Rwandan context

Although Rwanda’s pre-genocide enrollment rates were relatively high for East Africa and had grown significantly over the few decades preceding the genocide, they still lagged globally and access was determined by significantly discriminatory education policies and practices. Moreover, the tragedy of the Rwandan genocide and the risks its aftermath presented to the reconstruction of the Rwandan society were immense. In 1994, Rwanda lay devastated in the aftermath of one of the most brutal and swift mass killings in history. Over 800,000 people, mainly Tutsi but also some moderate Hutus were killed over a period of 3 months, and two million people—about one-third of the population—fled the country to DRC, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. About a million more were internally displaced. Sixty percent of women became heads of families. The number of girls and women with unwanted pregnancies after large-scale rape was high and linked to a 30 percent increase in the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. There were many orphans, unaccompanied children, street children, traumatized children and adolescents. There were also displaced people, returning refugees and demobilized or deserter soldiers.4 Table 1 provides some indicative data on the situation in the education sector pre-genocide.

4 Anna Obura, Never Again – Educational reconstruction in Rwanda (IIEP, 2003), 47.
### Table 2: Pre-genocide educational context in Rwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Indicators</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Gross Enrollment Rate of 65 percent (1990) and Net Enrollment Rate of 63 percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1990) Gender parity in access to education achieved in 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Transition rates from primary to secondary level at 10 percent in 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Poor quality of education attributed to insufficient school equipment and teaching</td>
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<tr>
<td>and learning materials as well as low levels of teacher qualification (60.1 percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>of primary teachers were qualified)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Provision Issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Six years of primary education conducted in two cycles of three years each with</td>
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<tr>
<td>specialization and vocational streams available at the senior secondary level</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Rapid expansion of private education to 43 percent (whereas before most education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>had been run by churches)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• “Free” primary education but hidden school costs (uniforms etc.)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equity and Social Cohesion Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnic and regional quota system to determine entry to all government and assisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>schools* and tertiary systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unpublished primary examination results and performance criteria for admittance to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Performance analysis disaggregated along ethnic lines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*assisted schools were private secondary schools set up by parents’ associations

(All data taken from Obura 2004)
Findings

Education Resilience Component 1: Creating a collective understanding of education in adversity

Understanding the adversity: Education addressed directly the drivers of conflict

As already alluded in the Rwandan context discussion above, the education sector openly recognized the adversity in the country and was understood in terms of the historic presence of inequity and exclusion as conflict drivers. To mitigate these sources of adversity was the immediate challenge that followed the violent conflict of 1994. Specifically, the education system recognized that the systemic and institutional causes and history of discrimination had also permeated its structures and practices. Over the 30 years preceding the genocide, previous regimes in Rwanda had practiced discrimination in terms of access, equity, quality and progression throughout the system. A quota system had been used for entry into schools overtly based on ethnic and regional criteria rather than performance. As such, in many ways the education system mirrored and reinforced the destructive and divisive trends in pre-genocide Rwandan society.

These challenges were then heightened in the massive violence that took place in 1994 which targeted and impacted education as well. For example, schools and colleges were often destroyed, burned or looted and their vehicles stolen. Principals, teachers and children were either killed or fled. Of the 1,836 primary and secondary schools, 65 percent were damaged and only 648 were operational in October 1994. Some schools were occupied by returning refugees, displaced people or military forces presenting challenges for getting the education system up and running in the immediate aftermath of the genocide. The Ministry of Education was also a shell in terms of both physical structure and human capacity with walls smashed, windows blown out, property destroyed or stolen, and many officials massacred or fled. Teachers had been killed but had also been killers—of pupils, other teachers, and neighbors leading to total erosion of faith in the education system. After the genocide only 45 percent of the 12,000 qualified teachers remained in the primary system and about one-third of the secondary teachers were qualified. The whole system was in chaos and disintegration.

The Ministry of Education in Rwanda after the genocide faced practical challenges to provide education services but also recognized the social fractures that had to be repaired. The three major practical service delivery challenges were the poor state of education infrastructure, the lack of human resources, and the shortage of financial resources. Thousands of pupils, students, teachers, principals and administrators had been killed, were refugees or in exile, and many classrooms, laboratories and libraries had been destroyed and their contents looted. In addition, there was a severe shortage of financial resources to invest in reconstruction and rehabilitation, as the Treasury had been looted by the outgoing government forces. There was obviously a complete lack of qualified teachers and administrative staff available to begin
the recovery process.

Socially, the remaining population was nervous, suspicious and scared of reprisals and a lack of trust pervaded the communities. There were two million refugees in Congo and 1.5 million on the streets, many of them orphans. Children and youth were traumatized, had been separated from their parents and some had also been actively involved in the violence. These were issues that could not be addressed by school infrastructure and academic learning alone. Table 2, below, highlights how these challenges affected children/youth, families and education institutions and staff.

Table 2: Impact of the genocide on children’s well-being and the education sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children and Youth Affected by the Violent Conflict</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 100,000 children lost or separated from their parents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Very high levels of direct exposure of children to trauma (e.g. 91 percent of children felt that they would die during the genocide)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Children involved in the perpetration of the genocide and subsequently rejected by society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High levels of sexual violence against women and girls (30 percent incidence between the ages of 13-35)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Families Affected by the Violent Conflict</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 13 percent increase in households below the poverty line from 1993 to 1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase in child and female headed households</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Institutions and Staff Affected by the Violent Conflict</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• All schools (including post primary centers) were looted and pillaged and many damaged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• One quarter of schools occupied by displaced persons and military in months following the genocide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Teaching profession was divided during the genocide between those who were targeted and those who perpetrated attacks, resulting in lack of trust, fear and total erosion of faith in the system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MoE building severely damaged and staff fled and many were killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(All data taken from Obura 2004)
Collective meaning and purpose of education: The education sector as a vehicle for positive social transformation

In the face of the above detailed education and social fragmentation challenges, the National Authorities sought to manage the immediate crisis and over the longer term rebuild the education system so that it could reduce the likelihood of returning to violence. To achieve this, the education system had to address challenges related to education service delivery and the pre- and post-conflict grievances. The key approach was to create an inclusive education system aiming at positive learning outcomes for all its students, while explicitly addressing the education system’s contributions (among other sectors) to mitigate the sources of violent conflict in Rwandan society. This dual focus—on education and social transformation—required both institutional and personal commitment. Ministers together with regional leaders and senior colleagues went from province to province, district to district cajoling and persuading parents to bring their children back to schools, places that people feared as sites of betrayal and massacre.

In terms of education services, the World Bank Country Study (2004) noted that the numbers of children in primary school in the period 1994 to 1999 surpassed the number that would have been enrolled had the system expanded at historical rates of increase. The gross enrollment ratio at 107 percent exceeded the corresponding ratio for the average low-income country in Africa at the time. In secondary education, the number of students grew at 20 percent a year from 1996. Although the gross enrollment ratio at this level remained below the average for low-income Sub-Saharan Africa at 13 percent compared with 20 percent, the gap would have been even wider had the system stagnated after the genocide. In higher education, enrollments rose even more rapidly, from 3,400 students in 1991 to nearly 17,000 by 2001, almost a fourfold increase in a decade.

The impressive education service delivery expansion also included approaches to repair the fractured social structure of Rwanda. This will be discussed in the education system level support component, next. However, we end this section noting a tragic testimony regarded by the participants in this case study as pivotal in the socio-political change in Rwanda, especially in the education sector. Relatives of insurgents appreciated the fact that no reverse discrimination was apparent in terms of school access and equity for their children, and often reported suspicious movements to the authorities. However, one tragic incident marked symbolically a collective effort to create one nation of which education was an important building stone. In Nyanza, rebels entered a school and asked the children to divide up into two groups, Hutu and Tutsi. They refused to do so, saying they were “all Rwandans now”, so rebels shot and killed the whole class—in effect they became martyrs for the new Rwanda.

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Education Resilience Component 4: System level support

Relevant and meaningful strategic direction: Education policies explicit commitment to social cohesion

It has been noted that soon after the 1994 Genocide, extensive and intensive consultations on what should be the long-term vision of the country took place. These consultations and discussions had already been initiated within the Rwandese Patriotic Front during the liberation struggle before 1994. Post-genocide, these values of equity and inclusion guided from the beginning the education sector emergency response. Ministry of Education staff directly went throughout Rwanda persuading parents and children to go back to school regardless of their ethnic roots.

Following the efforts to get all children back into school, a major policy conference backing up the concept of access and equity took place in April 1995. This Conference on Policy and Planning of Education in Rwanda came up with some major explicit policy commitments. It stated that Rwanda would produce:

- Citizens free of ethnic, regional, national and religious prejudices
- Citizens committed to human rights and to their obligations to society

The role of the education sector was to contribute to national reconciliation by:

- creating a culture of peace, emphasizing positive non-violent national values, and promoting the universal values of justice, peace, tolerance, respect for others, solidarity and democracy
- eliminating negative discrimination and favoritism and promoting access to higher levels of education using criteria based solely on student competency.6

This declaration was to have a major influence on the future direction of the education system. Education became a major agent for promoting social cohesion, peace and the well-being of the entire society. Moreover, the education sector of Rwanda recognized that the equity and inclusion values had to be supported and sustained by explicit laws and policies. Legal levers were to provide guidance, order and sustainability to the collectively agreed education and social cohesion commitments. Examples of the major legal instruments with direct bearing on education passed by the Parliament include:

- National Constitution
- Organic Law organizing Education no. 20/2003
- Law organizing Nursery, Primary and Secondary Education no. 20/2003
- Law organizing Higher Education no. 20/2005
- Laws governing different institutions
- Law organizing TVET

6 Anne Obura, *Never Again – Educational reconstruction in Rwanda* (IIEP, 2003), 93.
Indeed within the above laws and education policy areas, key principles of an equitable and inclusive system for a new Rwanda were embedded. For example, the curriculum policy since 1994 has been to strengthen equity and human rights, and also to provide a reasonable balance of core subjects for basic education and secondary education. Curriculum reform was not an easy process and required extensive discussions and negotiation during the reconstruction and recovery period of 1994 to 1999. The education reconstruction effort was kicked off by a curriculum conference in 1995 that culminated in a subsequent series of workshops and seminars during the 1996/1997 period which worked out modalities for the formulation of a new all-inclusive Rwandan curriculum. Reaching consensus and compromise regarding the course of action to be taken and following set guidelines or operational procedures required considerable patience and communication skills, a commodity that was in very short supply at the time. The country had just emerged out of war and genocide and required unique solutions immediately, but the process of building a collective view of the adversity that almost destroyed the country and of its mitigation approaches could not be obviated.

Curriculum reform had a social component. This was because people’s different backgrounds rather than reason or logic seemed to dictate their contributions towards what the new education system should be like, what should be taught in the curriculum, and how it should be assessed. The reconstruction and transition phase was a time of controversies, contradictions and dilemmas. A clear example was language. References to “our system” or “their system” referred to the so-called Anglophone and Francophone backgrounds. Although most Rwandans use Kinyarwanda for their everyday communication except when in the company of non-Rwandans, French and English are used more in official and business transactions. Consequently, what was required was a Rwandan educational system, with a Rwandan curriculum and assessment system. Materials from the neighbouring countries in East Africa, Southern Africa, from Congo, Burundi and Rwanda itself were compiled and reviewed. These documents formed the core of resource materials out of which a hybrid Rwandan curriculum evolved. It took skilful leadership to accommodate varied and sometimes outright opposing positions and to arrive at a common understanding which evolved into the current educational system.

Following the 1996/7 curriculum reform effort, the Ministry of Education developed the Education Policy (1998) with the assistance of UNESCO - IIEP which affirmed that education should be aimed at recreating in young people the values that had been eroded in the course of the country’s recent past (after the 1994 genocide). The Education Sector Policy was revised in 2002, and stated that Universal Primary Education would be provided by 2010, and that basic education encompassing grades 1-9 would be provided for all by 2015. Also, teachers at all levels would be trained in sufficient numbers and quality, and different forms of motivation for teachers put in place. This would demand an improvement in the quality of management of teachers in service, so that they could remain in service and continue to develop professionally.

In addition, there were other human and social issues that had to be considered within the education sector. An important issue was addressed in the Girls’ Education policy. It tried to consolidate a generally gender-sensitive attitude in the country and provide policy options to ensure girls’ participation in education institutions, including higher education and in sciences, mathe-
matics and technological fields in which they have been poorly represented. The special needs education policy also sought to address vulnerable children (such as orphans from the genocide, HIV / AIDS and other calamities). These children range from those with physical disabilities to those with psychological or social problems. Now equity and inclusion principles are also present in the strong focus on questions of quality. Thus the literacy, nine year of basic education, and higher education policies are all developed with alternative strategies to competitively position the quality learning needs for all, including those in situations of risk and adversity.

Even in more recent reforms regarding several initiatives to promote science, equity and inclusion concerns are addressed. For example, in TVET, which was historically marginalized and referred to as second class education and training, the government of Rwanda has been striving to develop skilled people for economic transformation and learning from the experience of other countries such as the Asian tigers. In its ICT policy, Rwanda has clearly spelled out its intention to be the ICT hub in the region. Equity, inclusion and merit permeate where the Ministry of Education builds and equips secondary schools to become Science Centers of Excellence and also delivers its successful One Lap Top per Child program which has benefitted 100,000 children in primary school.

A last set of examples focus on efforts to create a merit-based education community. In the area of ICT, the Rwanda Education Commons project provides a portal for sharing knowledge, particularly to bring teachers together across the country. Additionally, merit-based developments introduced professionalism and objectivity into the assessment system. Previously assessment was conducted at regional/district levels, allowing for discriminatory practices to be introduced into the final results. Instead a meritocracy was introduced through the setting up of the National Exams Council in 1998 which allowed transition from one level to another based on merit and not quotas or grading set at school/district levels. This move also appeared to contribute to peace-building and reconciliation as it was realized that education access would not be based on ethnicity but on merit.

Finally, the systemic approach to reform taken by Rwanda extends outside of the education sector to other key issues of concern that are needed to ensure more effective protection of all Rwandan children. Thus school health including nutrition, hygiene and HIV and AIDS are important considerations for real learning to take place. The policy was developed to guide all concerned on how a child needs a healthy body for a healthy mind. Early childhood development (ECD) policy has been developed by Ministries of Education, Health and Gender. The policy identifies different roles to be played by different partners and challenges communities to be the first owners of ECD.

A important general point to note for all policies is that development of policies registers the intent of an education system, while actual implementation and results confirm the level or resilience in each system. There are several levers that contribute to implementation of the desired strategic direction and corresponding education policies. One is the high political will as mentioned above that is translated through leadership at all levels. The second is the consultation

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7 The equity problem of girls in primary and secondary education has been resolved: Girls constitute 52 percent and 49 percent of primary and secondary enrollments respectively. This is the fundamental way of ensuring women’s participation not in the elected positions only but also in providing competing capacities and abilities with men in technical, professional and economic investments positions, thus effectively raising their well-being and significantly contributing to national development.
and dialogue process by all actors—government, development partners, civil society, faith-based organizations, private sector and communities. In Rwanda this promoted not only participation but also involvement and common ownership of the policies and consequently better results. The third is the development of committed, capable and accountable institutions. Lastly is the transition and institutionalization of innovative programs, guaranteeing their sustainability. Figure 2 presents a sample of post-conflict education sector policies in Rwanda integrating both education and social cohesion issues.

Figure 2: Post-conflict integrated education and social policy reform areas
The creation of a new “Rwandan” system was also pursued through a policy of decentralization—one of the success stories in governance in Rwanda. The overall strategy for decentralization as it has now developed was conceived as early as 1987 as part of a Rwanda Patriotic Front manifesto. Historically, Rwanda experienced little decentralized governance in its colonial period, or under dictatorship and military rule that largely manipulated its citizenry. Certainly there was little democratic decentralization in its full sense.

After the 1994 Genocide, there was no legal structure in place, but communes and prefectures were persuaded to take charge of services such as education. There were several home grown examples of local management, on which the government of Rwanda and the education sector capitalized. These included IMIHIGO and INGANDO which are part of Rwandese tradition and contribute directly or indirectly to education development. Other traditional forms of local participation and representation included UBUBEHE-Communal support, UMUGANDA-Community service, UMWIHERERO-Government Retreat, and UMUSHYIKIRANO- National dialogue. Others are GACACA-Traditional courts and GIRINKA-a cascade program providing a cow to each family (see Glossary for more details).

As early as 1996/1997, parent-teacher committees began in some schools to help support the rehabilitation process. Land was a serious issue, but it was decided to ensure that every child had a school nearby. To reduce the high drop-out rate it was agreed to build one classroom per term, with support from government for iron sheets. In 1999 democratic elections were held at sector level, and a committee of 10 in each sector was charged with looking after Education and Health services. Later, similar democratic elections were held at district level in 2001, and finally a Decentralization Policy was developed in 2000 with 5 main objectives:

- Greater implementation powers
- Greater accountability
- Efficient and effective service delivery
- Creating a responsive and seamless administration
- Capacity building

At this stage fiscal decentralization was not a reality but the platform was being laid. From 2001 to 2005, there was a stronger focus on political decentralization to ensure a better impact between policy makers, the policies and the clients at the grass roots. This had to work within each sector – whether education, health or social services.

The system now works through the village, sector and district levels and overall decentralization in Rwanda has been a great success due to IMIHIGO- performance contracts. This is one of Rwanda’s home grown solutions where district mayors sign a performance contract with the President of the Republic, indicating district targets and indicators which all mayors have to report on every year to the President in public. This has greatly promoted accountability.

These locally relevant approaches have allowed the Ministry of Education to handle the policy and regulatory functions while leaving implementation in the hands of decentralized bodies.
from district to community level. Some of the major activities that have been decentralized include:

- School construction since 2005. Districts decide where a school should be built and supervise the construction. The Education budget for construction is also managed by districts. Construction has been more cost-effective and created a sense of ownership.
- Recruitment of teachers and payment of salaries since 2004. Districts recruit teachers, pay teachers’ salaries and deal with teacher management issues such as training, transfer and so on. This has assisted in better teacher management and motivation.
- School Capitation grant since 2006. The Capitation Grant which was established in 2004 was administered by the Ministry of Education for two years only and then was decentralized to school level. Funds are transferred directly from the Ministry of Finance to school bank accounts. This has assisted a great deal in school performance and development.

All such activities are done through institutionalized participation such as District Education Committees, District Joint Action Forum, Parents and Teachers Committees and School Management Committees. This has allowed the local population to make decisions on their schools and has moved development very fast, creating greater trust in government. The Ministry of Education has also institutionalized the interface between the districts and the center and also the chances for districts to share their experiences. This is accomplished through monthly meetings between district education managers and Ministry senior officials chaired by the Minister or Permanent Secretary, the annual Joint Education Sector Review (JESR) and Technical Working Groups (TWGS) which meet quarterly.

Certainly reforms in this area have been promising, however, evidence collected for this case study points to the need to focus more on implementation. A 2005 study on “Improving the provision and management of external support to education in Rwanda” remarked that the education sector still had quite centralized decision making and financial management; and that the current approach displayed some of the classic problems of central planning, with decisions at the centre being made with insufficient awareness of the needs and priorities of those in the front line of service delivery (Foster, et al. 2005). Even within the decentralized structure, educational decisions were taken by provincial governors rather than educational managers. In this regard, one of the main challenges to improve the resilience of education was to make sure that decentralized structures worked and communities were more fully involved in the education of their children. In addition, the issue of leadership and management became apparent in the Joint Review of the Education sector (2003), which highlighted the urgent need to clarify roles and responsibilities, and to ensure effective linkages. It stressed the need for capacity building at all levels, and for ensuring monitoring to verify impact of policies in schools. This implied that any meaningful education reform must necessarily have an impact at school and classroom level. Also, the Ministry of Education had realised that its structural reforms would be limited in their impact if there was lack of connection to learning, teacher learning and student teaching. Thus, the Ministry of Education needed to move away from a compliance model of reform towards an approach which reflected the needs, expectations and aspirations of schools and communities, and which was supported by forms of leadership and management connected to learning.
Following the genocide, one of the immediate priorities for the incoming government was to get children back into school and off the streets, and to make sure parents and communities understood that all children would be accepted back into school regardless of ethnicity or regional origin. However, to implement these aims required human, material and financial resources. There was a need to recruit teachers whether untrained or not, with at least some minimum level of education up to Primary 6 to fill the gaps left by those killed or who had fled as refugees. Thus schools were re-opened in September 1994 despite their shattered state. To overcome the shortage of teachers, the Ministry called for secondary school leavers or even drop-outs to fill posts. Major efforts were also made to coordinate and ensure teacher compensation. Officers travelled to and from Kigali in bush taxis carrying millions of Rwandese francs to pay teachers, some managed to use helicopters for more remote areas, and teachers were paid monthly. UNICEF played a useful role at this early stage through a one-off support of US$800,000 for teacher salaries — an emergency measure to kick-start the process. Finally, teacher education was another major need. In the very early days of the emergency response a number of “crash” training courses were implemented, financed by partners such as UNICEF and World Bank, which enabled 23,000 teachers to be trained over 2 days. Later, the new government focused on the development of a proper teacher training structure to increase the number of qualified teachers by expanding the intake at the 12 teacher training colleges (TTCs). Then with the development of Kigali Institute of Education in 1998 even before the law was put in place, a center for training secondary teachers was developed for the first time, and later the training of primary teacher educators took place for the 12 teacher training colleges.

However, this is not withstanding several significant challenges more prominently related to coordination and financing. There were problems of coordination in the early stages of response, strong suspicions of NGOs and resentment of perceived high overheads, lack of transparency and accountability. Indeed, even in the larger agencies there were sometimes strong differences over needs, priorities and allocation of resources. One example was that a donor’s interest in developing a pre-defined peace education component in the curriculum was not generally favored by the government at the response and recovery stage, and there was also some irritation with the term “emergency” after the first few years of support to Rwanda. Additionally, it was felt by the Rwandan government that donors focused largely on primary education, and showed little interest in supporting secondary and tertiary education, including TVET.

Nevertheless, there were also plenty of examples of the government and partners agreeing on technical and financial support to key priorities both in the response and recovery stages and later in the consolidation/transformation phases. During the emergency, for example, UN agencies and NGOs provided a box of supplies called the “Teacher Emergency Package” which, despite its title causing problems later on, constituted a major morale boost to children and teachers alike. Portable blackboards were added later. UNHCR and others also supported reconstruction of classrooms, libraries and laboratories with built-in blackboards. Gradually more longer term, predictable funding came in, albeit mostly on a number of separate projects and
programs, with separate agreements. However, the real opportunity for improved government and donor coordination came with the development of stronger, more coherent strategies and policies from 2003 onwards that provided common guidance—some of which were discussed previously in this report (see figure 2, above).

Finally, in terms of education resources for service delivery, a World Bank (2004) study further observed how the system had expanded in ways that had moved it toward a good balance between the public and private sectors. At the base of the education pyramid, there had been a consistently strong effort by the government to extend the coverage of the public sector. As a result, the share of enrollments in private schools had remained modest at less than 1 percent. At the secondary level, enrollments grew as fast in the public as in the private sector in the post-genocide years. The share of students attending private schools had remained steady at about 40 percent, lower than the 62 percent in the 1980s, but still much higher than the 20 percent on average in low-income Sub-Saharan Africa. The diversity of post-secondary institutions and the mix of public-private sector providers became the strength of the system, endowing it with the flexibility to meet the growing demand for places at this level of study. Table 3 presents a current picture of the impact of the Rwandese education reforms in a more inclusive access, multiple sources of resources and a dual education and social cohesion approach.

**Table 3: Current features of the Rwandese Education System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increased Access with Relevant Support for Vulnerable Groups</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Rapid growth in enrollment rates across primary, secondary and tertiary (surpassing predictions based on pre-genocide enrollment growth rates) and 70 percent of children complete a whole course of primary education*</td>
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<td>• Institutionalized (and prioritized) support for vulnerable groups (e.g. Genocide Fund for orphans and the Girls’ Education policy for females)</td>
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<th>Various Sources of Support and Resources</th>
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<td>• Central support for community participation in education: policy and regulation are decided from a strong central core while communities, supported by strong and locally relevant institutions, and information sharing across education actors, implement associated activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Diversification of public-private school system allowing for greater flexibility to meet growing demand</td>
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<tr>
<th>Dual Education and Social Cohesion Efforts</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Meritocratic and transparent student selection and assessment processes in place</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Prioritized role of education within the national agenda and goals of social cohesion (indicative of this, public expenditure on education has risen and currently stands at 18.2 percent)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Clear linkages between education laws, policies, institutions, programs and activities often supported by locally inspired approaches</td>
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*2010 statistics from UNESCO UIS (statistics in brief)
In the intervening period between 2000 and 2005, the Ministry of Education realized that to establish a sustainable education system, it needed to develop a legal framework in the form of policies that would guide and drive implementation of various subsector activities. It quickly sought assistance from its development partners, notably the Department for International Development (DFID) of the British government which was very supportive in policy development. The World Bank and African Development Bank also played their part in the strengthening of structures, mechanisms, institutions and human resource development. Armed with this support, the Ministry of Education was able to commission and conduct a series of studies on the education sector which formed a basis for implementation of programs and activities. Perhaps even more importantly, the studies informed the Ministry of Education’s drive for resource mobilization as Rwanda was able to show very clearly that its policies were evidence-based and therefore if development partners were to commit funds, they would be put to proven good use.

A clear signal of the transition from emergency to on-going development was the leadership of the Ministry of Education. It insisted that both the studies and the policies should address the concerns of the VISION 2020 and the Poverty Reduction Strategic Program (PRSP) as the pillars of Rwandan reconstruction and development effort. The Vision 2020 objective has been defined as “...to create a knowledge based and technology led economy...” but it continued to emphasize a focus on inclusion. The Vision 2020 prioritized:

- The rebuilding of the nation based on key values such as unity, respect for human rights, patriotism and hard work
- The construction of a knowledge-based and technology-led economy
- The achievement of Universal Primary Education by 2010 and Basic Education for All by 2015, addressing the causes of higher drop-out rates among girls than boys
- Imparting key skills for development
- Health education, environmental education and gender studies
- The teaching of science and technology, promoting girls’ education in particular
- The establishment of career guidance and counseling
- Ensuring that education and training are a continuous catalyst in responding to national challenges

Equally the PRSP and EDPRS (Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy) place human capital very high in their strategic direction for poverty reduction and economic growth. The National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2002) stated that the government would continue to support teacher training, and that the curriculum would be evaluated in an effort to reduce the dropout and repetition rates, so that universal primary education could be achieved by 2010, leading to education for all by 2015. In addition, it affirmed that sufficient amounts of textbooks would be provided; that science and technology education would be developed; and that the education of girls would be emphasized and attainment properly monitored. The first
Joint Review on Education Sector (2002) had noted some challenges which included a limited capacity of the teacher education system to meet the demands of the expanded system; the heavy teaching load in primary schools caused by the double shift system; a shortage of qualified language teachers; and too many teaching subjects taught in basic education. In effect, this constituted a major leadership challenge in the curriculum reform process.

To mark an important transition to on-going development, donors have supported policy level data and discussions but under the leadership of the Ministry of Education and other local institutions. For example, the Education Sector Policy (ESP) 2003 is the major policy instrument guiding the education sector in Rwanda. This document has been developed in line with other national policies, notably Vision 2020 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP) 2000-2005, and was guided by international and regional commitments such as MDGs and African Union’s Decade for Education 1996-2005 Plan of Action. The ESP was informed by different studies such as the Study on Rwanda Education Diagnosis (1997) by UNESCO and Country Status Report (2002) by the World Bank. This key policy document has guided development of major strategy documents—The Long Term Strategy and Financial Framework (LTSFF) 2006-2015, the five year Education Sector Strategic plan (ESSP) 2004-2008 which focused on access to basic education and the ESSP 2009-2013 which focused on quality and post basic education. The LTSFF and the ESSP were based on WB Simulation Modeling. Again, the philosophy behind the policy as seen in its objectives is to create a citizen dedicated to national unity, human rights, patriotism and commitment to work well done as indicated in its objectives.

Finally, the concept of a Sector Wide Approach was developed around the first Sector Strategic Plan, and gradually activities and initiatives such as joint donor/government sector meetings, joint annual reviews, pooled financing mechanisms and joint evaluations were incorporated into the sector. In many ways, the Education sector in Rwanda led the way on better government and donor coordination, and from 2006 this was strengthened by Rwanda’s successful efforts to obtain assistance from the Education for All Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund. In the end Rwanda succeeded in obtaining $70 million from its first application from 2007 to 2009, and a further $35 million bridging fund from 2010/11. This success was very much the product of the enhanced donor/government coordination mechanisms previously mentioned.

It is clear that “the important issue is not only having strong people but also strong institutions” is a mantra that Rwanda recognizes well: it has established and used institutions as one of the major vehicles for national transformation. Evidence collected for the case study points to the fact that innovations and initiatives developed since 1994 have largely been not simply institutionalized but in fact consolidated within the education system institutions, and their complementary and reinforcing nature has been capitalized on. As the Ministry of Education planned and implemented new ideas, it had to at the same time revisit and consolidate the still young innovations in access, equity, learning achievement and management of the education system. The development of education has always been more of a spiral than linear model and certain levers have been used to increase efficiency in implementing set strategies. This is generally true of most post-conflict, post-crisis contexts. Examples of the institutionalization of major education and other sector policies since 1994 are provided in table 4 below.
### Table 4: Institutionalization of the reform process

**National level institutions**
The Auditor General’s Office (AGO); National Tender Board (NTB); Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA); Prosecutor General Office (PGO) and Ombudsman Office have ensured proper collection and use of government resources, transparency, rule of law and zero tolerance to corruption and the previous culture of impunity.

**Education specific institutions**
Various institutions have been established by act of Parliament to deal with the implementation of the key education issues of access, equity, quality and management:

- **Rwanda National Examination Council (RNEC) 1997** was created to champion quality education and also to ensure meritocracy and transparency in education assessment.
- **Student Financing Agency for Rwanda (SFAR) 2006** was established to contribute to improving equity and transparency in higher education by offering higher education scholarships locally and abroad on merit and for priority fields in the country.
- **Higher Education Council (HEC) 2006** was established more recently to ensure quality in higher education through setting up Qualification Frameworks and Accreditation of Higher Learning Institutions.
- **National Curriculum Development Centre 2007** is charged with assuring quality education, developing and reviewing curriculum and where necessary changing the pre-genocide curriculum (before the 1994 Genocide, curriculum issues were dealt with by Bureau Pedagogique, a department in the Ministry of Education).
- **National Unity Reconciliation Commission (NURC)** though not under education per se is another institution that works closely with education to foster peace and reconciliation education through solidarity training centers locally known as “INGANDO”.
- **Inspector General of Education (IGE) 2007** addresses the administration of schools along with inspection to ensure quality teaching. Before the 1994 Genocide, issues of inspection of education were dealt with by Inspecteur des Arrondissements—education officers who were responsible for both administration of education in arrondissements (provinces) and inspection of schools. It is now decentralized to province level to ensure inspectors can reach schools easily.
- **Teachers Service Commission (TSC) 2009** promotes professionalism.
- **Umwalimu SACCO (2008)** promotes teachers’ well-being, commitment and motivation.
- **Workforce Development Authority (WDA) 2009** was established to increase access and to coordinate different TVET providers and link them with the labor market.
- **Rwanda Education Board (REB) 2010** is intended to maximize synergies and efficiency.
Policy options/recommendations

No one post-conflict context is the same and each requires home-grown solutions. However, Rwanda’s case provides good examples of why it is important to understand the sources of fragility, conflict and violence, as well as the potential contributions of education systems (along other sectors) to mitigate and prevent repeated crisis. The World Bank Development Report 2011 has clearly presented the evidence that without deep reforms, violence, conflict and fragility become a vicious cycle that repeats itself.

In Rwanda, an understanding of how institutional and cultural exclusion and discrimination culminated in the most tragic event in its history, the genocide, propelled the education sector to explicitly address equity, inclusion and human rights within its education policies, programs and support resources. Adversity and its sources are different in each context, however the lessons for education sectors elsewhere is the need to understand them and address them…explicitly.

Explicit education policies with a dual aim of education and social cohesion guided important reforms and innovations in Rwanda. These approaches introduced in the relatively chaotic emergency response period were not discarded but gradually institutionalized (in some cases many years later) into a more efficient, equitable and professional decentralized system, sensitive to the need to promote inclusion (across ethnic, geographic and gender lines). A number of similar countries may take heart that education can recover successfully from conflict and be used to generate national cohesion and unity to protect against division, prejudice, hatred and future strife. Rwanda presents some fascinating examples of how important early innovations and core principles have been consolidated through laws, policies and institutions to ensure they are fully embedded in the system.

Institutions are also needed. One cannot pretend that deep-seated suspicion and distrust may not prevail amongst parents and the older generation in some cases, and teachers themselves may still harbor prejudices. But often it is the children themselves that have helped to change their parents’, teachers’ and communities’ attitudes. Rwanda has developed strong professional institutions, in particular the National Examinations Council, the National Curriculum Development Centre and the Inspectorate General to ensure consistency, quality and good governance in the system. It has attracted and managed considerable domestic and external financing and is increasingly producing better results in terms of learning outcomes. In more recent years, as political stability was reinforced in Rwanda, the impact on human and social resilience has become more marked, with greater focus on local ownership and participation in the development and management of schools, and the establishment of laws, policies and institutions to consolidate the reforms and innovations introduced.

Overall, the progress made since 1994 is extremely visible and the Rwandans are justly proud of their achievements. Rwanda has managed the transition remarkably well from emergency response and recovery to increased protection and prevention to further shocks in the system, and indeed to transformation of the education sector. In general a system has been built that provides equitable access to basic education, and increased opportunities for secondary and higher education. It has helped to bring children of all communities together to play, learn,
achieve and forget their differences.

Certainly there are caveats to this success—gaps and areas for focus in the near future. For example, while an impressive number of policies have been developed and endorsed by Parliament, not all have been fully implemented equally successfully. The curriculum has yet to fully embrace a civic education that encompasses and manages reconciliation. The UK-based Aegis Trust, working closely with the Gisozi Memorial Centre, has developed some extremely effective tools and materials and pupils/teachers in Kigali are making good use of them. There are also plans to take them out to rural areas. However, they have not been formally adopted within the education curriculum and system as a whole. The very difficult issue of trauma and counseling has been addressed by a number of NGOs working with the Ministry, but not through a country-wide counseling structure for supporting children and families who struggle with their memories of the past. In truth it would be quite hard to develop such a system in terms of cost and sustainability. Finally there remain considerable challenges in producing a literate, numerate body of students ready for further education or the workplace; but this challenge is certainly not unique to Rwanda.

The key lessons learnt regarding institutional resilience are presented below.
Table 5: Rwandan Education System Resilience Lessons Learned

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Education emergency response</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Getting children back to school immediately, putting them together, recruiting teachers and returning to classroom normalcy helps create stability, improve morale and heal wounds.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• A rapid understanding of the main sources of adversity—especially of violent conflict and social tension—can help provide more meaningful education services and help build eroded social and institutional trust.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Addressing immediate reconstruction in a holistic way: In Rwanda building back better required addressing physical and material needs for schools as well as softer components of the system such as teacher training and psycho-social support.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Education system reforms and transition to on-going development</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Developing the laws, policies and institutions to back up and consolidate a dual vision of education and social cohesion are crucial in contexts affected by human-made crisis such as violent conflict.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Committed leadership at all political, professional and social levels makes a difference to promote participation, manage the needed tensions for collective visioning, and to support implementation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ensuring transparency and accountability around a comprehensive reform agenda promotes ownership and supports policy implementation in contexts that were characterized by corruption, clientelism and despotism. International donors do best when they account for a clear criteria and process of institutionalization and local education system leadership—which should be in place before such a transition is to take place.</td>
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<th>School level programs and services</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Promoting access and quality in traditionally exclusionary contexts requires focusing on promoting equity and inclusion—for example Rwanda’s inclusive programs on girls’ education, special education, support for orphans, HIV related issues, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Existing locally relevant service delivery approaches that have been proven to work can be more effective—and more widely accepted—than importing external approaches.</td>
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<th>Community participation and local relevance</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Mobilizing the community is crucial to create ownership and build support for reforms. School management, teachers and the community who participate in construction, rehabilitation and psycho-social support of children enhances this stability establishing a clear vision on values, rights, non-discrimination, equity and national unity alongside education reforms and is important in the early reconstruction phase.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Strong co-ordination and partnership between all stakeholders (schools, communities, civil society, religious institutions, development partners and government) is essential as is maintaining a focus on what happens and what matters in the classroom.</td>
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References and links


RESILIENCE POLICY GOALS

1. Manage and Minimize Adversity in Education
   • Identification of adversities faced by students
   • Identification of current responses to risks in schools

2. Use and Protect Positive Engagement and Assets in Education Communities
   • Resilience through control, competence and being accountable
   • Resilience through socioemotional well-being, engagement with others and identity formation

3. Foster Relevant School & Community Support
   • Relevant approaches to access and permanence
   • Relevant approaches to learning and teaching
   • Relevant approaches to school management, school climate and community relations

4. Align Education System Services to the Resilience Assets
   • Meaningful and relevant strategic direction for education in contexts of adversity
   • Innovative education programs for learning, socioemotional well-being and protection
   • Available and equitable human, material and financial resources